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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter, we introduce the thesis by clarifying key definitions, identifying 
the research objective, and presenting our research model. In addition, we moti 
vate the structure of the dissertation.  
 
Markets evolve over time, and companies, in turn, adapt their strategies and 
activities to changing market circumstances. Continuous renewal and innova 
tion,  therefore,  are  needed  for  corporate  survival   Chesbrough,  2003;  Haour, 
2004 .  In  order  to  preserve  the  core  business  and  develop  new  business 
simultaneously, a capacity for reinventing new business proactively is essential 
 Collins, 2001; Kim and Mauborgne, 2005; Chesbrough, 2006; Markides, 2008 . 
Making innovation a priority however, is not enough, as most innovations fail 
 Chesbrough, 2003 ; the most difficult aspect of innovation is its implementa 
tion  Skarzynski and Gibson, 2008 .  
Markets  internationalize  because  customers  and  competitors  increas 
ingly act on an international scale  Ohmae, 1990 . This has caused competition 
to intensify in many sectors; it has caused product life cycles to reduce drasti 
cally, roles of consumers to shift, and the integration of different technologies to 
accelerate  OECD, 2008 . These trends have lead to increased technological, 
managerial  and  organizational  complexity,  and  made  innovation  riskier,  and 
more  costly   OECD,  2008 .  Companies  have  been  forced  to  cooperate  with 
external partners in order to reduce innovation costs and development time, 
thus reducing the risks associated with innovation.  
Collaboration in developing new products and introducing them to the 
market,  known  as  open  and  collaborative  innovation,  has  distinct  advantages 
 Rigby and Zook, 2002 , and is therefore not just another source of competitive 
advantage, but a competitive necessity  Kirschbaum, 2007 . Open innovation is all 
about “bridging internal and external resources” throughout the innovation process 
in order to make innovation happen  Lindegaard, 2010:19 . According to Huston 
and Sakkab  2006 , open innovation will become the dominant innovation model of 
the twenty first century. 
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1.1   DEFINITIONS 
 
Our research focuses on co innovation alliances. This type of alliance is consid 
ered to be “an important instrument in future innovation because it is considered as the 
most efficient and effective means of innovation collaboration, and therefore increasingly 
popular in technology intensive industries”  Lord et al., 2005: 134 . Co development 
alliances are increasingly important in open innovation models, because of their 
advantages due to the clear objectives and non competing but complementary 
partnership character  Duysters and De Man, 2003; Chiamonte, 2006; Ches 
brough and Schwartz, 2007 . We define the open and collaborative innovation 
concept in box 1.1 and a co innovation alliance in box 1.2. 
 
Box 1.1: Definition of open innovation 
 “The use of purposive inflows and outflows of knowledge to accelerate internal 
 innovations, and expand the markets for external use of innovation, respectively.  
Open innovation is a paradigm that assumes that firms can and should use external as 
well as internal ideas, and internal and external paths to market,  
as they look to advance their technology”  
Source: Chesbrough et al. (2006: vii). 
 
 
Box 1.2: Definition of a co-innovation alliance 
 “a business relationship, in which two or more independent firms or research institutes 
work cooperatively on a specific project, which is aimed at the development and commer-
cialization of new products or services that is clearly defined in terms of activity, geographic 
location, product, process and time.  
Although partners remain to a certain extent independent,  
they also share rewards and risks” 




1.2   RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND MODEL  
 
A great deal of research has been carried out on ex ante strategy processes, and 
much less on the ex post implementation of strategies  Boone et al., 1996 . For 
success, careful strategy formulation is necessary, but this is not enough: surveys   Chapter 1    
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of management consultants have shown that even if strategies are effectively 
formulated, approximately eighty percent of the strategies will be poorly exe 
cuted. Consequently, these strategies will fail  Bible et al., 2006 .  
Cooperating with third parties in open innovation projects entails added 
complexities and risks. Even when potential synergies with partners are present, 
firms face substantial difficulties attaining them. In many cases, implementation 
of open innovation will evolve even more problematically than the usual in house 
innovation. This challenge poses an important question, which is reflected in our 
research. Our aim is to contribute to improving implementation practices of 
these promising but risky co innovation alliances by diagnosing the main critical 
success factors and processes. We summarize these in a comprehensive model, 
which  we  abbreviate  with  the  letters  COINN.  This  acronym  stands  for 
improving the performance of CO INNovation. 
We provide a balance between many different aspects of co innovation 
alliances, including multiple dimensions of performance. We study the interplay 
between technological innovation and organizational innovation simultaneously 
because many of the performance drivers are interconnected and influence one 
another  Parkhe, 1993b; Makhija and Ganesh, 1997; Chiesa et al., 2009 . In addi 
tion, implementation of multi faceted strategies is more likely to lead to effec 
tiveness  than  the  implementation  of  monolithic  strategies   Cameron,  1986 ; 
multiple determinants of competence transfer should be explained by several 
interdependent  viewpoints   Chesbrough,  2003;  Hansen  and  Løvas,  2004; 
Christensen et al., 2005 .  
We  have  therefore  opted  for  a  multi dimensional  and  integrative 
research approach, in which structural aspects  organizational  and interpersonal 
aspects   relational      such  as  trust,  commitment,  decision  making  or  conflict 
resolution, and inter organizational communication   will be evaluated in the co  
innovation context  Cravens et al., 2000; Parkhe, 1993b; Bremser and Barsky, 
2004;  Davila  et  al.,  2006;  Kaplan  and  Norton,  2006;  Chiesa  et  al.,  2009 . 
Interpersonal relationships are important because without strong relationship 
building, potential synergies from the alliance are likely to remain unutilized, 
causing  the  alliance  to  underperform.  We  include  in  our  analysis  the 
development of relational dynamics, competence development, and the devel 
opment of organizational learning capacities of alliance partners  Parkhe 1993a; 
Gomes Casseres, 1996; Kumar and Nti, 1998; Larsson et al., 1998; Madhok and 
Tallman, 1998; AWT, 2006a; and Chesbrough et al., 2006 . Such an analysis 
becomes easily complicated easy when many variables interact with one another. 
Our scientific objective is stated in box 1.3.       INTRODUCTION 
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Box 1.3: Research objective 
The main objective is to develop, test and explore a theoretical and evidence-based model, 
which can serve as basis for constructing a management tool  
in order to diagnose and improve the performance of co-innovation alliances. 
 
In order to develop and validate both model and tool, we pose the questions 
listed in box 1.4. 
 
Box 1.4: Research questions 
1.  Which factors and processes can be derived from the literature in order to diagnose 
and manage co-innovation alliances? 
2.  How do they differ in case of different objectives (commercial, technological, 
financial)? 
3.  Which changes in these factors and processes result in higher performance?  
4.  How do these factors and processes relate to one another?  
 
Our research is based on relevant literature, as well as on co innovation prac 
tices. Our conceptual model is illustrated in Figure 1.1. 
 
Figure 1.1: COINN research model 
 
We study the relationships of organizational and relational drivers with co-innovation performance from 
four theoretical perspectives and evaluate the influences of market, strategy and alliance characteristics.    Chapter 1    
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1.3   STRUCTURE  
 
In Chapter 2, we indicate the relevance of our research by summarizing 
trends and their implications for innovation management. We position co inno 
vation alliances in the context of several types of alliances and various categories 
of innovation.  
In Chapter 3, we discuss the contributions of relevant theories concern 
ing performance of co innovation alliances. We limit our research to contin 
gency theory, network theory, organizational learning theory and the resource 
based view. We have not chosen a single perspective from one theory, because 
key  concepts  from  each  of  the  chosen  theories  are  complementary  to  one 
another  Mjoen and Tallman, 1997 . 
In Chapter 4, we develop our conceptual framework relating to three 
dependent variables   i.e., commercial, technological and financial performance. 
In order to provide an insight into the underlying factors driving performance, 
organizational and relationship drivers are introduced. General characteristics of 
the alliance partners, the market environment of the co innovation project and 
the strategic drivers are added as control variables. Facilitating and blocking fac 
tors and processes are stipulated, with each section ending with one or more 
hypotheses. We use the results of studies about the performance of joint ven 
tures,  strategic  alliances  and  inter firm  networks  as  means  of  developing  our 
model.  
In  Chapter  5,  we  motivate  the  chosen  research  design.  Our  research 
objectives imply several methodological challenges and choices, due to the fact 
that information on the perceptions of managers have had to be gathered. Fur 
thermore, we have to deal with a multi industry scope, a multi level character, 
and  a  mixed  hierarchical   multi level   and  non hierarchical   cross classified  
structure. For parametric tests, independency of observations is required. Our 
observations are to a certain extent correlated or nested, which has an influence 
on  the  appropriate  statistical  treatment.  We  also  discuss  the  methodological 
choices and their implications in our research model and design, including our 
research activities. Furthermore, we will discuss our data collection process, as 
well as the companies, projects, partnerships and respondents that participated 
in our research. Before analyzing our data, we screen our dataset for missing val 
ues, outliers, sample size, and normality. Subsequently, we construct our scales, 
using principal component analysis techniques. 
 In Chapter 6, we present the empirical results from multivariate data 
analyses. In several regression models, we include different parts of our model.       INTRODUCTION 
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We test the main linear and curvilinear effects of our model and conclude by 
discussing conditions that explain performance of co innovation alliances. 
In Chapter 7, we summarize the research, discuss the issue of improving 
the  performance  of  co innovation  alliances,  elaborate  on  the  managerial 
implications  and  limitations  of  the  research,  and  suggest  avenues  for  further 
research.  
 
The structure of the dissertation is illustrated in Figure 1.2. 
 




In boxes, we summarize or quote the highlights of the text. In figures, we illus 
trate theories and concepts. In tables, we juxtapose concepts or quantify calcula 
tions.  
   Chapter 2  7 
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2.  RELEVANCY AND POSITIONING 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter, we discuss the relevancy of our research and its position in the 
literature regarding alliances and innovation. Several trends generate increasing 
dynamism and complexity that affect the innovation strategies of companies. 
These trends imply that the implementation of innovation is an increasingly 
complex process, which results in a growing need for cooperation with external 
partner s  in co innovation alliances. New competences are necessary in order 
to implement the alliances successfully.  
We discuss the different categories and definitions of innovation. We 
explore the advantages, disadvantages and applicability of the different types of 
innovation, and highlight in what respect the open innovation paradigm is new. 
One of the distinctions is between in house  closed  innovation and innovation 
with external partners  distributed innovation . We will position the subject of 
our research, namely the co innovation alliance. We conclude by summarizing 




2.2  TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS  
 
Customers and competitors act increasingly on a global scale, resulting in new 
and intensified competition. Furthermore, the development of new technology 
becomes increasingly more expensive and complex while technology life cycles 
shorten and products become more knowledge  intensive.  
In many cases, it can be observed that companies that initially acted 
locally,  gradually  expand  their  scope  and  develop  from  regional  players  into 
national and even global protagonists. This results in new, intensified, and more 
dynamic competition  Bartlett and Ghoshal, 2000; Gassman, 2006 . New Asian 
or Eastern European companies capture increasing market shares  Mahbubani, 
2008 .  Competitors  have  to  collaborate  to  establish  industrial  standards  in 
order to build up enough market power to enforce it  Vanhaverbeke and Noor 
derhaven,  2001 .  For  multinationals,  it  is  increasingly  difficult  to  maintain  a 
competitive advantage on the basis of traditional economies of scale and scope 
alone. They have to “partner or perish”. Competition between alliance blocks is 
replacing competition between individual firms  Prahalad, 1998; Vanhaverbeke, 
and Noorderhaven, 2001 . In new markets, new standards have to be estab RELEVANCY and POSITIONING  8 
lished.  In  the  1990s,  forming  alliances  was  already  seen  as  one  of  the  most 
powerful  trends  in  business.  At  that  time,  eighty two  percent  of  executives 
expected that alliances would be one of the prime drivers of future growth in 
their  organizations   Kalmbach  and  Roussel,  1999 .  The  number  of  alliances 
aimed at technological learning and knowledge creation has grown rapidly since 
the mid eighties  Gilsing et al., 2007 . By forming alliances, the speed of tech 
nological development can be increased. Research and development costs can 
be  shared  in  order  to  meet  the  rising  cost  of  technological  innovation. 
Furthermore,  within  alliances,  companies  can  manufacture  goods  for  global 
markets, develop new products jointly, or seek access to foreign markets and 
technologies  Mowery et al., 1998 .  
However, in addition to competition between alliance blocks, competi 
tion  within  alliances  may  also  arise     e.g.,  in  the  case  of  cooperation  with 
 potential  competitors. This balance between intra alliance competition and 
collaboration is delicate and needs to be managed constantly  Brandenburger 
and  Nalebuff,  1996 .  Firms  must  therefore  position  themselves  strategically 
among as well as within alliances  Bamford et al., 2003 . New forms of combined 
competition  and  collaboration  involve  new  potential  risks  for  co innovation 
alliances     e.g.,  due  to  leakage  of  proprietary  technology,  improper  strategic 
intentions of co opetition partners, and complex decision making within the 
alliance   Doz  and  Prahalad,  1984;  Hamel,  Doz  and  Prahalad,  1989;  OECD, 
2008 .  
A second trend is that the development of new technology becomes 
increasingly expensive and complex. Increasingly, a combination of different 
technologies that also have to be integrated is necessary  Chesbrough, 2006; 
Gassman,  2006;  OECD,  2008,  Schoenmakers  and  Duijsters,  2010 .  This 
phenomenon is known as ‘technology fusion’  Gassman, 2006 . Examples are 
mechatronics, optronics, bioinformatics or domotica. This implies more com 
plexity of business processes and industrial borders that are shifting or even dis 
appearing,  resulting  in  more  interdisciplinary  cross border  research,  and  an 
increasing dependency on networks. In order to meet the increasing volatility 
in the markets, factories tend to become less dedicated to a single business line. 
Manufacturers  become  more  flexible  if  they  serve  multiple,  related  business 
units in a larger market area: globalization of industries has been associated 
with  growing  interdependence  across  national  markets   Doz  and  Prahalad, 
1984;  Prahalad,  1998 .  As  a  result  of  this,  the  interdependency  between 
companies is increasing.  
Gaining competitive advantage from cooperation is not new. The dif 
ference however,  lies in the increased dynamism: positions are shifting more   Chapter 2  9 
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rapidly and firms, and their alliances, face greater uncertainty. Existing tech 
nologies become obsolete more rapidly, requiring the necessity to develop new 
ones in time  Gilsing et al., 2007 . Increased dynamism results in eroding exist 
ing  competitive  positions  of  incumbents,  in  shorter  product  life  cycles,  and 
consequently, a shorter payback period for new products  Andrew and Sirkin, 
2006; Gassman, 2006 . Life cycles of products and technologies become shorter 
due to fast price erosion of products, resulting in a growing need for speed in inno 
vation  AWT, 2006 . In order to compete globally, during a smaller window of 
opportunity  Moore, 2001 , companies need to act faster and more effectively 
 Christensen and Raynor, 2003 . As an example of fast price erosion, we show 
the  development  of  the  sales  prices  of  video  recorders  and  DVD players  in 
Figure 2.1. Because of technological trends, the need for interdisciplinary cross 
border and cross sector research is becoming more eminent, which transcend 
the innovative capabilities of single companies. Companies increasingly have to 
ally with partners with complementary expertise in order to obtain access to 
different technologies and knowledge quickly  Gassman, 2006; OECD, 2008 , 
as illustrated in Box 2.1.  
 
Figure 2.1: Price erosion of video recorders and DVD-players 
 
Source: Hoekstra, Philips (2004) as cited in AWT (2006). 
 
Box: 2.1: Too many opportunities  
 “No company is smart enough 
 to know what to do with every new opportunity it finds, 
  and no company has enough resources   
 to pursue all the opportunities it might put into practice” 
Source: Wolpert (2002: 80). 
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A  third  trend  implies  that  the  knowledge  intensity  of  products  is 
increasing. Consequently, individual social relationships are essential, known as 
“soft technology”, as in more personalized product design, computer software, 
consulting services, and entertainment aspects  Jin, 2005 . The importance of 
soft technology is rising   contrary to hard technology, such as machinery and 
factories: for instance, in the processes of technology transfer and commerciali 
zation of technology. Furthermore, soft and hard technologies tend to be fur 
ther  integrated,  and  soft  technology  is  transforming  hard  technology.  Soft 
technology is less standardized and requires special talents  Jin, 2005 . In cer 
tain cases, the role of the consumer shifts from customer to ‘prosumer’ by co 
creating goods and services, rather than just consuming the end product  Tap 
scott  and  Williams,  2006 .
1  In  these  cases,  innovators  rely  heavily  on  their 
interaction with lead users, in order to develop new and customized products 
and services  Von Hippel, 2001, 2005, 2007 . After this development with a few 
visionary early adopter consumers, new products must be introduced to more 
pragmatic mainstream market segments. This ‘crossing the chasm’ is crucial for 
successful market introduction  Moore, 2001 . For knowledge intensive prod 
ucts however, ‘crossing the chasm’ involves specialized knowledge and access to 
markets and distribution channels. 
 
Jointly,  these  trends  imply  an  increased  organizational  and  managerial  com 
plexity  Doz and Prahalad, 1984 . In general, in order to reduce this, coopera 
tion with external parties becomes a necessity. More specifically, in new busi 
ness development, companies increasingly need to rely on external partners, a 
phenomenon  described  by  Chesbrough   2003a,b   as  open  innovation.  For  the 
implementation of open innovation strategies successfully, new competences 
are required, which will be discussed below.  
The first implication, more organizational and managerial complexity, 
can be observed in the large number of participants and factors that influence 
decision making.  Multinational  industrial  customers  and  global  competitors 
require globally integrated manufacturing. Global strategies are implemented 
and integrated through globally distributed but interdependent resources and 
activities. At the same time, industrial structures, distribution channels with 
specific customer needs, vary according to local markets, implying a need for 
local responsiveness. The paradox of acting globally and locally simultaneously 
demands an organization in which conflicting priorities between responsiveness 
                                                
1 This is also known as “swarm creativity”, in which collaborative innovation networks 
are used to create competitive advantage  Gloor, 2006  or “Wikinomics”, in analogy 
with  Wikipedia,  the  collaboratively  created  encyclopedia   Tapscott  and  Williams, 
2006 .   Chapter 2  11 
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at the local level and global strategies at the central level have to be addressed. 
In  so called  multifocal   Prahalad  and  Doz,  1987   or  transnational  companies 
 Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989 , an appropriate balance between global integration 
and local responsiveness is managed. Part of this management process is sens 
ing, mobilizing and optimizing: identifying new technologies globally  sensing , 
gaining access to them, putting them into practice by integrating internal and 
external capabilities  mobilizing , ultimately, optimizing the operations for effi 
ciency and flexibility worldwide. This is known as a meta national structure 
 Doz et al., 2001 . Once such a structure has been established, it has to be main 
tained,  which  involves  aspects  such  as  building  and  retaining  a  capacity  for 
flexible and quick response in order to handle potential technological disconti 
nuities  Ghoshal and Gratton, 2002 . Firms compete by using the flexibility, 
scale and scope of their international networks. In institutionalized network 
based structures   i.e. headquarters, subsidiaries and partners   the relationships 
differ, both formally and informally  Devinney et al., 2000 .  
Alliances are considered an effective means of dealing with these com 
plexities   Hagedoorn,  1993;  Hagedoorn  and  Schakenraad,  1994;  Osborn  and 
Hagedoorn,  1997   because  they  have  distinct  advantages  in  the  “knowledge 
economy”   e.g., in the form of customization, flexibility, and rapid response to 
complex tasks  Teece, 1992; Gomes Casseres, 1994 . There are however, certain 
complications  with  respect  to  command and control  because  of  different 
ownership, dependence on alliance partners, or the integration of the alliance 
activities  within  the  organization   Gomes Casseres,  1994;  Contractor  and 
Lorange, 2002 .  
Increasing  dynamism  and  uncertainty  in  industries  demand  shorter 
time to market periods. Alliances are often the chosen option for acquiring a 
new  technology  from  outside  instead  of  developing  it  in house   Lambe  and 
Spekman, 1997  or via mergers and acquisitions  Vanhaverbeke, Duysters and 
Noorderhaven,  2002 .
2  Complexity  and  dynamism  increases  the  companies’ 
risks,  while  at  the  same  time  the  risk  tolerance  of  managers  decreases, 
subsequently,  management  prioritizes  short term  results  and  companies 
concentrate on their core businesses. The focus on projects that lead to short 
term results implies a shift towards more incremental and less risky innovation 
in contrast to fundamental R&D and radical innovative projects, which require 
more time and carry a greater risk  Lindegaard, 2010 . Companies tend to ally 
with knowledge sources or business partners in order to reduce development 
cost,  time  or  risk.  Instead  of  choosing  a  conventional  two company  joint 
                                                
2 Another explanation for the increased number of alliances might be the fact that firm 
managers are following the cooperation activities of their partners  Haunschild, 1993 . RELEVANCY and POSITIONING  12 
venture, companies increasingly engage in more hybrid alliances  Parkhe, 1993; 
Doz and Hamel, 1998 . To sum up, alliances have become a crucial component 
of building and sustaining a globally competitive advantage. 
These trends imply a tendency towards innovative projects with exter 
nal partners, because they benefit from the combination of external and inter 
nal knowledge sources during the development and introduction of new busi 
nesses. By collaborating with others   customers, suppliers and even competi 
tors   a company is able to reduce time and development costs and increases the 
productivity of new business development. Furthermore, it enables a firm to re 
focus its own innovative resources. Through open innovation, external knowl 
edge is used inside  “outside in”  and inside knowledge will be commercialized 
outside  “inside out” . This combination can boost technological innovation, and 
is also a strategic or business model innovation  Chesbrough, 2003b, 2006 . A 
business model describes the way value is created and captured.
3 In the case of 
open innovation, value will be created and captured with external entities.  
In order to benefit from co innovation alliances effectively, new compe 
tences are required  Hansen and Nohria, 2004; Isaksen and Tidd, 2006 . This 
involves  not  only  timely  product  development  and  introduction,  but  also 
knowledge  transfer  across  markets  and  businesses,  as  well  as  continuous  re 
newal and innovation with respect to organizational values, processes and prac 
tices. Innovative inter unit collaboration cannot be implemented in a vertical 
command and control structure, but needs interaction at different levels simul 
taneously, because of the need to facilitate and benefit from bottom up initia 
tives  Ghoshal and Gratton, 2002; Hamel and Välikangas, 2003; Govindarajan 
and Trimble, 2005; Trompenaars, 2007 .  
 
 
2.3  ALLIANCES 
 
An alliance is used as an umbrella term referring to several forms of inter firm 
cooperation arrangements between two or more separate companies, in which 
they share objectives, risk, return and control, as well as some operational inte 
gration and mutual dependence  Bamford and Ernst, 2002, 2005 . This coopera 
tion can be aimed at achieving short term objectives or long term competitive 
advantage  Contractor and Lorange, 2002 . The alliance partners exchange and 
                                                
3  A  business  model  describes  the  way  value  is  created  by  identification  of  market 
segments  and  values  chains,  which  includes  the  position  of  a  firm  within  its  value 
network   or  ecosystem .  Furthermore,  in  a  business  model,  the  captured  value  is 
specified by defining the cost structure and profit potential. In a business model, the 
competitive strategy is formulated as well  Chesbrough, 2003b, 2006 .   Chapter 2  13 
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share knowledge as well as resources with the intent of developing processes, 
products, or services  Gulati, 1998 . The alliance should be advantageous for all 
partners involved  Das and Teng, 2000b; Duysters and Heimeriks, 2002b . The 
objectives  of  the  partners  in  the  alliance  are  interconnected,  mutually 
compatible  and  difficult  for  each  to  accomplish  individually   Spekman  and 
Isabella,  2000;  Todeva,  2000 .  While  maintaining  their  own  corporate 
identities  and  separate  organizations,  partners  share  reciprocal  inputs 
 Vanhaverbeke et al., 2002 . Alliances include structural and relational linkages 
 Todeva,  2000 .  The  balances  between  those  linkages  evolve  gradually. 
Alliances  are  therefore  considered  more  complex  to  manage  and  relatively 
unstable compared with fully owned companies  Sydow and Windeler, 1998 . 
Alliances  include  several  cooperative  arrangements  ranging  from  weak  inter 
firm  linkages   as  in  distribution  agreement  or  logistical  supply chain 
relationship  to strong partnerships, as in equity joint ventures.
4 Alliances are 
embedded in a firm's strategic portfolio, and evolve within the firm's strategy 
and its competitive environment  Koza and Lewin, 1998 . 
Common elements in the aforementioned definitions of alliances are: 
 a  shared decision making implying more than arm’s length contracts through 
 b  a governance mechanism that is formed to pursue collaborative interests 
between  c  two or more independent firms that  d  share a variety of resources 
as in relational contracting, information exchange, joint learning and collective 
action with a  e  lack of full control and integration.  
A metaphor of an alliance is shown in Box 2.2. 
 
Box 2.2: Alliance as a marriage 
“Alliances are much like marriages. 
 The partners have to understand each other’s expectations,  
be sensitive to each other’s changes of mood and  
not be too surprised if their partnership ends in divorce” 
 Source: Hindle (2003: 208). 
 
The scope of an alliance may vary in duration or strategic autonomy. 
The duration may be open ended and broad, as in strategic alliances, or specific, 
as in open innovation alliances  Cools and Roos, 2005; OECD, 2008 . A licens 
ing strategy offers an opportunity to source technology quickly, but with low 
                                                
4 The term “joint ventures” is used more narrowly for a separate business unit that is 
jointly owned by at least two organizations  Reuer, 2000 .  
 RELEVANCY and POSITIONING  14 
autonomy, because of the remaining dependency on others. Acquiring technol 
ogy  offers  high  autonomy  in  the  short term,  whereas  developing  it  in house 
provides a more time consuming strategic autonomy. A co innovation alliance 
can be considered to be a joint development alliance, which has an intermediary 
position, as visualized in Figure 2.2. 
Co innovation alliances are aimed at generating new business develop 
ment in order to react to a rapidly changing environment. A co innovation alli 
ance has a certain, though limited synergy in a well defined boundaries and nar 
rowly defined objectives between non competing partners that cooperate for a 
given period. Such an alliance can be considered as temporary
5  Chesbrough and 
Schwartz,  2007 .  These  narrowly  defined  tasks  are  there  to  reduce  costs  of 
R&D, learn from the capabilities of the alliance partners, jointly innovate in 
high tech industries, shorten the development time, expand innovation output, 
or open up new markets  Mortara et al., 2009 .  
In  our  research,  we  adapt  the  definition  of  a  co innovation  alliance 
fromSlowinski and Sagal  2003 , as reproduced in box 2.3. 
 
Figure 2.2: Positioning of joint development alliances  
Source: adapted from the European Industrial Research Management Association EIRMA(2004)  
as cited in OECD (2008). 
 
Co-innovation focuses on joint development cooperation, while open and collaborative innovation 
involves other types of cooperation with external parties as well. 
 
                                                
5 Named by Duysters and De Man  2003  ‘transitory alliance’ and by Dussauge et al. 
 2000  ‘link alliance’.   Chapter 2  15 
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Box 2.3: Definition of co-innovation alliance6 
A business relationship in which two or more independent firms or research  
institutes work cooperatively on a specific project that  
   is clearly defined in terms of activity, geographic location, product, process and 
time, 
   is aimed at the development and commercialization of new products or services, 
   retains an agreed level of flexibility, as each firm makes specific commitments to 
one another within the scope of the alliance, each can work independently of the 
other on projects outside the alliance, 
   shares rewards and risks of the project, which may go beyond measurable financial 
return to include new intellectual property, skills sets, opportunity cost, and market 
position,  
   commits resources to the relationship in order to accomplish the objectives of the 
alliance. 
        Adapted from: Slowinski and Sagal (2003:4). 
 
 
2.4  INNOVATION  
 
Innovation is not synonymous with research and development  R&D . Innova 
tion can be defined as: “the transformation of an idea into the launching of a new or 
improved product, a new or improved industrial or commercial process, or a new method 
in which to serve society”  OECD, 1994: 84 , and R&D as “creative work undertaken 
on a systematic basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge, including the knowledge 
of  man,  culture,  society,  and  the  use  of  this  knowledge  to  devise  new  applications” 
 OECD, 1994: 84 . R&D converts money into knowledge, whereas innovation 
transfers knowledge into money, or creativity that has been put into practice. 
R&D  is  an  essential  part  of  innovation,  whereas  innovation  relates to  more 
aspects. Innovation involves the total process of the development of a novel 
element  in  a  business  proposition  including  commercialization   Andrew  and 
Sirkin, 2006 .  
                                                
6 Known as a “non equity alliance”, which do not involve a separate entity or equity 
sharing by the participants. Instead, the following items have to be agreed upon: scope 
of  the  objectives,  key  responsibilities  of  the  partners,  governance,  operational 
management, contributions, cost allocation, sharing of profits or income, disclosure of 
proprietary  information  or  technology,  licences  for  existing  IPR,  inter party 
transactions, liabilities and indemnity of the partners, exclusivity, term, and termination 
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Normally, there are more ideas than can possibly be exploited  Hindle, 
2003, Gassman, 2006 . Therefore, the main issue is how to manage the innova 
tion process so that it creates economic value. In many cases, innovative pro 
jects will not deliver the expected results, although innovation ultimately leads 
to new business, as quoted by a manager of the innovative company 3M, repro 
duced in box 2.4. 
 
Box 2.4: Innovation and serendipity 
“You have to kiss a lot of frogs to find the prince. 
But remember, one prince can pay for a lot of frogs”  
Source: Hindle (2003: 123). 
 
Innovation can be characterized by the degree of novelty, aggregation level, 
type of innovation, and degree of openness.  
First, when we classify innovation by the degree of novelty, we distin 
guish incremental innovation  “doing what we do better”  from radical innovation 
 “new to the world” . A large proportion of the innovation activities in companies 
have an incremental character. In this case, new features are added to existing 
products, or the innovation is aimed at increased efficiency. Inherently, incre 
mental innovation involves less risk than more radical innovation because of the 
lower degree of novelty. Depending fully on incremental innovation involves 
certain risks, because the development of new business is limited. In order to 
develop enough new business, companies have a growing dependency on dis 
continuous  innovation,  which  includes  specific  innovative  competences 
 Hamel,  1998 .  In  mature  industries,  companies  usually  rely  more  on  incre 
mental  innovation;  in  new  industries,  companies  rely  more  on  fundamental, 
breakthrough or game changing innovation  Christensen et al., 2004; Tidd et 
al., 2005; Meijer, 2006; Lafley and Sharan, 2008 . Radical inventions are to a 
higher  degree  based  on  emerging  technologies  and  on  combining  diverse 
knowledge domains of emerging and existing knowledge. Within open innova 
tion  alliances,  technologies  can  be  combined  effectively   Schoenmakers  and 
Duysters, 2010 .  
As second classification of innovation, we distinguish innovation at sev 
eral aggregation levels: within a team, a firm, between firms, at industrial level 
or in an entire economic system. Another distinction relates to the component 
level juxtaposed to the aggregated system level. Innovation at the component 
level concerns improvements to components, the addition of new components 
to existing systems or advanced materials in order to improve component per   Chapter 2  17 
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formance. Innovation at the aggregated system level is known as systemic inno 
vation  Nooteboom, 2000; Tidd, et al., 2005 . In our study, we concentrate on 
systemic innovation at the organizational and inter organizational level. 
Third,  if  we  classify  innovation  by  type,  we  can  distinguish  product, 
process, position and paradigm innovation  Tidd et al., 2005 . These types do 
not exclude one another. Product innovation is aimed at changes in products or 
services,  which  an  organization  offers     e.g.,  by  inventing  new  technologies. 
Process innovation will result in changes in the ways products or services are 
created and delivered, usually considered to be incremental innovation. Posi 
tion or paradigm innovation
7 affects changes in the context in which the prod 
ucts or services are introduced, for example via changes in the underlying busi 
ness models the organization uses, such as changes in the redesign of chains of 
production, supply, and distribution  Nooteboom, 2000; Tidd et al., 2005; Von 
Stamm, 2008 . Kim and Mauborgne  2005  describe some examples of business 
model
8 innovation. Rather than competing in ‘bloody red oceans’, i.e. markets 
with  fierce  competition,  companies  innovate  their  business  models  through 
eliminating or reducing unwanted elements. These companies concentrate on 
new or less contested ‘blue ocean’ market propositions.  
Fourth, another distinction relates to the extent of openness. We posi 
tion our research in this framework of open innovation approaches. Open inno 
vation has been defined in Chapter 1, box 1.1. The main element involves a 
deliberate  balance  between  the  usage  of  external  and  internal  competences, 
whilst considering external relationships as deliberately chosen rather than a 
useful side effect  Chesbrough, 2003, 2006 . Open innovation is both a set of 
practices using external sources, such as in the usage of innovation intermedi 
aries, commercializing un used in house developed technology, spinning out of 
innovation  projects,  sale  of  innovation  results  to  third  parties  or  innovating 
business models using innovative ecosystems.
9 At the same time, it is a cogni 
tive innovation model   i.e., an open mentality  “proudly found elsewhere” . In 
open innovation, it is assumed that relevant knowledge is abundantly available 
outside firms that can be used outside the company  “outside in”  in order to 
generate new ideas, develop and bring them quickly to the market. In addition, 
companies  exploit  their  own  intellectual  property   “inside out” .  Intellectual 
property is considered to be a temporary asset as well as a source of revenue, 
                                                
7 Tidd et al.  2005  separate position innovation  repositioning of a perception of a 
product  from paradigm  business model  innovation. In practice however, these types 
appear simultaneously. 
8 See the definition of a business model in Section 2.1. 
9  An  innovation  ecosystem  is  a  network  of  a  corporate  innovator  with  knowledge 
institutions, suppliers, service providers, development agencies, etc. RELEVANCY and POSITIONING  18 
which should be commercialized in time  Chesbrough et al., 2006 . Further 
more, in the open innovation approach, the risk of unjustified  dis approval of 
continuation  of  innovation  projects     false  negatives  and  false  positives     is 
assumed to be too large due to uncertain and changing conditions. Therefore, 
rather  than   dis continuation  of  in house  innovation  projects,  more  options 
should be considered, such as licensing out or spinning out of activities. In the 
closed innovation approach, innovation involves mostly the process between 
invention, research, development and market introduction  discover develop 
ship . In the open innovation approach, the innovation process is more dynamic 
and less linear  OECD, 2008 . In this aspect, open innovation differs from the 
traditional closed innovational approach,
10 as illustrated in Table 2.1.  
 
Table 2.1: Principles of closed and open innovation 
Closed innovation  Open innovation 
The smart people in our field work for us. 
 
Not  all  the  smart  people  work  for  us  so  we 
must tap into the knowledge and expertise of 
bright individuals outside our company.  
To profit from R&D, we must discover, 
develop and ship it ourselves.  
 
External  R&D  can  create  significant  value; 
internal R&D is needed to claim some portion 
of that value.  
If we discover it ourselves, we will get it to 
the market first. 
We do not need to originate the research in 
order to profit from it.  
If we are the first to commercialize an 
innovation, we will win. 
Building a better business model is better than 
getting to market first.  
If we create the most and the best ideas in 
the industry, we will win. 
If  we  make  the  best  use  of  internal  and 
external ideas, we will win.  
We should control our Intellectual Property 
(IP), so that our competitors do not profit 
from our ideas. 
 
We  should  profit  from  other’s  use  of  our 
Intellectual  Property  (IP),  and  we  should  buy 
others’  IP  whenever  it  advances  our  own 
business model. 
Scope: “The lab is our world”.  Scope: “The world is our lab.” 
Mentality: “Not Invented Here.”
11  Mentality: “Proudly found elsewhere.” 
Know-how is most important.  Know-who is important. 
Source: Chesbrough (2003a) and Philips. 
 
Open  innovation  offers  an  opportunity  to  achieve  a  new  source  of 
competitive advantage, as illustrated by a quote from an executive of Procter & 
Gamble in Box 2.5. 
                                                
10 These differences explain why the open innovation concept is not “old wine in new 
bottles”, as suggested by Trott and Hartmann  2009 . 
11 Described as a tendency of managers to believe they have all the necessary knowledge 
in house and therefore are rejecting ideas from outside  Katz and Allen, 1982 .   Chapter 2  19 
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Box 2.5:  A new source of competitive advantage    
“There are many kinds of competitive advantage. 
The original view was: I have got it, and you don’t … 
Then there is the view, that I have got it, you have got it, but I have it cheaper …  
Then there is I have got it, you have got it, but I got it first …  
 
Then there is I have got it, you have got it from me,  
so I make money when I sell it, and I make money when you sell it.” 
Source: Chesbrough (2006: 201). 
 
Recent research on innovation with external partners can be grouped into three 
major streams  West and Bogers, 2009 : open innovation, user innovation, and 
cumulative  innovation.  All  three  approaches  concentrate  on  innovational 
interaction with external parties but at the same time differ from one another. 
Most research has been carried out on user innovation; research on the open 
innovation paradigm is growing more rapidly, while cumulative innovation has 
been studied less  West and Bogers, 2009 .  
The  first  approach,  open  innovation,  focuses  on  organizational 
innovation by selecting the best combination of external and internal resources. 
Resources  of  firms  with  external  partners  are  exchanged  in  outside in  and 
inside out  value  networks  in  which  firms  commercialize  other’s  innovations. 
These networks are worldwide  “the world is my lab” . Intellectual property and 
spillovers are being commercialized   e.g., via licensing or corporate venturing. 
An example of the use of open innovation is the ‘Connect and Development’ 
program of Procter and Gamble  P&G , in which P&G systematically scouts 
the world for proven technologies and products that P&G can improve, scale 
up, and market, either on its own or in partnership with other companies. P&G 
realized  substantially  better,  faster  and  cheaper  product  development:  the 
innovation success rate more than doubled, while the cost of innovation has 
fallen. Many more new products were launched, R&D productivity at P&G has 
increased  by  nearly  sixty  percent  and  R&D  costs  as  percentage  of  sales  has 
dropped thirty percent. The quote in box 2.6 illustrates this. Examples of work 
in the open innovation stream are Gilsing et al.  2008 , Nambisan and Swahney 
 2008 , Chesbrough  2003b, 2006 , and Laursen and Salter  2006 . 
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Box 2.6: Open Innovation example: ‘Connect and Develop’  
“The Connect and Develop strategy will become  
the dominant innovation model in the twenty-first century. 
 For most companies, the alternative invent-it-ourselves model 
 is a sure path to diminishing returns” 
 Source: Huston and Sakkab (2006:66). 
 
The second category of research is on user innovation. The focus here is 
on a new business model,
12 in which users are assumed to have the knowledge 
and motivation to contribute   without financial compensation   to innovations 
that solve needs which so far have not been met by existing producers, while 
producers commercialize the products. The level of analysis is mostly that of 
individuals, who freely reveal their innovations to other users and producers. 
Examples of user innovation are open source software, such as Linux, or the 
internet encyclopedia Wikipedia. References from the user innovation litera 
ture are von Hippel  2001, 2005, 2007 , Gloor  2006  and Tapscott and Wil 
liams  2006 . 
The third stream of research studies is cumulative innovation. Here, 
competing firms use the technological knowledge spillovers of others for their 
own technological innovation. For instance when such knowledge is not easy to 
protect, intellectual property might not be protected,. The level of analysis is 
usually the refinement of technology by explicit cooperation and knowledge 
sharing, or building upon unprotected knowledge spillovers of competitors. An 
example is the publically available pool of specialized information in the bio 
pharmaceutical  drug  industry.  References  are  Allen   1983 ,  Nuvolari   2004 , 
Scotchmer  2004 , and Murray and O’Mahony  2007 . 
Our research concerning co innovation alliances shows that companies 
choose to develop and market their products jointly with external partners. The 
openness however,  is relative, because openness is only conducted towards  a 
network of  selected partners, in which firms decide to cooperate exclusively, 
and only to a limited extent. The exclusivity is usually restricted to a certain 
period, activities or geographic location. After this, no further obligation exist, 
although   depending on the results of the previous cooperation   new contracts 
may be agreed upon.  
According  to  Chesbrough   2003b ,  openness  to  third  parties  can  be 
described as a continuum from a higher to a lower degree. The degree of open 
                                                
12 Defined in Section 2.1.   Chapter 2  21 
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ness may vary according to the subject matter. We add to this the dynamic 
aspect: openness varies with time   e.g., according to the development phase. In 
addition, we argue that openness is differentiated per subject  openness on a 
need to know  basis ,  varies  per  partnership,  and  has  a  formal  and  informal 
aspect   personal  and  organizational  openness .  The  protection  of  know how 
and intellectual property  IP 
13 is dependent on the strategic value of IP; firms 
tend not to share strategic know how   i.e., IP that is considered to be essential 
for competitive advantage of the core business. They share and develop non 
differentiating know how and IP with only selected partners. Finally, they give 
others access to generic non differentiating IP and expect knowledge sources, 
such as research institutions or experts, to build upon the IP, which might be 
beneficial to everybody. This is illustrated in Figure 2.3.  
 
Figure 2.3: IP protection dependent on type of IP 
 
Source: Van der Walle, Philips (2007). 
Disclosure of know-how and IP to external parties depends on  
the strategic value of it to a company.  
 
 
We discuss the application of the different types of innovation by way of a 
matrix, in which the originality of the innovation in terms of technology and 
market are described  table 2.3 . Process innovation is aimed at increasing the 
efficiency while incremental innovation adds new features to existing products. 
This type of innovation is used in the case of fine tuning of existing technolo 
gies for existing markets, and usually carried out in house  closed innovation . 
                                                
13  Know how  can  be  defined  as  accumulated  skills.  Examples  of  IP  are  patents  and 
trademarks. We discuss the differences of know how and IP further in Section 3.5 on 
organizational learning theory. RELEVANCY and POSITIONING  22 
Technological innovation is directed at developing new technologies for exist 
ing markets   e.g., in order to reduce cost price when competition is tough. 
Organizational  or  business  model  innovation  is  used  in  cases  where  existing 
technologies are applied to new markets. By innovating the business ecosystem, 
new markets are developed. Radical innovation will be applied in the case of 
innovations that are aimed at new markets and technologies. With these inno 
vations, higher rewards may be achieved, although at a higher level of uncer 
tainty and risk. This classification is summarized in Table 2.2. 
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Adapted from: Davila et al. (2006).  
 
An example of a co innovation project is the Senseo alliance, the coop 
eration between Philips and Sara Lee/Douwe Egberts in developing and mar 
keting a new coffee making system. Co innovation research differs to a certain 
extent  from  these  aforementioned  three  approaches.  In  contrast  to  these 
streams,  within  co innovation,  external  relationships  with  co developers  are 
observed, instead of a focus on worldwide networks, users or competitors. In 
co innovation, the locus of innovation is at the aggregate level of the firm and 
beyond  instead of outside a firm, at user level, or society , the cooperation is 
aimed at achieving strategic, technological or financial targets  rather than just 
financial, utilitarian or technological objectives , spillover knowledge is not free 
as intellectual property is protected   sometimes jointly   by ad hoc agreements. 
In addition, the innovation mode is selectively cooperative, in which innovators 
share knowledge or resources selectively only during predefined stages  instead 
of “inside out” and “outside in” or “user feedback” . Furthermore, co innovation is 
usually applied to more radical or business model innovations. The differences 
between the closed innovation and the streams of collaborative innovations   
open, user, cumulative and co innovation   are summarized in Table 2.3.   Chapter 2  23 
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Table 2.3: Different innovation approaches 
 




Several  advantages  of  innovation  cooperation  with  external  partners  can  be 
distinguished, as is listed in Box 2.7. 
 
                                                
14 This does not imply that other types of innovation are excluded. 
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Box 2.7: Advantages of external innovation cooperation 
1.  Access to complementary competences 
2.  Risk sharing 
3.  Increased flexibility 
4.  Additional return on R&D investment 
5.  Increased R&D productivity 
6.  Improvement of innovative culture 
 
 
External experts, such as lead users, component suppliers or universi 
ties,  may  have  the  unique  knowledge  of  the  key  technologies  necessary  to 
develop new products. Cooperating with them provides a broader spectrum of 
ideas. In addition, technologies and resources can be accessed while avoiding 
the huge costs of in house development.  
A  second  advantage  is  that  the  risks  of  innovation  can  be  shared 
between the partners, and reduced because of the beneficial effect of additional 
competences.
15  
A third benefit is external cooperation, through which flexibility and 
responsiveness towards markets can be increased, involving not only an increase 
in the speed of exploration, but also of exploitation.  
Furthermore, additional return on internal R&D investments may be 
gained  from  licensing  or  the  spinning  out  of  otherwise  un used  intellectual 
property.
16  
In addition, by allying, corporations can focus on their highest potential 
opportunities by combining their core innovation competences with external 
ones, thus increasing the productivity of R&D, as well as the speed and quality 
of new product introduction. In the case of closed innovation, a company relies 
fully on its own R&D without openness to the external environment.  
Lastly, through the relationships with external expertise, a company can 
improve its innovative culture  OECD, 2008 . The ability to exploit external 
knowledge  is  a  critical  component  of  innovative  performance   Cohen  and 
Levinthal, 1990 . Firms that are more open to external knowledge sources can 
deepen  their  technological  competencies  faster,  and  consequently  become 
                                                
15 Andrew and King  2003  state that breakthrough ideas have failure rates of between 
sixty and eighty five percent and that improving the success rate of innovation projects 
has a larger impact than only reducing costs.  
16 Companies sometimes follow a “use it or lose it” strategy, implying the external use of 
intellectual  property  after  this  remains  unused  internally.  This  creates  a  sense  of 
internal urgency concerning those internally available technologies  OECD, 2008 .   Chapter 2  25 
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more innovative  Haour, 2004; Laursen and Salter, 2006 . however,  after reach 
ing a certain optimum level, additional search for new competences becomes 
unproductive   Laursen  and  Salter,  2006 .  The  openness  to  relevant  external 
sources therefore needs to be managed carefully, resulting in a changing degree 
of openness to partners.  
 
Benefiting from the advantages and simultaneously avoiding the disadvantages, 
demand  effective  management.  An  adequate  way  of  implementating  of 
innovative projects is essential for achieving results. Part of this involves finding 
the  right  mix  of  innovation  activities  vis à vis  a  firm’s  current  strategy,  its 
markets  and  technologies.  In  addition,  a  balance  between  sufficient  new 
business development and existing activities is indispensible. Ultimately, it is 
important to realize that the management of co innovation alliances follows a 
cycle of processes, as will be explained in the following section and illustrated in 
Figure 2.4. 
It is essential to establish the right mix of innovation types, which is 
missing in many companies  Moore, 2005 . The challenge facing management is 
being able to choose and pursue an adequate type of innovative activity, which 
fits in with specific strategies, markets and technologies. For example, in the 
early phase of a products life cycle, other types of innovation are required than 
those used in mature or declining markets  Moore, 2005 . Usually, core compe 
tencies  in technology and markets  will be developed internally where possible, 
in order to avoid the risks of cooperation with external parties   e.g., lack of 
control, dependency on others, and the potential lack of protection of intel 
lectual  property.  In  other  cases  however,  open  innovation  may  be  more 
appropriate because it enables faster, and less costly development, while at the 
same time incurring fewer risks. When a technology is considered to be non 
core,  but  has  to  be  used  in  core  markets,  a  company  may  choose  between 
developing it internally, outsource or license it. Core technology for non core 
markets can either be acquired from outside or developed jointly. In this case, a 
company  may  develop  its  technological  capabilities.  For  obtaining  access  to 
unfamiliar technology for a core market  or to core technology in an unfamiliar 
market , joint ventures or contract R&D alliances are usually the appropriate 
vehicles.  As  long  as  the  technology  and/or  the  market  is  important  without 
being  vital,  companies  will  seek  to  perpetuate  involvement  with  the  use  of 
internal  corporate  venturing  units,  corporate  incubator  organizations  or 
external  venture  capital   Vanhaverbeke  and  Peeters,  2005 .  Activities  that 
consist  of  unfamiliar  technologies  for  unfamiliar  markets  will  generally  be 
divested.  Co innovation  alliances  tend  to  be  aimed  at  developing  new  tech RELEVANCY and POSITIONING  26 
nology  or  market  rather  than  a  means  of  incremental  innovation.  The 
relationship between a companies’ strategic portfolio in terms of markets or 
technologies and the appropriate modes of innovation is illustrated in Table 2.4  
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Source: EIRMA (2004), adapted from Roberts and Berry (1985), as cited in OECD(2008). 
 
 
A balance between innovative and existing business activities is impor 
tant. Innovation should be integrated into the business so that sufficient atten 
tion will be given to investment in new businesses in addition to the current 
existing core business  Campbell and Park, 2005; Davila et al., 2006; Lafley and 
Sharan,  2008 .  It  is  difficult  to  find  an  appropriate  balance  between  the 
exploitation  of  existing  business  and  the  exploration  of  new  and  innovative 
business, because the different activities require different cultures, leadership 
styles, structures and competences  O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004 .
17 Such a bal 
ance is important because of the need to develop enough new business in addi 
tion to the current ones. In order to remain competitive, companies have to 
absorb new knowledge and integrate it within their current business  Prahalad, 
1998;  Campbell  and  Park,  2005;  Lafley  and  Charan,  2008 .  For  this  reason, 
                                                
17  O’Reilly  and  Tushman   2004   call  companies  which  can  combine  these  activities 
“ambidextrous”.   Chapter 2  27 
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companies need to shift from a product centered view to a systemic view of 
innovation  in  which  the  business  model
18  itself  is  innovated   Hamel,  1998; 
Chesbrough,  2006;  Vanhaverbeke,  2008 .  This  implies  a  shift  of  focus  on 
technological innovation to an innovational approach, which involves business 
model  innovation  in  order  to  change  the  rules  of  the  game   Hamel,  1998; 
Christensen and Raynor, 2003; Lafley and Charan, 2008 .  
Finally, the managerial tasks of co innovation alliances follow a cycle of 
processes.
19 The management of an alliance is to a certain extent similar to con 
ducting a merger or an acquisition. The implementation process involves stra 
tegic analysis, alliance preparation, partner selection, design, management and 
the evaluation of the co innovation alliance.
20  
In our research, we focus on the organizational and relational drivers of 
co innovation performance. The analysis can be used for preparing the alliance, 
selecting  partners,  designing,  managing,  and  evaluating  the  partnership,  as 
described  by  Bell   2003 .  In  our  analysis,  we  assess  strategic  and  market 
influences, as illustrated in Figure 2.4.  
 
Figure 2.4: COINN Model related to the co-innovation cycle 
 
                                                
18 See the definition of a business model in Section 2.1. 
19 See Lorange and Roos  1993 , Porter Lynch  1993 , Callahan and MacKenzie  1999 , 
Spekman et al  2000 , Bell  2003  and Segil,  2004 .  
20 Careful selection and evaluation of partners improve the effectivity of an alliance 
 Bucklin and Sengupta, 1993 . Pansiri  2005: 1102  summarizes evaluation criteria for 
alliance partners with 4C’s: Compatibility, Capability, Commitment and Control. 
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Apart from these activities, an entrepreneurial spirit is indispensible, as illus 
trated in Box 2.8. 
 
Box 2.8: Innovation according to Richard Branson 
“An innovative business is one which lives and breathes “outside the box”. 
It is not just good ideas, it is a combination of good ideas, motivated staff and an 
instinctive understanding of what your customer wants” 




2.5   ORIGINALITY AND PRACTICAL VALUE 
 
For many organizations, temporary alliances are an increasingly important part 
of  their  strategy   Duysters  and  De  Man,  2003;  Chesbrough  and  Schwartz, 
2007 . Consequently, assessing the performance of such alliances becomes a pri 
ority. Performance evaluation is a critical success factor for alliances. The real 
ity  however,  is  that  formal  performance  evaluation  processes  are  not  widely 
used, due to the unique nature of the alliances  Cravens et al., 2000 . The same 
applies  to  innovation;  the  Boston  Consulting  Group   2006b   concludes  that 
innovation  is  seldom  measured  properly  and  companies  that  measure  their 
innovative activities are not usually confident or satisfied with their systems of 
measurement. According to a McKinsey survey in 2004, about eighty percent 
of  alliances  are  underperforming.  The  management  of  alliances  is  more 
complicated than the management of corporations, and appropriate perform 
ance  diagnosis  and  a  system  for  measuring  the  performance  of  alliances  are 
lacking  Bamford and Ernst, 2005 . No reliable and validated measuring system 
is as yet available to co innovation ventures. In our research, we develop a basis 
for such a measurement system as a means of developing a formal assessment 
approach that links performance evaluation to the objectives of the alliance. 
The result is a generic template that can be adapted to the specific evaluation 
requirements.  It  is  important  to  start  the  evaluation  process  early,  before 
problems  lead  to  mistrust,  counterproductive  behavior  or  underperformance 
 Gulati, 1998; Bamford and Ernst, 2005 . With the use of our model, managers 
can proactively re direct their alliances, if necessary.    Chapter 2  29 
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Our COINN instrument is innovative because it is multifaceted, inte 
grative and evidence based  Chesbrough et al., 2006; Sorge and van Witteloos 
tuijn, 2007 . Furthermore, dealing with the drivers and their influence on per 
formance, reflects a dynamic view of alliances  Gilsing et al., 2007 . The effects 
of  organizational  and  relational  aspects  on  performance  is  integrated  in  our 
model. We base our model on the evidence from several industries, such as 
high tech, fast moving consumer goods and service industries, as well as those 
of companies of varying sizes ranging from large multinationals down to small 
and medium sized enterprises. We measure the effects of our variables on per 
formance during several phases of the business development, and take a bal 
anced view of performance in which tangible and intangible aspects are consid 




2.6   SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In our research, we focus on the implementation of co innovation alliances. 
These partnerships are aimed at the specific well defined tasks of co develop 
ment of new products or services and co market introduction of new business, 
but do not usually involve joint equity or a separate legal entity. We do not 
concentrate  on  more  loosely  structured  more  open  networks,  which  often 
involve a larger number of collaborators; open networks often have different, 
less focused, objectives, and face different management issues.  
Innovation starts with idea generation, followed by phases of technical 
and  commercial  development.  During  technological  development  and  in  the 
early phase of commercial development, cash flow will be negative, and after 
market introduction, positive. We measure the advantages of co innovation by 
plotting the cumulative cash flow illustrated in Figure 2.5. By cooperating with 
external partners, commercial, technological and financial advantages can be 
gained. By sharing technological competences, through more effective learning, 
the time to market can be shortened: products can meet their break even point 
more  rapidly  with  the  advantage  of   B B*   shown  in  Figure  2.5,  and 
technological risks shared between the partners. At the same time, by sharing 
costs, the cumulated project costs can be limited with an advantage of  C C* . 
Another way of increasing innovation performance is by lowering the costs of 
commercialization,  which  can  be  achieved  be  using  the  competences  and 
resources of outside partners  Andrew and Sirkin, 2006 . Furthermore, through 
combining sales, market forces or distribution channels, strategic synergy can RELEVANCY and POSITIONING  30 
be obtained, resulting in scale advantages  S S* , less time to volume, shared 
market  risk,  better  strategic  position,  or  a  larger  market.  Furthermore, 
additional  revenues  may  be  gained  from  licenses,  spin offs  or  divestures  to 
external  parties   M M* .  A  potential  disadvantage  of  cooperation  however, 
might be the need to share markets or margins with partners. A successful co 
innovation implies that ultimately the net effect of the cooperation will be a 
larger  attainable  market. 
 
Figure 2.5: Advantages of co-innovation 
  
 Adapted from Andrew and Sirkin (2006). 
Commercial, technological and financial advantages of co-innovation:  
 
In the technological development 
phase, major advantages are 
 
In the commercial development phase, 
major advantages are 
- a reduction of the time-to-market (from A 
to A*),  
- a faster breakeven situation (from B to B*), 
- less development costs (from C to C*). 
 
-  faster up-scaling,  
-  less time-to-volume (from S to S*), and 
-  a larger market attainable through sharing of 
distribution channels, licensing, spin-offs or dives-
tures (from M to M*). 
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In conclusion, co innovation has potential commercial, financial and techno 
logical advantages. Examples of commercial advantage are the sharing of distri 
bution channels resulting in reduced market risk and a larger attainable market. 
Technological advantages can be derived from access to complementary com 
petences, which results in shared or reduced technical risk and a more innova 
tive culture. Examples of financial advantages are a higher level of innovation 
productivity  and  output,  additional  return  on  R&D,  rapid  product  develop 
ment, and faster market introduction and penetration. 
Open and collaborative innovation carries with it potential disadvan 
tages, such as extra governance costs, complexity of management due to the 
absence of hierarchical leadership, an over dependence on partners, opportun 
istic behavior of partners, the dilution of margins, a lack of disclosure of vital 
information, and the increased risk of leakage of proprietary information to 
potential competitors.  
In addition, the implementation of co innovation alliances requires new 
managerial  tasks     e.g.,  the  management  of  potentially  conflicting  priorities 
between existing businesses as well as alliance partners, or the management of 
new  sources  of  information,  such  as  specialized  innovation  intermediaries, 
external  ventures  or  incubator  organizations   Vanhaverbeke,  2008 .  Further 
more, in order to implement co innovation successfully, new roles have to be 
conducted, such as the “cross pollinator” role  Kelley, 2005 .  
Finally, implementing co innovation requires new competences, such as 
the ability to develop relational capital with externals, and an open organiza 
tional culture that includes a “Proudly Found Elsewhere” mentality, as will be 
discussed in the following chapters. RELEVANCY and POSITIONING  32 
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 3.  THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES  
 
3.1   INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter, we discuss four perspectives in general, which serve as the basis for 
our co innovation COINN model: network theory, contingency theory,  organiza 
tional learning theory, and resource based view. We discuss the key concepts of 
these theories and their impact on co innovation performance, as is illustrated in 
Figure 3.1. We concentrate on the factors and processes that can be derived from 
the literature in order to diagnose and manage co innovation alliances. 
 
Figure 3.1: Research perspectives of the COINN model   
 
 
In the section on network theory, we define several aspects of ties  strong 
versus weak, direct versus indirect ties, and structural versus personal ties . We 
discuss differences between a closed and an open network, and the concept of 
structural holes, and place these concepts in the co innovation context. In the 
section  on  resource based  view,  we  define  core  competences,  dynamic  and 
combinative  capabilities.  We  explain  the  differences  between  competences, 
capabilities  and  abilities,  and  discuss  facilitating  and  blocking  factors  in 
competence development. In the section on contingency theory, we discuss the 
concept  of  fit  in  general,  and  the  effects  of  a  market,  strategy,  resource, 
organization and culture fit on the performance of co innovation alliances. The 
organizational learning theory is one of the pillars of our COINN model. We also 
discuss  absorptive  capacity,  combinative  capability,  cognitive  distance  and  the            THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
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paradoxes of information and replication. We explain different types of knowledge 
and the accompanying processes of learning, and discuss facilitating factors and 
difficulties for organizational learning in co innovation alliances. 
The  literature  review  serves  at  least  two  purposes.  We  will  make  an 
inventory of concepts of relevant constructs in order to build our COINN model, 
including the use, limitations and relationship to performance, and in the literature 
search  we  will  select  validated  questions  that  might  be  relevant  to  our 
questionnaire  Netemeyer et al., 2003 .  
We motivate our choice of theoretical perspectives as follows. We select 
network  theory  because  co innovation  involves  by  definition  relationships  with 
external parties, and   as discussed in Chapter 2   networks play an increasingly 
important role in competition. Assessing whether the competences of partners in 
the  co innovation  alliance  are  and  remain  up  to  standard  is  a  vital  element  in 
selecting and evaluating partners. Describing companies in terms of bundles of 
competences,  which  is  the  perspective  of  the  resource based  view,  is  therefore 
relevant.  In  addition,  competences  should  fit  with  one  another:  for  alliance 
performance, a fit between the alliance partners, or between the alliance and the 
environment, is essential, which can be analyzed through the lens of contingency 
theory. A fit however, is a conditio sine qua non but not sufficient. A company can 
only benefit from its co innovation alliance if it is able to acquire, process, and use 
additional knowledge effectively. We select organizational learning theory in order 
to understand the internal processes. 
In  addition  to  the  four  theoretical  perspectives,  we  observe  research 
regarding the performance of adjacent organizational forms, such as joint ventures, 
 strategic   alliances,  and  international  networks,  which  have  been  researched 
extensively in many different industries, regions and time frames. The results of 
these studies are of importance to co innovation alliances.
1 Some of the studies 
observe aspects, such as conflict resolution, trust or organizational culture; others 
explain time effects or causal effects, which have a bearing on stability, survival, or 
failure (Parkhe, 1991; Doz, 1996 , as summarized in several meta studies.
2  
                                                
1 One of the perspectives of alliance research is the transaction cost theory  Nooteboom, 
1999; Madhok and Tallman, 1998; Park and Ungson, 2001; Glaister and Buckley, 1996; Park 
and Russo, 1996; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Parkhe, 1993a; and Kogut, 1988 . Because of 
the focus of our research, we do not discuss this theory separately, but add its contribution 
where relevant in the next chapter on the COINN model.  
2 See: Koza and Lewin  1998 , Eisenhardt and Martin  2000 , Park and Ungson  2001 , 
Ireland et al.  2002  and Heimeriks  2005 .                        Chapter 3     
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3.2  NETWORK THEORY 
 
Network theory has been used to explain alliance performance in many research 
projects,
3 and sometimes combined with organizational learning
4 or contingency 
theory   Gilsing  et  al.,  2007 .  Especially  the  effects  of  a  social  network   social 
capital  on inter organizational relationships have been discussed frequently.
5  
As  mentioned  before,  networks  are  increasingly  important  in  creating 
competitive advantage and boosting innovation performance: a network, with its 
greater  diversity  of  knowledge,  is  more  effective  than  an  individual  firm  at 
generating,  transferring,  and  combining  knowledge;  a  network  facilitates 
knowledge transfer among members  Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000 , and therefore, 
firms  that  are  embedded  in  networks  are  likely  to  achieve  a  better  innovative 
performance   Pennings  and  Harianto,  1992;  Powell  et  al.,  1996;  Ahuja,  2000a; 
Baum et al., 2000 . Especially for young companies, cooperating with others is 
essential  Shan et al., 1994; Baum et al., 2000 . In addition, through information 
networking,  a  company  can  obtain  more  influence  in  an  industry   Zaheer  and 
Zaheer,  1997 .  Some  key  elements  of  network  theory,  listed  in  box  3.1,  will  be 
discussed in the following. 
 
Box 3.1: Aspects of network theory 
1.  Strong and weak ties  
2.  Direct and indirect ties 
3.  Closed and open network 
4.  Structural holes  
5.  Structural ties and personal ties 
 
Strong and weak ties do not describe the intensity of relationships, but the 
social structure that surrounds them: two people share a strong tie when they have 
mutual contacts and a weak tie when the contacts are not connected in any way. 
Strong  ties  are  beneficial  for  existing  groups,  and  weak  ties  for  new  groups. 
Through strong ties, current information flows readily within an existing group 
                                                
3 See: Blankenburg Holm et al.  1996 , Dyer and Singh  1998 , Gulati  1999 , Gulati et al. 
 2000 , De Man and Duysters  2002 , Koka and Prescott  2002 , Goerzen and Beamish 
 2005 , and Laursen and Paulsen  2006 . 
4 See: Gulati  1999 , Stuart  2000 , and Hagedoorn and Duysters  2002 . 
5 See: Oliver  1990 , Gulati  1995 , Powell at al.  1996 , Walker et al.  1997 , Osborn and 
Hagedoorn  1997 , Inkpen and Dinur  1998 , Kraatz  1998 , Madhavan et al.  1998 , Tsai 
and Ghoshal  1998 , Gulati  1999 , Ahuah  2000 , Baum et al.  2000 , Dyer and Nobeoka 
 2000 , and Kale et al.  2000 .            THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
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and weak ties encourage new information  Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000 . Gilsing and 
Duysters  2008: 704  conclude that originality is created by a combination of both 
weak  and  strong  ties;  the  weak  ties  serve  as  bridge  in  the  acquisition  of  new 
knowledge, while the strong ties enable absorption of new knowledge within the 
alliance.  Weak  ties  facilitate  access  to  new  knowledge  from  outside,  but 
complicate the transference of complex knowledge internally, for which strong ties 
are required  Hansen, 1999 . 
The concept of direct and indirect ties is important. In a direct tie connection, 
two companies are directly related to each other, which is not the case with an 
indirect tie. A direct tie has the advantage of potential resource sharing, while 
indirectly tied relationships might offer more opportunity for capturing knowledge 
spillovers  Ahuja, 2000a . Indirect ties may serve as a ‘radar’ for companies by 
sensing  new  developments,  which  are  especially  useful  in  explorative  learning 
 Beerkens, 2004 . 
We distinguish closed and open networks. In a closed network, all partners are 
connected,  contrary  to  an  open  network,  where  only  some  of  the  partners  are 
linked  to  one  another.  In  open  networks,  partners  have  outside  network  rela 
tionships, which are not shared by their partners. 
Burt  1992  defined the degree of connectivity, known as the structural hole. 
People who hold a brokerage or structural hole position, are the sole link between 
different groups, and may benefit from their unique position, whereas when not in 
such a position, they have access to different, non sharing flows of information. 
Structural hole positions can be exploited. It is therefore important to recognize 
such positions, because of the potential advantages, or disadvantages such as over 
dependency on partners  Walker et al., 1997; Ahuja, 2000a . A gap may arise in a 
larger network if individuals or organizations when structural hole positions are 
moved within a network  Hargadon, 2003 , structural holes are therefore crucial in 
the management of inter organizational relationships. 
The fact that networks consist of structural ties  formal relationships between 
organizations   and  personal  ties   personal  relationships  between  social  actors   is 
worth mentioning. These ties interact with one another. When managers have 
good personal relationships, they tend to form structural ties as well. The sum of 
all personal ties is known as the social capital of a company. Social capital enables 
firms  to  access  and  capture  the  embedded  resources  in  their  social  relations 
 Gilsing  et  al.,  2007   and  is  considered  to  be  a  good  indicator  of  future 
cooperation: firms with higher social capital are likely to have more relationships 
with new partners. Apart from this, the more relationships a firm has, the more 
likely it is that its social capital will increase  Walker et al., 1997 , which will have a                        Chapter 3     
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positive impact on the trust and cooperation within the network  Gilsing et al., 
2007 . The differences between the above mentioned ties are illustrated in Figure 
3.2: firm A has direct ties with firms B, C, and D. Firm 1 has direct ties with firms 
3, 4, and 5. Firm A has indirect ties with Firms E through M, and firm 1 with firms 
6 and 7. Firm A forms a closed network with its partners B, C, and D. In a closed 
network,  all  are  tied  to  each  other,  with  no  structural  holes   from  Firm  A’s 
perspective . Firm 1’s partners are not connected to each other, creating an open 
network with structural hole positions for partners 2, 3, 4, and 5.  
 
Figure 3.2: Direct ties, indirect ties and structural holes 
 
Source: Ahuja (2000a). 
 
Which  factors  are  productive  for  co innovation  result,  and  which  ones  are 
counter productive? At least ten items, listed in box 3.2, are relevant for alliance 
performance. 
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Box 3.2: Contributing elements of network theory 
1.  Aim of networking  
2.  Size of the network and its partners 
3.  Diversity of a network and interdependence of its partners  
4.  Structure of a network 
5.  Context of a network 
6.  Intensity of a network  
7.  Position of a partner within a network 
8.  Networking capabilities  
9.  Balance between structural and personal embeddedness 
10.  Dynamism of networks 
 
The Aim of networking is paramount to co innovation alliances, as it depends 
on  the  strategic  motivation  of  a  firm  and  influences  the  level  of  desired 
coordination within the alliance.
6 The optimal structure of inter firm networks 
depends on the objectives or aims of the network members  Ahuja, 2000, Gilsing 
et al., 2007 . If networking is used as a source of knowledge and learning, network 
membership  will  lead  to  more  information  transfer  and  learning,  a  larger 
knowledge  base  or  improved  process  and  product  innovation   Beckman  and 
Haunschild, 2002; Caloghirou et al., 2003 . This learning effect however, depends 
on  the  type  of  knowledge  that  the  partners  strive  to  obtain.  This  type  of 
knowledge  determines  the  optimal  type  of  network     for  example,  an  open  or 
closed  network.  We  will  discuss  the  types  of  knowledge  later  in  the  section 
concerning organization learning. 
The size of the network and its partners contributes to explaining the per 
formance of co innovation alliances as it influences the embeddedness of a firm
7. 
To a certain extent, a larger number of direct ties offer a higher innovation output, 
because of the opportunity to share more knowledge, or to gain economies of 
scale  advantages   Ahuja,  200a .  A  small  or  very  large  network  is  usually  less 
successful  Vanhaverbeke et al., 2001 : the added value of a very small network is 
not substantial enough, while the very large network might suffer from many inter 
nal stresses due to divergence of the different partners  Baum et al., 2000 . An 
exception is an R&D network, in which the size and diversity  even with potential 
                                                
6 Aim of networking is used to construct the strategy control variables in section 5.6, see: box 
5.4, and the independent variable Control need. 
7 Size of an alliance serves as a control variable and Embeddedness as a independent variable in 
our COINN model.                        Chapter 3     
 
39 
rivals   has  certain  advantages  in  accessing  new  knowledge.  however,    due  to 
complex  coordination  and  decision  making,  the  higher  the  number  of  direct 
relationships in the knowledge network, the longer the project completion time 
 Hansen,  2002 .  The  sizes  of  network  partners  should  fit  with  the  internal 
knowledge base
8: especially young and small firms benefit from large, innovative 
partners  Stuart, 2000 . Companies with a large internal knowledge base usually 
seek  a  small  external  knowledge  base  via  alliances,  while  companies  with  small 
internal knowledge bases put more emphasis on building up an external knowledge 
base via networking. The combination of alliance partners that have a large and 
internal knowledge base and that strive for a large external knowledge base, tends 
to be less stable. The same applies to situations involving alliances of partners with 
small  internal  knowledge  bases  striving  for  small  external  knowledge  bases. 
Another  problematic  network  combination,  due  to  the  higher  possibility  of 
conflicts of interest, is a network with companies that have global, fully integrated 
strategies  Gomes Casseres, 1989 . The size of a network is also important for the 
intent to perform: the likelihood that a partner fulfils its objectives is higher in a 
small  dyadic  alliance than in a large  multi partner  alliance  Garcia Canal et al., 
2003 . 
The diversity of a network and interdependence among its partners is important as 
it  influences  the  embeddedness  of  a  firm.
9  Organizations  build  ties  with  other 
organizations that have complementary resources and capabilities, but also take 
into consideration the position the potential partners have in the social structure 
of the network. This is known as structural differentiation  Gulati and Gargiulo, 
1999 .  Knowledge  heterogeneity  may  lead  to  more  impact  on  performance, 
because the different competences of the alliance partners add value substantially. 
This heterogeneity however, also has disadvantages, because the communication 
between partners is more difficult and consequently, the probability of conflict 
and turnover is higher  Goerzen and Beamish, 2005 . Here, technological distance 
 Gilsing  et  al.,  2008   or  cognitive  distance
10   Nooteboom,  1999a   is  relevant. 
Interdependence between partners and their embeddedness in networks have a 
significant  and  positive  impact  on  the  decision  to  start  new  alliances,  because 
companies rely on their network partners to determine whether and with whom 
they could cooperate  Gulati, 1998 . Companies also modify existing networks by 
beginning new alliances. If companies are interdependent, they tend to form more 
alliances  with  each  other   Gulati  and  Gargiulo,  1999 .  Within  a  network  with 
                                                
8 Size of the focal firm and its partners, both in absolute terms as well as relative to one 
another, serve as a control variables in our COINN model. 
9 These items are used to construct the independent variable Embeddedness. 
10 To be explained later in the organizational learning section.            THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
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much  structural  differentiation,  relevant  information  concerning  competencies, 
needs, and reliability of potential partners can be processed more easily. Such a 
network facilitates the identification of complementary and reliable partners, and 
thus reduces the risk of cooperating with new partners.
11 The higher the structural 
differentiation of a network, the more organizational decisions concerning new 
partnerships are guided by considerations of the existing network compared with 
the  considerations  of  exogenous  factors.  A  differentiated  network  structure 
implies  that  more  information  is  available  to  the  network.  At  the  same  time 
however, it reduces the range of potential alliance partners, who might be invited 
to enter the alliance  Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999 . The diversity of a network has an 
effect on the speed of implementation; if knowledge can be obtained directly from 
other chains in the network  due to a shorter path  or when knowledge can be 
codified  in case network diversity is limited , projects can be completed more 
rapidly.  In  addition,  if  partners  in  a  network  are  mutually  interdependent  and 
directly linked, we can expect higher product quality and faster time to market 
 Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Hansen, 2002 . 
Another contribution of network theory deals with the structure of a network, 
which  is  affected  by  similarities  in  the  strategic  capabilities,  their  strategic 
linkages, or in the complementary nature of the firms  Nohria and Garcia Pont, 
1991;  Vanhaverbeke  and  Noorderhaven,  2001 .  The  structure  of  a  network 
influences the level of embeddedness as well. Networks consist of internal  intra 
firm  and external  inter firm  linkages. External linkages can be further separated 
into rational  strategic  and relational linkages. The choice of these is influenced 
by cultural diversity.
12  
The context of a network is of significance to co innovation alliances because 
context influences the choice of network strategies by determining the optimal 
number of ties and the density of a network  Powell et al., 1996; Rowley el al., 
2000; Vanhaverbeke and Noorderhaven, 2001 .
13 On the one hand, in a dynamic 
environment, firms tend to have more learning based motives in their networks, 
and are especially focused on explorative or non routinized learning
14  Hagedoorn 
and  Duysters,  2002b .  On  the  other  hand,  in  a  static  environment,  firms 
                                                
11  The  item  complementary  partnerships  is  used  to  construct  the  independent  variable 
Balanced competences. 
12 For instance, Taiwanese companies tend to start strategic linkages with investments in 
the United States, while they form relational linkages in Southeast Asia and China. Small 
firms are more sensitive to relational linkages than large firms in their choice of investment 
location  Chen and Chen, 1998 . 
13  Context  of  a  network  is  used  to  construct  the  control  variables  concerning  market 
conditions, see: Section 5.6, Box 5.3.  
14  This  learning  involves  changes  in  company  routines  and  experimentation  with  new 
alternatives.                        Chapter 3     
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concentrate on efficiency in their networks and are selective when networking. In 
these cases, learning is focused on exploitative or routinized learning, which adds 
primarily to the existing knowledge and competences of a firm.  
The intensity  or density  of a network influences innovative performance as 
networks can be categorized into weakly or highly interconnected. As discussed 
earlier,  strong tie  networks  are  better  suited  for  the  diffusion  of  existing 
knowledge, while weak tie networks are preferable in the case of co innovation, 
where exploration of new knowledge is important. The number of a firm’s direct 
ties however, moderates the effectiveness of indirect ties: the greater the number 
of  direct  ties,  the  smaller  the  benefit  from  indirect  ties,  because  in  this  case, 
companies are more strictly limited in profiting from their indirect ties  Ahuja, 
200a; Gilsing et al., 2007 . The intensity of a network correlates positively with 
innovative  performance  and  is  determined  by  interpersonal  relations  and 
management involvement, as discussed in the next chapter.
15 
The position of a partner within a network is significant to co innovation alli 
ances   e.g., in determining the level of embeddedness of a firm.
16 Companies man 
age co innovation differently when their positions within an innovation system 
vary. The extent to which a partner is occupied in a network and the prominence 
of its position is known as positional embeddedness  Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999 .
17 The 
greater the differences of tasks and roles in a network, the more important the 
various partners are. In other words, large structural differentiation also implies 
more positional embeddedness. Companies with greater network centrality benefit 
more from the network and may achieve faster growth  Powell et al., 1996; Tsai, 
2001; Bekkers et al., 2002 , because they have more and better contacts with the 
key players within the network. This effect however, depends on a firms’ ability to 
successfully  replicate  new  knowledge   Tsai,  2001 .
18  Key  partners  provide  firms 
with  easier  access  to  complementary  capabilities  and  specialized  knowledge, 
enabling them to lower the overall coordination and production costs. As a result 
of this, the network as a whole might also benefit  Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999 . 
In co innovation alliances, companies with different positions within a network 
cooperate with one another. For example, experts who have a unique distinctive 
technology, cooperate with large firms, that have complementary competences, 
such  as  marketing  know how  or  access  to  distribution  channels.
19  Different 
                                                
15 Interpersonal relations and Management involvement serve as independent variables in our 
COINN model. 
16 See: the independent variable Embeddedness. 
17 See: the independent variable Interpersonal relations. 
18  Known  as  absorptive  capacity,  see:  Box  3.7  in  Section  3.5  on  organizational  learning  or 
Section 4.4.3 on technology transfer. 
19 See: the independent variable Balanced competences in the COINN model.            THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
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positions in networks insure that the interplay is highly desirable though more 
complex   Christensen  et  al.,  2005 .  Networking  may  raise  the  value  of  future 
business relationships.  
Networking capabilities contribute to the performance of co innovation alli 
ances   i.e., the capabilities of a firm to develop and utilize inter organizational 
relationships  Walter et al., 2006 . Such networking capabilities can be built up 
through experience: the greater the extent of a firm’s network resources derived 
via  prior  networks,  the  greater  the  likelihood  of  entering  into  a  new  network 
 Gulati,  1999 .
20  In  addition,  these  capabilities  are  dependent  on  interpersonal 
relations and management involvement.
21 
Another  contributing  factor  consists  of  a  balance  between  structural  and 
personal embeddedness. We will discus, management involvement and interpersonal 
relationships in the next chapter in the sections on trust. Personal ties between 
gatekeepers or boundary spanners play a major role in the maintenance of inter 
organizational cooperation. The so called boundary spanners are people who scan 
and interpret the environment, and then pass on information to the rest of the 
organization   Hansen,  2002 .  A  certain  personal  chemistry  or  emotional 
attachment is essential. Such relation based attachment may also lead to individual 
gains  Das and Teng, 2002 , gaining “fine grained information”  Gulati, 1998:296  
or  competence  development   Andersson  et  al.,  2002 .  A  balance  between 
individual  and  structural  embeddedness  between  partners  stabilizes  alliances 
 Seabright et al., 1992; Madhok, 1995a; Child and Faulkner, 1998 . 
Dynamic aspects of networks are relevant to co innovation alliances, and will 
therefore  be  included  as  a  control  variable  in  our  COINN  model.
22  Networks 
evolve gradually   for instance, from a collection of dyadic weak ties to a web like 
structure  with  stronger  ties,  which  affects  the  relationships  within  alliances. 
Within all inter firm cooperative relationships, certain elements of cooperation 
and competition can be detected simultaneously  Bell, 2003 . Companies adapt 
their strategies and activities to the changing environment.
23 Consequently, non 
competing partners may become rivals. Partners may enter or leave the alliance. 
Participation  in  networks  influences  the  behavior  of  firms  that  are  within  and 
others that are outside the network  Gulati et al., 2000 .
24 Multi lateral alliances, 
                                                
20 Experience is part of the independent variable Embeddedness. 
21 See: the independent variables Interpersonal relations and Management involvement. 
22 See: in Section 5.6, Box 5.3, the control variables Market life cycle and Market turbulence.  
23 This insight is used to define the strategy control variables Flexibility and Stability, see 
Section 5.6, Box 5.4. 
24 One of the motives to form an alliance is the ability to influence the networking activity 
of the partners, such as placing constraints on ties with others, known as lock in and lock 
out effects.                        Chapter 3     
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where  firms  are  both  competing  and  collaborating,  tend  to  evolve  into  several 
more  stable  coalitions  which  compete  with  one  another.  Networks  that  are 
unstable, may break down in order to form more stable substructures  Doz and 
Hamel,  1998 .  The  balance  between  collaboration  and  competition  within  an 
alliance also depends on the relationship of the alliance partners with third parties, 
which might complicate the alliance, as illustrated in Figure.  
 
Figure 3.3: Effect of outside networks on alliance stability 
 
Source: Gomes-Casseres (1996). 
 
In this figure, A and B are alliance partners. Both have relationships with external 
party C. If C cooperates with both A and B or competes with both, the alliance is 
balanced, but if C cooperates with only one of the alliance partners, and competes 
with the other, the alliance is unbalanced  situation 3, as illustrated in Figure 3.3 . 
In situation 3, A can play different roles: it can mediate between B and C, it may 
dominate  because  the  others  compete  or  it  might  play  a  divide and rule  game 
 Gomes Casseres, 1996 .             THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
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In conclusion, ties in networks are much closer. The character of a relation 
ship  between  external  partners  and  their  attitude  towards  each  other  differ  in 
embedded vis à vis stand alone situations. Partners tend to act less egoistically and 
are more oriented in the long run. Furthermore, they act with more loyalty and 
trust, and will not change sides overnight. Relationships in embedded situations 
are  more  personal,  and  differ  from  relationships  with  individually  acting 
companies.  Individually  acting  companies  merely  exchange  information  con 
cerning prices, while network partners exchange information on many more issues. 
Firms  with  embedded  relationships  are  more  inclined  to  solve  their  problems 
jointly  Uzzi, 1997  
Different ties tend to offer different advantages. Direct or indirect ties and 
connections between partners may influence a firm's innovation performance, by 
offering resource sharing  direct ties  and knowledge spillover benefits  direct and 
indirect ties . Even though most firms are becoming increasingly embedded within 
alliance networks, not all perform well  Vanhaverbeke and Noorderhaven, 2001 . 
In  assessing  potential  alliance  partners,  it  is  therefore  relevant  to  assess  the 
networks  of  the  partners.  Furthermore,  because  the  ways  and  means  by  which 
networks are managed are not always clear, it is important to involve them in the 
assessment as well  Devinney et al., 2000; Goerzen, 2005 .  
 
 
3.3  RESOURCE BASED VIEW 
 
The resource based view was initiated by Penrose  1959  and has become one of 
the  most  influential  frameworks  in  the  strategic  management  literature.  The 
resource based  view  complements  and  integrates  contributions  from  several 
perspectives   e.g., industrial organization and transaction cost theory. The con 
tribution of the resource based view in explaining alliance performance has been 
summarized in several studies  Peteraf 1993; Teece et al., 1997; Sanchez, 2001; De 
Man and Duysters, 2002; Goerzen and Beamish, 2005; Lavie, 2006 . 
In the resource based view, firms are seen as bundles of resources, which to 
a greater or lesser extent are specific to the firm. These resources are “valuable, 
rare,  imperfectly  imitable  and  imperfectly  substitutable”   Maijoor  and  van 
Witteloostuijn, 1996: 550 . Other firms cannot instantly copy them because they 
are difficult to imitate. Core competences
25 are bundles of skills and technologies 
                                                
25  Sometimes  called  capabilities   Doz  and  Hamel,  1998 .  We  consider  capabilities  and 
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that  form  critical  sources  of  competitive a dvantage  and  corporate  identity 
 Spekman et al., 2000; Ulrich and Smalwood, 2004 .  
We  summarize  some  relevant  aspects  of  competences  to  co innovation 
alliances in box 3.3. 
 
Box 3.3: Aspects of competences  
1.  Tangible or intangible aspects  
2.  Development and utilization  
3.  Static and dynamic  
4.  Technical and social aspects  
5.  Organizational and personal level 
6.  Internal and external acquisition  
 
Resources can be tangible   such as land or machines   or intangible  for 
instance,  knowledge,  tacit  know how,  brand  names,  managerial  systems,  and 
organizational culture  Leonard Barton, 1992; Nooteboom, 2000 .
26 
In  addition  to  developing  competences,  the  utilization  of  competences  is 
important. Some researchers concentrate on the development of competences by 
emphasizing  the  origin,  acquisition,  maintenance  and  erosion  of  a  firm’s 
capabilities by viewing them as a basis for developing new resources  Mowery et 
al., 1998; Combs and Ketchen, 1999 . Others stress the utilization of competences, 
by taking into consideration that firms try to capture value from them; in this case, 
a competence is viewed as a firm’s ability to use and exploit resources economically 
 Bell, 1996 .  
The  distinction  between  a  static  and  dynamic  view  of  competences  is 
paramount.  Initially,  the  resource based  view  did  not  involve  dynamic  aspects. 
Later, the resource based view has been extended to the dynamic capabilities view 
by adding dynamic aspects of resource access, thus creating capability, and learning 
in  changing  environments.  In  order  to  be  able  to  cope  with  changing 
environments, the dynamic capabilities view focuses on a firm’s ability to integrate, 
build and reconfigure internal distinctive competences, and combine them with 
external competences  Kogut and Zander, 1992; Teece et al., 1997; Teece, 2007 .  
Competences  have  both  a  technical  and  a  social  aspect.  Technical 
competences  are  for  instance,  the  functional  expertise  in  manufacturing  or 
developing new products. Social competences are for example an organizational 
                                                
26 In the section concerning organizational learning, we describe that tangible and intangi 
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culture of open mindedness towards new developments or an individual ability to 
influence  and  persuade  external  alliance  partners.  For  instance,  Gulati   1995b  
provides  empirical  support  for  the  importance  of  a  social  network  in  alliance 
formation. 
Organizational  and  personal  competences  differ  from  one  another.  In  the 
resource based view, most competences are considered at the organizational level. 
Because our research involves implementation, individual competences should be 
considered as well. Bailey et al.  2001: 5  define individual competences as sets of 
behavior  that  are  instrumental  in  the  delivery  of  desired  results.  Individual 
competences  reflect  a  person’s  ability  to  apply  knowledge,  understanding,  and 
skills  resulting  in  the  required  performance  standard,  which  includes  problem 
solving, meeting changing demands, or a person’s potential for development.  
In addition to the firm specific development, competences can be developed 
through external partners. One of the basic reasons that firms cooperate with one 
another, is that they depend on the critical complementary competences of others, 
which cannot be developed readily or sufficiently rapidly on their own  Child and 
Faulkner, 1998; Nohria and Garcia Pont, 1991; Nooteboom et al., 2007 . Firms 
compare their competences with the technological portfolios of potential partners. 
Through partnering, companies can develop and generate their core competences 
or  gain  critical  mass  for  certain  resources   Ahuja,  2000b;  Gulati  et  al.,  2000; 
Caloghirou  et  al.,  2003 .    By  employing  complementary  resources,  the  alliance 
partners can improve their competitive position. Even though a firms’ competence 
may initially be complementary, they may end up as rivals.  Das and Teng, 1998; 
Khanna et al., 1998; Park and Ungson, 2001; Lambe et al., 2002 .  
Some factors facilitate the development and use of competences, others 
complicate it, as listed in boxes 3.4 and 3.5. 
 
Box 3.4: Facilitating factors in the use of competences 
1.  Internal sources: experience and specialization 
2.  Development via selection, training and coaching 
3.  External cooperation 
 
One way of developing capabilities is through the accumulation of expe 
rience.
27  In  order  to  benefit  from  experience,  it  should  be  bundled,  sorted, 
integrated and diffused  Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Levinthal and March, 1993; 
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Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Kale et al., 2002; Bell, 2003 .
28 We discuss evalua 
tion  mechanisms  in  section  4.4.3.  on  transfer  of  technology.  In  addition, 
organizational capabilities may be developed through the selection of new personnel 
with the required competences, or the training and coaching of existing personnel 
 Bartram,  2005,  2006;  Stober  and  Grant,  2006 .
29  Furthermore,  firms  strive  to 




Several complicating factors of developing and utilizing competences can also be 
listed, see box 3.5. 
 
Box 3.5: Complicating factors in the use of competences 
1.  Tacit knowledge 
2.  Dynamic circumstances 
3.  Protected knowledge 
4.  Core rigidities 
 
Some intangible competences involve tacit knowledge, which is difficult t0 
describe,  and  thus  a  complication  in  the  process  of  transfer  of  technology  or 
claiming and commercializing property rights  Nooteboom, 2000 .
31  
Another complicating factor is the fact that a firm’s resources only develop 
gradually. In times of external turbulence, companies may therefore not be able to 
acquire  new  abilities  quickly  enough
32.  In  this  case,  other  sources  might  be 
necessary   such as a co innovation alliance  Levitt and March, 1988; Ghoshal and 
Gratton, 2002; Bell, 2003 . Duysters and Hagedoorn  2000a  conclude however, 
that in the short term, only market knowledge may be acquired through external 
partners; external sources might not be an appropriate means of developing new 
core competences in the short term either.  
In addition, companies might consider certain knowledge as strategic, and 
consequently  have  the  tendency  not  to  share  it  with  external  partners.  When 
knowledge is protected, partners do not have access to it
33.   
                                                
28 To be discussed further at the organizational learning Section, 3.5. 
29 To be discussed further in Chapter 7  Summary and conclusions . 
30  Additional  partner  competences  are  included  in  the  independent  variable  Balanced 
competences. 
31 The aspect of tacit knowledge is included in the independent variable Transfer of technol 
ogy. 
32 See in Section 5.6, Box 5.3, the control variable: Market turbulence. 
33 Relevant to the independent variables Trust, Culture fit, and Technology transfer.            THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
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Last, traditional core competences might evolve into core rigidities when 
they become counter productive   e.g., due to changing market forces.
34 Those 
competences were initially the basis for corporate success, therefore companies are 
reluctant to abandon or change them, even if they become counter productive. In 
the case of core rigidities, a redefinition of core capabilities is required or new 
competences  should  be  acquired   Moss  Kanter,  1989;  Leonard Barton,  1992; 
Hamel and Välikangas, 2003; Christensen et al., 2004 . This is especially relevant 
to co innovation, where traditional systems, skills or values of the partners may be 
inappropriate.  Co innovation  is  usually  conducted  in  dynamic  and  uncertain 
markets where it is essential to highlight the need for change and therefore act 
deliberately  and  proactively  towards  corporate  renewal.  Co innovation  alliance 
partners should give enough attention to their organizational cultures by enabling 
organizational renewal.  Govindarajan and Trimble, 2005; Trompenaars, 2007 .  
 
In  conclusion,  with  the  resource based  view  it  remains  unclear  how  a  firm  can 
develop  new  alliance  capabilities.  In  order  to  meet  this  shortfall,  we  include 
organizational learning theory in our analysis. We discuss the ability of a firm to 
learn from new information, known as “absorptive capacity” which is considered to 
be  an  important  source  of  competitive  advantage
35   Ghoshal,  1987;  Cohen  and 
Levinthal, 1990; Kale and Singh, 2007 . In order to manage a co innovation alli 
ance properly in an efficient and effective way, specific alliance competences are 
essential.  These  competences  include  social,  technical,  individual,  and  orga 
nizational  aspects.  Besides  alliance  management,  knowledge  management  is 
necessary in order to benefit from the results of the co innovation alliance, which 
involves the capture, dissemination and use of such knowledge  Eisenhardt and 
Martin, 2000; Heimeriks and Duysters, 2002a; Ulrich and Smallwood, 2004 .  
 
 
3.4  CONTINGENCY THEORY 
 
Contingency  theory  assumes  the  existence  of  an  optimal  compatibility,  or  fit, 
between  constructs     e.g.,  a  fit  between  a  market  environment,  and  a  specific 
business  model,  governance  structure,  leadership  style,  and  organization  form 
 Strebel, 2003 . Researching the concept of fit is in itself, not new  Chandler, 1962; 
Lawrence  and  Lorsch,  1967;  Porter,  1980;  Mintzberg,  1983 .  Several  researchers 
have  summarized  the  impact  of  contingency  theory  on  alliances   Hill  and 
                                                
34 This item is relevant to the independent variables Culture fit and Technology transfer, and 
the strategy control variables Flexibility and Stability, 4.  
35 To be discussed further in the organizational learning Section 3.5.                        Chapter 3     
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Hellriegel, 1994; Nohria and Ghoshal, 1994; De Man and Duysters, 2002; Douma 
et al., 2000; Garcia Canal et al., 2003; Goerzen and Beamish, 2005 . The added 
value  of  contingency  theory  to  our  research  on  co innovation  alliances  can  be 
found  in  the  identification  of  the  drivers  of  fit  and  their  consequences  on 
performance. It is known that a strategy fit, an organization fit or external fit   the 
degree  of  congruence  between  strategy  and  its  external  and  internal  context    
significantly  correlates  with  performance   Lin  and  Germain,  1998;  van 
Witteloostuijn et al., 2008 . Misfits can be considered as potential failure factors, 
causing a lower success rate or underperformance of the co innovation alliance. 
 
Below we will discuss the concepts of market fit, strategy fit, resource fit, and culture fit 
as contingencies that are relevant to co innovation alliances. 
Market fit
36 is the congruence between the market environment and orga 
nizational  form,  leadership  style,  or  governance  structure  of  companies.  In 
situations of high complexity and resource scarcity, more collaboration is desirable 
and the intent to ally will be increased. Consequently, partners will be committed 
to the co innovation alliance, provide more resources, and be more determined to 
reach  the  alliance  goals,  resulting  in  a  better  performance.  Environmental 
complexityhas an impact on the way in which the partnership should be managed 
effectively, and on the most appropriate leadership style: a dynamic or uncertain 
market requires a more flexible structure.
37 In this situation, we can expect that a 
highly  detailed  contract  will  hinder  both  innovation  process  and  the  outcome. 
Furthermore, in the early development stages of markets, we can expect business 
models that are less integrated in the formal structures of the alliance partners 
because, in this case, the primary focus is on innovation; standardized routines to 
increase efficiency are less relevant  Strebel, 2003 . The market also has an impact 
on appropriate leadership styles; in situations of low urgency for change and low 
resistance to change, a different leadership style should be chosen  chairman or 
coach   vis à vis  situations  of  high  urgency  and  high  resistance   commander . 
Environmental complexity also has an impact on the way in which the partnership 
should be managed effectively; in early development stages, we can expect business 
models that are less integrated in the formal structures of the alliance partners. In 
this case, the primary focus is on innovation; standardized routines to increase 
efficiency might be counter productive  Strebel, 2003 . Different environmental 
circumstances lead therefore to different organizational structures and leadership 
styles.  In  many  cases,  the  markets  of  co innovation  are  in  the  early  stages  of 
                                                
36 We consider this synonymous with environmental fit. 
37  See:  the  market  control  variable  Market  complexity  and  the  strategy  control  variable 
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development with high technological complexity and dynamism, implying the need 
for  a  flexible  organization,  which  is  not  necessarily  integrated  in  the  formal 
structures of the alliance partners. At the same time, these circumstances demand 
leaders who are able to deal with uncertainties, and can persuade business partners 
to cooperate. We include several market conditions as control variables in our 
model.  
A strategy fit describes how well a firm and its partners are aligned strategi 
cally  Slowinsky and Sagal, 2003 . A strategy fit between alliance partners exists 
when  the  strategic  drivers  of  the  alliance  partners  match  and  do  not  conflict, 
which implies a shared vision and a compatibility of strategies. A good basis for 
cooperation exits when partners have a good strategy fit  Brouthers et al., 1995; 
Douma et al., 2000 . In cases of a limited strategy fit, the commitment of the 
partners to resolve potential conflicts will be lower, causing the cooperation to 
dissolve when unforeseen obstacles arise. In co innovation, it is important to be 
able  to  judge  whether  the  strategic  drivers  of  the  partners  fit.  When  do 
technological, strategic and financial goals of the partners match one another? Can 
flexibility  be  expected  in  unforeseen  circumstances?  Will  partners  remain 
committed to the partnership? Strategy fit also serves as control variable in our 
model as well.
38  
In the case of a resource fit between alliance partners, the resources of the 
alliance partners are complementary to one another: partners need each other to 
fulfill the alliance task   in our context  , in order to innovate. We therefore, use 
resource fit to construct our independent variables balanced competences, coordination 
need and management involvement. Changes that disturb the exchange resource fit 
between partners, might lead to the dissolution of the alliance  Dyer and Singh, 
1998; Gulati, 1999; Porter, 1980; Slowinski and Sagal, 2003 . We will evaluate the 
resource  fit  between  partners  empirically  and  view  its  relationship  to  co 
innovation performance in the next chapters.  
An organization fit facilitates alliance success and determines whether an 
alliance is feasible. An organizational ﬁt between alliance partners enables effective 
management control or decision authority  Johnson et al., 1996; Dyer and Singh, 
1998;  Douma  et  al.,  2000;  Kale  et  al.,  2000 .  We  will  evaluate  the  impact  of 
organization  fit  on  co innovation  performance  empirically  in  the  next  chapters, 
especially in the sections on contract and coordination need.  
A culture fit has an impact on the appropriate organization type: socio cul 
tural distance   a fit between national cultures, or organizational cultures   is one of 
                                                
38 See: the strategy control variables Strategic, technological and cost saving motives, Flexibility, 
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the factors which leads to the decision to ally or not  Agarwal, 1994 . We will 
assess the extent to which partners have a culture fit in the following, and assess the 
influence on co innovation performance. 
 
In conclusion, different circumstances lead to different fits. Companies should be 
prepared to differentiate their policies towards differing circumstances, known as 
a differentiated fit, because the fit should be differentiated per organizational part, 
including the external network of a firm  Nohria and Ghoshal, 1994; Andersson et 
al., 2002 . 
Furthermore, fits change in the course of time. Markets of co innovation 
alliances  usually  change  rapidly  and  the  traditional  concept  of  fit  is  too  rigid, 
therefore a more dynamic view should be considered  Douma et al., 2000 . A sure 
fit can easily become a misfit. At the same time, a suboptimal relationship between 
partners may improve, provided that the partners can adapt, are flexible, and have 
the capacity to manage the dynamics effectively  Doz, 1988 .  
A  fit  between  partners  does  not  necessarily  mean  similar  inputs  of  the 
partners  in  co innovation  alliances;  especially  where  creativity  or  innovation  is 
vital,  diversity  to  a  certain  extent,  will  be  functional,  because  it  enriches  idea 
generation and decision making  Kirton, 2003 . 
Several  fits  should  be  achieved  simultaneously;  matches  between  the 
strategic drivers of partners in a network, the positions these partners have in their 
industries, the organizations and cultures are important. A situation with multiple 





3.5  ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 
 
In  organizational  learning  theory,  the  central  issue  is  how  firms  can  learn. 
Knowledge has become the most important resource for firms  Gassman, 2006: 
224 ,  consequently,  competing  for  knowledge  factors  has  become  increasingly 
important,  especially  in  the  case  of  innovation.  The  ability  to  create  new 
knowledge  is  increasingly  becoming  a  priority  for  top  management   De  Geus, 
1997a,b , although the relevance of learning is dependent on the turbulence of the 
environment  Inkpen, 1995 : the more turbulence, the more the ability to learn 
                                                
39 Doz and Hamel  1998  describe an example of an alliance of an industry leader and his 
challenger. Such an alliance is only viable if partners obtain specialized positions in the 
alliance. Otherwise, such a combination may lead to rivalry between the alliance partners, 
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becomes a necessity. In order to learn from their environment, firms should focus 
on relevant developments in their environment. Structured attention therefore is 
necessary towards designated employees who are able to develop new ideas and put 
them  into  practice   De  Geus,  1997a,b .  New  technologies  should  be  identified 
globally,  made  accessible,  assimilated,  transformed  and  exploited  in  order  to 
develop  and  market  new  products  which  involves  the  organizational  learning 
processes of sensing mobilizing optimizing.
40  
Organizational  learning  is  a  multi dimensional  construct  and  must  be 
viewed from a number of perspectives simultaneously, for instance through the 
cognitive change and behavioral change lenses between different accompanying 
management roles  Levitt and March, 1988; Huber 1991; Inkpen, 1995; Bell et al., 
2002 . The contribution of organization learning theory, which gives insight into 
alliance performance, has been summarized in a number of studies  De Man and 
Duysters, 2002; Goerzen and Beamish, 2005 . 
 
Box 3.6: Sharing knowledge  
“Unlike most assets, organizational knowledge 
 can actually grow when shared”  
Source: Inkpen (1998: 75). 
 
Learning refers to the development of skills, knowledge, and experience. Through 
learning, the effectiveness of those experiences can be assessed, and appropriate 
action can be taken  Cyert and March, 1963; Inkpen, 1995 . Learning is defined as 
“the  ability  to  process  knowledge  through  which  the  range  of  potential  behaviors  can  be 
increased”   Huber,  1991:  89   and  involves  acquisition  and  exploitation  of  new 
knowledge by an organization  Kumar and Nti, 1998 .  
 
Before elaborating on several organizational learning constructs, we briefly discuss 
different types of knowledge, which require different learning strategies. Informa 
tion differs from know how, the learning of tacit knowledge differs from that of 
explicit knowledge, internal learning differs from external learning, and explorative 
learning from exploitative learning. 
Information is all about what to do while know how is all about how to do 
it. On the one hand, information   e.g., facts and data can be learned easily once 
decoded. Know how, on the other hand, is more difficult to transfer to others. 
                                                
40 See: Doz et al.  2001  on “meta national structure”, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
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Know how,  defined  as  accumulated  skills,  describes  current  practices  or  routines 
within a firm  Kogut and Zander, 1992: 386 . Know how can be categorized into 
explicit  know how,  which  can  be  codified,  and  tacit  know how,  which  is  less 
explicit  and  more  ambiguous,  and  thus  more  difficult  to  codify  or  transfer  to 
alliance partners  Child and Faulkner, 1998; Kumar and Nti, 1998; Simonin, 1999 . 
The greater the tacitness of knowledge, the lower the accessibility, especially in 
the  case  of  formal  learning  strategies   Janowicz Panjaitan  and  Noorderhaven, 
2008 . 
Certain learning are aimed at exploration   i.e. experimentation with new 
alternatives  , while other types of learning are aimed at exploitation    that is 
refinement and the extension of existing technology aimed at efficiency. Different 
learning strategies, resources and capabilities are necessary in achieving the various 
learning goals  March, 1991 ; exploitation needs routinized learning, while explora 
tion activities require a thinking out of the box learning style, in which breaking 
away from existing rules, norms, and routines is encouraged  Nooteboom, 2000 .  
In  addition  to  different  types  of  knowledge,  we  discuss  general 
characteristics of learning processes, as listed in box 3.7. 
 
Box 3.7: General characteristics of organizational learning 
1.  Cyclical character of learning 
2.  Organizational learning differs from individual learning 
3.  Absorptive capacity 
4.  Differential learning 
5.  Combinative capability 
6.  Cognitive distance 
7.  Paradoxes of information and replication 
 
Organizational learning is an iterative, dynamic process, in which firms learn 
from their own experiences and from the experiences of others. They connect 
experiences  to  each  other,  draw  conclusions  from  them,  and  use  them  in  the 
future.
41 This leads to reevaluating and revising conditions, which in turn leads to 
re adjusting  and  renewing  learning  processes.  Organizational  learning  therefore, 
should be viewed as a cyclical process  Child and Faulkner, 1998; Doz and Hamel, 
1998; Nooteboom, 2000 . 
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Learning processes differ at the individual, group, organizational and network 
level  and  require  different  learning  strategies   Lynn,  1998;  Nooteboom,  1999a; 
Crossan et al, 2002 . Learning starts at the individual level where potentially useful 
information  is  sensed  and  acquired.  When  knowledge  is  transformed  from  an 
individual to a collective state, it is known as organizational learning. In the case of 
organizational learning, personal and group information and know how should be 
embedded in or transferred to the organizational level Frequent interaction within 
small groups through a unique  codified  language is desirable, involving cognitive 
and  behavioral  adaptation  with  attention  to  the  learning  process  and  outcome 
 Kogut  and  Zander,  1992;  Inkpen  and  Crossan,  1995 .  With  organizational 
learning,  new  knowledge  is  utilized  and  the  competences  of  organizations  are 
improved  Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Huber, 1991; Inkpen, 1995 .  
A  prerequisite  of  organizational  learning  is  a  firm's  ability  to  value, 
assimilate, and utilize new external knowledge. This is known as absorptive capacity
 
 Cohen  and  Levinthal,  1990;  Lane  and  Lubatkin,  1998 ,  which  depends  on  the 
characteristics of external and internal knowledge  Lane et al., 2006 . One of the 
factors that affect a firm’s ability to absorb skills from its alliance partners is the 
similarity of both partners’ knowledge bases or technological capital, as determined 
by  their  experiences  in  related  technological  areas.  Furthermore,  absorptive 
capacity is determined by the quality of the human assets, and the organization 
structures  and  cultures.  A  firm’s  ability  to  absorb  capabilities  from  its  alliance 
partner depends also on the pre alliance relationship  Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; 
Mowery  et  al.,  1996;  Lane  and  Lubatkin,  1998;  Nooteboom  et  al.,  2007 .  The 
greater  the  absorptive  capacity,  the  more  benefit  a  firm  can  extract  from  new 
knowledge  Kumar and Nti, 1998 . 
The concept of differential learning was introduced  Kumar and Nti, 1998 , 
in  order  to  stress  the  fact  that  the  alliance  partners  may  differentially  acquire 
knowledge.  In  an  alliance,  firms  may  have  unequal  capacities  to  learn  from 
partners, when they have different relative absorptive capacities. This affects the 
learning  balance  within  the  alliance,  and  consequently  the  balance  of  power 
between the partners  Lane and Lubatkin, 1998 . 
 In  addition  to  absorptive  capacity,  the  combinative  capability  concept  is 
important: the ability to synthesize and apply current and new acquired knowledge, skills 
and capabilities  Kogut and Zander, 1992: 384 . Firms have a limited capacity for 
processing information. With learning however, this capacity may be increased 
 Huber, 1991 . Especially when implementing innovations, new knowledge based 
on the abilities of alliance partners is required. Firms therefore invest in those 
assets  or  the  alliances  with  which  they  are  able  to  combine  their  current                        Chapter 3     
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capabilities  Kogut and Zander, 1992 . Complementary knowledge is a prerequisite 
when searching for knowledge. Firms will seek knowledge in a complementary area 
rather than additional knowledge in the same area in which they already have a 
knowledge base. Alliances play an important role in accessing new information, 
integrating it in the existing knowledge base and facilitating the use of this new 
knowledge   Grant  and  Baden Fuller,  2004 .
42  A  large  combinative  capacity 
facilitates companies in making better use of external capabilities.  
The  differences  in  fields  of  knowledge,  known  as  cognitive  distance,  are 
essential,  as illustrated in Figure 3.4  Nooteboom, 1999a; Nooteboom et al., 2007 . 
The more varied these fields are, the more novelty value
43 there is to be gained 
from the alliance partners but at the same time, the more difficult it will become 
to  transfer  fields  of  knowledge  to  one  another.  Cognitive  proximity  makes 
understanding easier, but at the same time, implies less novelty value. Learning is 
most effective at a cognitive distance that is neither too large nor too small. In co 
innovation alliances, we expect a hill shaped correlation between performance and 
cognitive distance. Optimal cognitive distance depends on absorptive capacity; with 
more knowledge, one needs larger cognitive distances to find novelty. The optimal 
cognitive  distance  is  larger  in  exploration  activities,  where  more  novelty  is 
necessary, than in exploitation activities  Nooteboom et al., 2007 .  
 
Figure 3.4: Cognitive distance 
 
Source: Nooteboom (1999a). 
In the context of co innovation, the concept of the information paradox is 
essential  Chesbrough, 2006    i.e., a provider of information that has to disclose it 
                                                
42  In  addition,  employees  are  indispensable  that  can  mix  and  match  ideas,  people  and 
technologies in a role known as “cross pollinator”  Kelley, 2005 . 
43  Sometimes,  the  term  ‘novelty  value’  may  have  a  negative  connotation,  referring  to  a 
temporary or fashionable newness. We use this term in the positive sense as it is under 
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in order to enable the potential receiver to judge the value of the information. If 
disclosed however, the receiver may decide not to purchase it and may possibly 
benefit from the information at no cost. An information paradox normally exists 
during the transfer of explicit knowledge. The information paradox can be compared 
with  the  paradox  of  replication,  which  expresses  a  fundamental  dilemma  in 
technology transfer. When knowledge is replicated to external partners, it can be 
used in order to achieve faster sales growth. At the same time however, it involves 
the risk of imitation by external partners, which may lead to erosion of the market 
position of the knowledge provider. Codification of knowledge has the advantage 
of easier and more cost efficient  intra  or inter firm  technology transfer, offering 
the possibility of achieving scale in knowledge reuse and thus of business growth 
 Hansen  et  al.,  1999:  108 .  At  the  same  time,  codification  involves  the  risk  of 
imitation. The risk of imitation after technology transfer depends on the skills of 
the receiver of the technology. New technologies may be transferred to the least 
capable users, whereas the most capable competitors might imitate a technology, 
for  instance  by  reverse engineering
44  a  product.  This  results  in  a  race  between 
innovators  and  potential  imitators,  which  is  considered  to  be  a  new  form  of 
competition. Firms tend to compete not only with their own knowledge, but also 
through  their  ability  to  imitate  the  successful  product  innovations  of  their 
competitors   Kogut  and  Zander,  1992   or  benefit  more  from  innovations  than 
alliance  partners   Gulati  et  al.,  2000 .
45  De  Geus   1988:  71   even  considers  the 
ability to learn faster than competitors the only sustainable competitive advantage. 
 
The  literature  describes  several  facilitating  factors  for  organizational  learning, 
through which capabilities within co innovation alliances may be developed  Doz, 
1996; Simonin, 1997; Gulati, 1998, Anand and Khanna, 2000; Kale et al., 2002 , five 
of these are listed in box 3.8.  
 
Box 3.8: Facilitating factors for learning 
1.  Learning intent  
2.  Managerial support 
3.  Relational capital 
4.  Capabilities  
5.  Organization 
 
                                                
44 That is, analyzing the engineering of a product in detail with the purpose of imitation. 
45 E.g., through the exploitation of knowledge that have been acquired via the alliance in 
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The more receptive people are, the more likely they are to learn  Child and 
Faulkner, 1998 . Learning intent is important, for instance for the ability to transfer 
technology.
46 The amount of acquired knowledge is influenced by the recipient’s 
intent. In addition to this, the intent to acquire knowledge, skills and abilities is 
just as important as the transparency of the partner’s knowledge  Hamel, 1991 . 
The learning intent may also be counter productive due to the fact that a high 
learning  intent  may  provoke  higher  knowledge  protection  by  a  supplier  of 
knowledge.  Knowledge  protection  can  only  be  reduced  by  high  level  of  trust 
between  partners   Hamel,  1991;  Child  and  Faulkner,  1998;  Norman,  2004 . 
Learning intent is dependent on strategic intent; for instance, the learning intent 
in  link alliances  differs  from  that  in  scale alliances   Dussauge  et  al.  2000,  see 
Chapter 2 . 
Higher levels of managerial support provided by the partners to the alliance, 
may  lead  to  enhanced  learning  within  the  alliance.  Child  and  Faulkner   1998  
conclude that commitment and direct personal involvement of senior management 
facilitate  learning,  however  higher  levels  of  technical  support  provided  by  the 
foreign  partner  do  not  automatically  enhance  alliance  learning   Child  and 
Faulkner,  1998;  Steensma  and  Lyles,  2000 .  Management  “support”  may  even 
become counter productive if a set of rigid managerial beliefs is imposed on the 
alliance, which may result in an unwillingness to unlearn past ineffective practices, 
consequently the effectiveness of organizational learning might be limited  Inkpen 
and Crossan, 1995 . Nevertheless, management plays a role in managing and solving 
conflicts or problems in a co innovation alliance, which when undertaken wisely, 
may lead to more learning within the alliance  Kale et al., 2000 .
47 
A third facilitating factor is relational capital. Kale et al.  2000  report that 
the greater the relational capital between the alliance partners, the greater the 
degree of learning achieved will be. If there is a lack of trust, emotional barriers 
impede learning  Child and Faulkner, 1998 , however, excessive relational capital 
may be harmful to productive business oriented relationships  Gargiulo and Ertug, 
2006 . We discuss the aspect of relational capital in the next chapter.
48  
Firms  develop  learning  capabilities  by  learning  to  acquire  knowledge  by 
experience.  Firms  with  greater  collaborative  experience  usually  achieve  higher 
levels  of  collaborative  know how  and  more  tangible  and  intangible  benefits 
 Simonin, 1997; Child and Faulkner, 1998 . A higher level of alliance experience 
facilitates  the  aggregation  of  the  information  at  the  organizational  level 
                                                
46 We included this insight in the dependent variable Technology transfer. 
47 We included these insights in the dependent variable Management involvement. 
48 See: the sections on the performance drivers trust, management involvement and interper 
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 Heimeriks  and  Duysters,  2002a .  Experience  in  related  technological  areas  is 
important in determining absorptive capacity: the process of acquiring knowledge 
is  more  effective  where  the  alliance  partners  have  a  certain  amount  of 
complementary knowledge  Inkpen, 2000 . Technological learning is based on a 
combination of internal and external learning: within co innovation alliances, firms 
may learn from or with its partners  Inkpen, 1995; Child and Faulkner, 1998 . In the 
first case, only access to a partner’s knowledge and skills is necessary. The second 
case   learning with others   requires both technological and social capital. For the 
development of technological capital, strong internal technological capabilities are 
necessary,  which  are  supported  by  a  small  alliance  portfolio.  Companies  that 
depend on external learning will focus on building up social capital; they acquire 
new  technology  mainly  through  their  alliance  partners  while  using  a  minimum 
amount  of  internal  technical  know how.  These  types  of  internal  and  external 
learning reinforce one another.
49 
An appropriate organization is essential to both organizational learning and 
transfer of technology, which necessitates an adequate design at various levels of 
interface,  division  of  tasks  and  protection  of  knowledge  between  the  partners 
 Hamel, 1991 . We include the aspects of organization in our model that we coined 
coordination and contract need. 
 
At  the  same  time,  several  factors  might  complicate  the  organizational  learning 
process, as listed in box 3.9. 
 
Box 3.9: Complicating factors for learning 
1.  Motivational barriers 
2.  Divergent goals 
3.  Protection of knowledge 
4.  Cultural differences leading to organizational barriers  
5.  Insufficient “unlearning” 
 
 
Motivational barriers might impede the transfer of knowledge, such as a lack 
of commitment, insufficient confidence, inclination to re invent the wheel, non 
compliance,  jealousy,  or  resistance  to  change  known  as  not invented here 
mentality  Szulanski, 1996 . Motivational barriers also have a negative impact on 
                                                
49  We  include  the  aspect  of  learning  capabilities  in  our  model  in  the  sections  on  the 
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the level of trust and the intensity of interpersonal relationships between alliance 
partners. 
Cooperation and competition has an effect on learning within alliances. 
Partners in the co innovation alliance may have divergent goals, both on the indi 
vidual and the organizational level.
50 Individuals may derive private benefits   such 
as  incentives  from  outside  parties     which  might  come  into  conflict  with  the 
alliance goals  Khanna et al., 1998 . If the opportunities outside the alliance prove 
to be more promising, a partner might be inclined to act more opportunistically 
and not in the best interest of the alliance. Especially a lack of reciprocation of 
interest between the partners may impede the inclination to transfer technology; a 
lower level of knowledge transfer is to be expected in unilateral than in bilateral 
contracts  Mowery et al., 1996 . Furthermore, if partners compete, the accessibility 
of knowledge will be reduced  Inkpen, 2000 .  
A third complicating factor is the inability to protect core knowledge and core 
proprietary assets, which in turn leads to restrictive technology transfer, resulting 
in  a  decrease  of  trust,  an  inclination  to  coordinate  and  control  joint  activities 
tightly, and eventually the dissolution of the co innovation alliance  Kale et al., 
2000 .
51  
The learning process may be hampered by cultural differences.
52 Different 
cultures may have different implicit learning strategies. In some cultures, learning 
is considered to be a linear process   e.g., focusing on analytical learning, based on 
individual  effort.  In  other  societies,  learning  is  considered  to  be  much  more 
sequential,  experiential,  intuititive  and  team oriented.  These  different  learning 
styles  across  multiple  cultures  might  lead  to  misunderstandings,  conflicts,  and 
difficulties in cooperating  Prahalad, 1998 . Furthermore, different organizational 
routines,  or  a  culture  of  protectiveness  and  reluctance  to  disclose  know how, 
might hinder the learning process  Simonin, 1999 . Cultural differences may lead to 
organizational barriers that may form obstacles to knowledge transfer   e.g., the 
recipient’s lack of absorptive capacity, causal ambiguity between knowledge and 
the  desired  results,  or  a  disturbed  relationship  between  the  source  and  the 
recipient of the knowledge.  
A  lack  of  ability  to  “unlearn”  counter productive  practices  might  be  a  com 
plicating factor in learning new practices.
53 By “unlearning”, companies are more 
able to think out of the box, which is essential to innovation. Therefore   apart 
                                                
50 We include the aspect of divergent goals in the strategy control variables on Strategic, 
Technological and Cost saving motives. 
51 We include the aspect of protection of knowledge in the independent variables: Contract 
need, Coordination need, Trust and Technology transfer. 
52 See: the independent variable Cultural fit. 
53 We include the aspect of ‘unlearning’ the independent variable: Technology transfer.            THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
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from learning   the unlearning of constraining routines is important to co inno 
vation alliances  Hamel and Prahalad, 1994 , as illustrated in box 3.10.  
 
Box 3.10: Thinking out of the Box 
“The difficulty lies not in the new ideas,  
but in escaping from the old ones” 
Source: John Maynard Keynes (1937: xxiii). 
 
In  conclusion,  we  discuss  the  nature  of  co innovational  learning,  the  aspect  of 
protecting  know how  and  the  balance  between  technological  and  social psy 
chological contracts. 
Exploration and exploitation activities require different learning styles. For co 
innovation, exploration is most important. In exploration, where search for nov 
elty is essential, more emphasis should be placed on cognitive distance than in 
exploitation  Nooteboom et al., 2007 . In exploitation, the activities of coopera 
tion are more similar to one another, which facilitates specialized learning. This 
may complicate the acquisition of knowledge from other businesses, which may 
result in a possible lack of learning new skills or insufficient selection and imple 
mentation of non conforming activities  Vanhaverbeke et al., 2003 .  
In co innovation alliances, learning is just as important as the protection of 
critical intellectual property. The managers involved should find an adequate balance 
between  openness  to  new  ideas  while  protecting  vital  company  interests,  thus 
avoiding the risk of being hollowed out by alliance partners who might have their 
own competitive interests in mind  Lei and Slocum, 1992; Prahalad, 1998 .  
Alliance partners should jointly organize their learning processes, and dis 
cuss openly their shared expectations concerning the respective contributions of 
the partners within the alliance, which includes discussions concerning shared per 
ceptions, uncertainties and risks, as well as levels of commitment to the alliance.  
In addition to technological discussions, social psychological contracts are 
also essential. When unexpected dilemmas arise during the innovation process   
which  is  usually  the  case  in  innovation     misunderstandings  and  conflicts  may 
hamper the learning processes. Significant imbalances between formal technologi 
cal and informal social psychological contracts may lead to underperformance, and 
possibly to dissolution of the co innovation alliance  Smith Ring and van de Ven, 
1994; Kumar and Nti, 1998 . 
                        Chapter 3     
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3.6   SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this chapter, we discussed four theoretical perspectives, which form the basis of 
our  model:  network  theory,  contingency  theory,  organizational  learning  theory, 
and a resource based view. We reviewed their implications on the performance of 
co innovation alliances.  
Networks  and  networking  play  an  important  role  in  co innovation 
alliances.  In network theory, we discussed the effects of the drivers of networking, 
the size of a network, its diversity, and the effect of the interdependence of part 
ners. In addition to this, we identified as important factors the structure of a net 
work,  its  context,  the  intensity  of  the  relationships,  the  position  of  a  partner 
within a network, its networking capabilities, and the balance between structural 
and personal embeddedness. Last, we discussed how networks evolve gradually. 
Evaluating the competences of partners vis à vis one another, which is the 
perspective  of  the  resource based  view,  is  a  vital  element  in  assessing  the 
performance of co innovation alliances. With the resource based view, we assessed 
the influence of the competences of a firm and its partners, where the develop 
ment of competences, experience and specialization are important. Competences 
may  be  developed  by  selection,  the  training  and  coaching  of  personnel,  or  by 
cooperating with external partners. Some factors complicate the development and 
use  of  competences,  such  as  tacit  knowledge,  a  dynamic  environment,  or 
protection  of  knowledge.  Finally,  we  identified  dysfunctional  aspects  of  core 
competences  core rigidities . 
Competences  should  fit  with  one  another:  for  alliance  performance 
appraisal,  a  fit  between  the  alliance  partners,  or  between  the  alliance  and  the 
environment, is essential, which can be analyzed through the lens of contingency 
theory. In the discussion concerning contingency theory, we described the neces 
sity of multiple fits between alliance partners, together with the effects of market 
fit, strategy fit, resource fit, organization fit and culture fit on the performance of 
co innovation alliances. 
The existence of several ‘fits’ however, is a conditio sine qua non but not 
sufficient. A company can only benefit from its co innovation alliance if it is able 
to  understand  the  internal  processes  of  digesting  and  implementing  additional 
knowledge  effectively.  In  understanding  the  internal  processes  of  acquiring, 
processing  and  using  additional  knowledge  effectively,  we  elaborated  on 
organizational learning theory. Appropriate learning intent, managerial support, 
the influence of relational capital, the availability of learning capabilities, and an 
appropriate organization facilitate organizational learning. We went on to discuss            THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
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several barriers in organizational learning, such as lack of motivation, divergent 
goals, the protection of knowledge, cultural differences, organizational barriers, 
and an inability to unlearn inappropriate practices. 
In the next chapter, we use the insight of theoretical perspectives to for 
mulate several hypotheses concerning co innovation performance.     Chapter 4    
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4  PERFORMANCE DRIVERS 
 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter, we build a conceptual framework consisting of dependent vari 
ables   performance ,  independent  variables   organizational  and  relational ,  as 
illustrated in Figure 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.1: Variables of the COINN model 
   
 
 
As described earlier, each variable in our COINN model is derived from adjacent 
research  areas,  such  as  that  on  strategic  alliances,  joint  ventures,  inter firm 
cooperation,  and  research  into  the  context  of  the  aforementioned  four 
theoretical domains. 
We define performance, elaborate on practicalities regarding measuring 
performance, and conclude with the description of the performance criteria that 
we used. We analyze which organizational factors and processes contribute to 
the performance of co innovation alliances, and how these factors and processes 
interact  with  one  another  in  determining  alliance  performance.  Not  only  do 
structural factors count, but also the personal relationships among the managers 
involved. These structural and relational aspects mutually influence one another 
 Faems et al., 2008  at different aggregation levels: the personal  dyadic , intra 
firm, inter firm, and the network level. 
        PERFORMANCE DRIVERS  
 
64 
Box 4.1: Business and relationships as a DNA-molecule 
 “Business and relationship are intimately intertwined with one another  
like a DNA-molecule;  
they are difficult to isolate or separate, and most certainly work together  
to create the entity,  






Source: Spekman and Isabella (2000: 77). 
 
In studies concerning the structural aspects of an alliances’ success or 
failure, collaborative advantages and firm specific capabilities in the development 
of alliances are studied, such as in  mis matches regarding strategy, structure or 
alliance  governance.  Other  aspects  are   in proper  execution  or   in ability  to 
deliver  the  expected  competences   Duysters  et  al.,  1999;  Dyer  and  Nobeoka, 
2000; Ireland et al., 2002; Kale et al., 2002 . 
Relational factors contribute considerably to the performance and suc 
cess of co innovation alliances   for instance, when alliances have to cope with 
unforeseen circumstances  Kauser and Shaw, 2004 . At the relational level, pat 
terns of behavior are described. Main sources of success or failure include the 
level  of  trust  and  loyalty,  sufficient  management  commitment  and  previous 
experiences.  Other  sources  include  the  level  of  coordination  and  integration, 
clear rules of engagement, accountability, and relational capital  Dyer and Singh, 
1998; Khanna et al., 1998; Madhok and Talman, 1998; Yan and Zeng, 1999; Kale 
et al., 2000 .  
 
 
4.2  DEFINING AND MEASURING PERFORMANCE  
 
Measuring the performance of co innovation alliances is complex and few com 
panies  succeed  in  assessing  the  performance  of  their  alliances  systematically. 
Dyer  et  al.   2001   report  that  over  fifty one  percent  of  alliances  do  not 
implement performance metrics at all. In addition, few firms are confident that 
their  measurements  of  innovation  performance  are  valid.  Improvement  of 
Business  Relationship     Chapter 4    
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measurement and the management of innovation activities are major concerns of 
innovative companies  Boston Consulting Group, 2006a,b .  
For alliance stability and success, the perceived output of the alliance in 
both  the  short  and  long term  should  be  larger  than  the  joint  input  of  the 
individual partners  Bamford and Ernst, 2002; Bamford et al., 2003 . The output 
of the co innovation alliance might be a direct and tangible outcome, such as a 
new innovative product or service, but can also be an indirect outcome, such as 
the development of a new technology, new know how or market access. The 
input of the partners might consist of capital, assets, raw material, manpower, 
specialized staff, know how, business systems, technology, market intelligence, 
brands, customers, and more.  
For  the  adequate  performance  assessment  of  innovation  activities,  the 
selection of an appropriate set of metrics is not sufficient. An adequate business 
model is necessary, involving a description of how the company can be innova 
tive, which innovation processes are needed, and how it will generate value from 
innovation because a measurement system is considered to be only as good as the 
underlying innovation business model  Kerssens van Drongelen and Bilderbeek, 
1999;  Chesbrough,  2003b;  Davila  et  al.,  2006 .  Furthermore,  awareness  of 
performance  measures  should  lead  to  the  corrective  actions  in  the  case  of 
underperformance or proactive actions in order to improve performance  Stober 
and Grant, 2006 . 
The  success  of  co innovation  is  difficult  to  predict  and  assessment  of 
performance  is  complex,  due  to  technological  complexity,  uncertainty,  dyna 
mism, and the nature of the collaboration, i.e. with external partners. Chesbrough 
 2004   illustrates  this  by  using  the  metaphor  of  playing  poker  as  opposed  to 
chess. A chess player plays on a fully defined battlefield of sixty four squares, 
with exactly defined tools against one combatant. In a fully defined game like 
chess, the player with superior skills to predict and adapt will win. In co innova 
tion however, many circumstances are uncertain and the poker metaphor is more 
applicable: based on the information available at that time, a player decides each 
game  whether  to  continue  playing   by  taking  new  chances   or  quitting.  In 
managing co innovation alliances, therefore the participants in an alliance must 
be able and willing to adapt resources with a high degree of flexibility.  
We consider the performance concept to be interest driven, subjective, 
and multi dimensional.
1 It is assessed relative to the various objectives driving an 
                                                
1 Gulati  1998  and Kale et al.  2002  researched different perspectives of performance. 
The interest driven side of performance was researched by Hamel et al.  1989 , Hill and 
Hellriegel  1994  and De Man and Duysters  2002 . Ariño  2003  researched content and 
discriminant validity of several measures of performance, such as strategic performance.        PERFORMANCE DRIVERS  
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alliance that may conflict with one another or be changed during the coopera 
tion. As discussed in Figure 2.5, we concentrate on three aspects of performance: 
the commercial, technological and financial aspect  see Table 4.1 .  
In a co innovation alliance, the partners cooperate in order to develop 
new products  “growing the pie”  and compete at the same time as well in the 
allocation of the benefits, such as profit and ownership  “sharing the pie” . This 
balance  between  intra alliance  competition  and  collaboration  needs  to  be 
managed constantly  Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996 . We therefore measure 
performance in absolute terms, such as the pay back period or financial growth, 
as well as in relative terms   e.g., the ownership of intellectual property rights. 
 
Table 4.1: Aspects of performance 
 
Aspect  Performance criteria            References 
Commercial 
performance 
1.  Marketing benefits, such as the rights of 
partners to market or distribute the alliance 
output, 
2.  Ownership of intellectual property rights, 
3.  Reduction of corporate risk or uncertainty,  
4.  Contribution to the competitive position, 
5.  Integration of the co-innovation project into 
the existing corporate business, 
6.  Growth opportunities for market share. 
Calogirou et al. (2003);  
Goerzen (2005);  






1.  Possibilities to acquire knowledge,  
2.  Access to complementary resources, 
3.  Exploitation of research synergies,  
4.  Achievement of learning objectives,  
5.  Improvement of the innovative, corporate 
portfolio,  
6.  Learning balance.
2  
Andrew and Sirkin 
(2006); 
Sydow and Windeler 
(1998);  
Calogirou et al. (2003);  
Boone et al. (2005);  
Goerzen (2005); 
Pansiri (2005); 




1.  Cash spending, 
2.  Revenue growth,  
3.  The period leading up to a positive cumulate 
cash flow or break-even outcome,  
4.  Reducing costs through the partnership,  
5.  Achievement of financial and strategic objec-
tives.  
Kogut (1989);  
Hagendoorn and 
Schakenraad, (1994);  
Sydow and Windeler 
(1998);  
Baum et al. (2000);  
Goerzen (2005);  
Boston Consulting Group 
(2006); Tjemkes (2008). 
 
                                                                                                                          
Finally, the subjectivity of performance was researched by Geringer and Hebert  1991 , 
Boone et al.  2005 , and Pansiri  2005 . 
2 That is, partners learn equally from one another.     Chapter 4    
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In Chapter 5, we will evaluate the performance criteria and construct scales for 
our dependent variables concerning performance. 
 
 
4.3  ORGANIZATIONAL DRIVERS 
 
4.3.1  CONTRACT NEED
3 
 
A sufficient level of flexibility is an essential part of creative and innovative proc 
esses. At the same time, managers have to implement effective control mecha 
nisms in order to be able to monitor progress, and adjust if necessary. However 
too much or the wrong type of control may constrain the team’s creativity, ham 
per progress, and lead to under performance  Bonner et al., 2002 . In this sec 
tion, we discuss the necessity and consequences of formal controls in co innova 
tion alliances.  
To a certain extent, contractual safeguards are necessary, especially when 
specific assets are required for a limited period  Reuer and Ariño, 2007 . Con 
tracts  are  used  to  decrease  opportunistic  behavior  by  the  contract  partners, 
which affect the performance of alliances  Mohr and Spekman, 1994, Cannon et 
al., 2000; Kauser and Shaw, 2004; Dekker, 2004 .  
In certain cases, formal controls may become counter productive. Put 
ting much emphasis on legal safeguards rather than on cooperation is considered 
a  major  pitfall  in  alliances   Jagersma,  2005 .  Such  an  attitude  can  result  in  a 
legalistic approach, which might have a negative impact on alliance performance. 
When  a  contract  becomes  excessively  detailed,  it  will  become  inflexible  and 
complicates monitoring compliance  Luo, 2002; Poppo and Zenger, 2002 . This 
is especially a risk with co innovation.  
Negotiating contractual safeguards should be carried out at the appropri 
ate time, after the essence of the innovation alliance has been agreed upon. In 
other words: negotiate business logic before control issues: “first identify the pie 
 opportunities and synergies    before allocating the slices, such as profit and ownership 
issues”  Jagersma, 2005: 49 .  
The choice of the most effective control mechanism in achieving innova 
tion outcomes is dependent on the desired level of innovativeness: a high degree 
of formal controls has a negative impact on project performance in highly inno 
vative projects  Bonner et al., 2002 .  
                                                
3  This  variable  is  based  on  organization  fit   contingency  theory   and  the  insights 
concerning organizational context and barriers  organizational learning theory .  
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The effectiveness of managerial control mechanisms depends on the type 
of knowledge a project depends upon: sometimes, formal control mechanisms are 
preferable; and in other cases, informal controls are more suitable. In the man 
agement  of  explicit  knowledge,  formal  control  mechanisms,  such  as  outcome 
control and process control,
4 do have a positive effect on project timeliness. At 
the same time, in the case of managing tacit knowledge, formal control mecha 
nisms have a positive effect on creativity. On the other hand, informal control 
mechanisms   for instance, clan control   will have a more positive effect on 
product quality when knowledge is tacit rather than when knowledge is explicit 
 Rijnsdijk et al., 2009 . This is illustrated in Table 4.2. 
 










Formal control mechanisms 






Formal control mechanisms 




  Exploitation activities 
(such as efficiency, 
 product quality, and timeliness) 
Exploration activities 
(such as creativity,  
and innovation) 
 
Adapted from: Rijnsdijk et al. (2009). 
 
Co innovation usually involves more tacit than explicit knowledge; in this case, 
therefore, informal control is preferable for product quality. 
The adequacy of formal controls is dependent on the aim of cooperation. 
In cases where learning is important, formal contracts tend to be less important 
 Hamel et al., 1989 . Moreover, companies that are confident of their ability to 
learn may consider formal contracts less important, and might even prefer more 
ambiguous loose contracts with more freedom to acquire skills and technologies 
 Hamel et al., 1989 .  
                                                
4 In outcome control, output is specified and evaluated. In process control, behavior is 
specified  and  evaluated.  Informal  or  clan  control  is  based  on  socialization  of  team 
members     Chapter 4    
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Box 4.2: Contracts and relationships 
“Formal contracts do not make successful relationships; people do” 
Source: Sonnenberg (1992: 49). 
 
The decision to rely on formal contracts is influenced by culture differences. For 
example, American managers normally prefer formal contracts in order to avoid 
conflicts and uncertainties, whereas Japanese managers prefer mutual discussion 
and mediation to formal contracts  Park and Ungson, 2001 .
5 
Establishing a balance between formal and informal contracts is essential. 
On the one hand, excessive reliance on formal, legal procedures obstructs the 
possibility  of  building  up  the  informal,  interpersonal  relationships,  which  are 
necessary for implementing activities in the co innovation alliance successfully.
6 
On the other hand, over investing in the relationship can also lead to inefficien 
cies or business risks  Ring and Van de Ven, 1994 .  
Detailed formal contracts reduce the flexibility to adapt to unforeseen 
circumstances,  which  will  definitely  arise  during  the  innovation  process.  We 
expect that too much emphasis on contractual safeguards in advance,  a legalistic 
approach  leads to less flexibility. This would hamper the co innovation process, 
because freedom to experiment is necessary. In the absence of flexibility, alli 
ances are restricted to executing pre defined obligations between parties, lacking 
the means to adapt creatively or innovatively to changing circumstances, which 
may lead to market
7, strategic, and organizational misfits, as described in the sec 
tion  on  contingency  theory.  The  more  contractual  an  alliance  is,  the  more 
inflexible it will become, which impedes the innovation process, due to orga 
nizational  barriers,  which  complicate  organizational  learning  and  creativity 
 Spekman et al., 2000; Strebel, 2003 . Based on the above, we suggest  
 
Hypothesis 1:  CONTRACT NEED 
An emphasis on agreeing upon many details and a formal contract in advance  




                                                
5 Hamel et al.  1989: 139  illustrate this by stating: the challenge for Western companies is 
“not to write tighter legal agreements but to become better learners”.
 
6 The relationship between contractual safeguards and alliance performance depends on 
both  the  level  and  type  of  trust   Lui  and  Ngo,  2004 .  We  discuss  the  independent 
variables “trust” and “personal relationships” in more detail in Section 4.4. 






Embeddedness, as defined in Section 3.2 on network theory, influences alliance 
formation and management  Emden et al, 2005 . Embeddedness of a firm and its 
partners  is  dependent  on  previous  experience  with  external  cooperation,  the 
position within networks, the size and interdependency between partners within 
the network. 
The relationship between alliance experience and performance is complex, 
and entails general alliance and partner specific experience, i.e. leaning effects 
across  multiple  and  a  single  partnership,  respectively.  Hoang  and  Rothaermel 
 2005  conclude that general alliance experience has a positive, although dimin 
ishing,  effect  on  alliance  success,  whereas  partner specific  experience  may  de 
crease alliance performance.  
Experience  in  external  cooperation  is  a  positive  factor  for  alliance 
performance; when one of the partners is inexperienced in alliance management, 
the chance of success might be reduced  Park and Russo, 1996; Draulans et al., 
2003 .  Through  experience,  partners  can  develop  their  skills  in  managing 
alliances  AWT, 2006 .  
Furthermore, when partners have joint experiences, they develop higher 
levels of collaborative know how  Simonin, 1997; Beckman and Haunschild, 2002; 
Emden et al., 2005 . Joint experiences may be considered as a starting point for 
further cooperation on innovation  Lampe and Spekman, 1998; Child and Yan, 
2003   where  they  learn  to  operate  in  new  areas  and  learn  how  to  cooperate 
 Barkema et al., 1997 .  
On the one hand, through accumulation of know how, a higher success 
rate  can  be  expected,  especially  in  innovation  alliances   Anand  and  Khanna, 
2000; Draulans et al., 2003 . This learning effect from previous alliances is most 
beneficial when alliance activities are complex and uncertain  Sampson, 2005  or 
when  companies  are  inexperienced.
9  The  cumulative  benefits  of  alliance 
experience tend to decrease after a certain level. In this case, a company may 
exceed its capacity in handling alliances, or cooperation experiences may start to 
become  out dated.  It  has  been  observed  that  with  advanced  management 
                                                
8 This variable is grounded on the diversity, structure and size of a network  network 
theory ,  external  cooperation   both  in  network  theory  and  organizational  learning 
theory , and experience and specialization  resource based view . 
9 This learning effect cannot be distinguished however, in alliances with weak ties  such 
as licensing . In marketing alliances, the learning effect might even be negative  Anand 
and  Khanna,  2000 .  Furthermore,  the  evaluation  of  inexperienced  companies  differs 
from  experienced  companies.  Inexperienced  companies  benefit  mostly  from  the 
evaluation of an individual alliance, while experienced companies mostly from comparing 
various alliances with one another.     Chapter 4    
 
71 
techniques, the success rate can be increased, albeit with decreasing cumulative 
effects  Draulans et al., 2003; Sampson, 2005 . This is illustrated in Figure 4.2.  
 
Figure 4.2: Decreasing learning effects of managing alliances 
 
Source: Draulans et al. (2003). 
 
On  the  other  hand,  from  a  network  theory  perspective,  multiple 
cooperation with the same partners may lack sufficient variation or may generate 
‘non redundant’  knowledge,  which  might  be  an  essential  disadvantage  in  the 
innovation  in  an  environment  of  high  technological  uncertainty   Burt,  1992; 
Goerzen, 2007 . 
The position in networks determines the embeddedness of a firm and its 
partners. If a network partner plays a central role in a network, it will usually be 
trusted more, might have more power, and has an innovative reputation, resulting 
in more exchange of resources between partners. Furthermore, a highly central 
firm is likely to be connected to many more knowledge sources than a less central 
firm, which may be beneficial to the innovation process  Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998 . 
Although network centrality has positive elements, it entails negative as well. If 
an  industry  is  considered  to  be  highly  dynamic,  industry  structures  can  be 
changed  drastically.  For  instance,  in  the  case  of  radical  innovation,  a  shift  in 
technological paradigms can make previously required skills and knowledge bases 
obsolete, or at least less important, and might deteriorate the position of firms 
with a central position in networks. Therefore, assessing such industry trends in 
relation to network centrality is relevant for selecting potential alliance partners 
 Madhavan et al., 1998 .  
The size of networks is important for alliance performance, because with 
more external relationships, the technical, commercial and social capital of a firm 
will increase  Walker et al., 1997 . Especially social capital is relevant, because 
firms with higher social capital are likely to have more relationships with new 
partners, which is considered to facilitate cooperation  Ahuja, 2000b .        PERFORMANCE DRIVERS  
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Diversity  of  partners  within  a  network  of  linkages  is  essential  because 
having several different experiences prior to the alliance makes information ex 
change  between  partners  more  unique  and  useful   Beckman  and  Haunschild, 
2002 . The same applies to more interdependency between partners. Multiple rela 
tionships  between  partners  affect  decision  quality  positively   Beckman  and 
Haunschild, 2002 . In addition, an alliance, whose partners are tied with multiple 
linkages simultaneously, is less likely to fail  Kogut, 1989 . 
The aspects of embeddedness interact with one another and reinforce 
each other; the greater the number of innovation alliances a firm has, the more 
experience of managing them is available. This makes a firm more attractive to 
potential  partners  enabling  them  to  possess  a  more  central  role  within  its 
networks. This network centrality may facilitate further growth and innovation 
 Powell et al., 1996 .  
On the other hand, it is also important to consider the effects of too 
much embeddedness. Too much embeddedness or over embeddedness has negative 
effects: it can lead to too much dependency on the networks, less flexibility and 
less internal learning  Gargiulo and Ertug, 2006 . High embeddedness with existing 
partners might be less adequate in environments of greater technological uncer 
tainty  Goerzen, 2007 . This is illustrated in Figure 4.3. 
 
Figure 4.3: Performance and embeddedness 
 
 
We define our variable our variable ‘embeddedness’ as the sum of experience with 
network relations, the number of partnerships and the centrality of network roles 
of the firm and its partner. Consistent with previous research we conclude with 
 
Hypothesis 2: EMBEDDEDNESS 
The relationship between embeddedness and performance  
of a co-innovation alliance is hill-shaped. 
 
     Chapter 4    
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4.3.3    BALANCED COMPETENCES
10 
 
A situation, in which the contribution of partners is balanced, depends 
on  a  resource  fit  between  them   including  the  complementary  or  interdepen 
dency of their resources , and their organizational learning capabilities. The rela 
tive uniqueness of partner contributions is not static; hence the balance of power 
is dynamic. 
First, we discuss the resource fit between partners concerning co innova 
tion performance. On the one hand, when exploiting existing capabilities, firms 
usually prefer to develop their innovations alone   e.g., when improving existing 
production  techniques  or  engaging  in  incremental  innovation.  On  the  other 
hand, they tend to ally when a firm needs to expand its capabilities in order to 
compete  more  successfully  or  to  explore  new  opportunities   Gomes Casseres, 
1989; Lei and Slocum, 1991, 1992 . By combining complementary  technological  
capabilities  of  alliance  partners,  companies  can  boost  their  innovative 
productivity  Afuah, 2000; Stuart, 2000 . In order to achieve a resource fit, a 
degree  of  shared  knowledge  is  essential,  which  is  in  line  with  the  cognitive 
distance  theory;  a  higher  level  of  collaborative  know how  increases  of  both 
tangible and intangible benefits  Mowery et al., 1996; Chan et al., 1997; Lane and 
Lubatkin, 1998; Callahan and MacKenzie, 1999; De Man and Duysters, 2002 . In 
order  to  achieve  a  resource  fit,  the  contributions  should  be  complementary, 
compatible  and  interdependent.  Complementarily  is  important,  because  firms 
tend  to  seek  the  transfer  of  knowledge  that  complements  their  existing 
knowledge base. In order to be able to make use of the skills of the alliance 
partners, they should be compatible  Makhija and Ganesh, 1997; Shenkar and Li, 
1999 .  
Furthermore, interdependence in terms of investment and resources   or 
even mutual interdependency  reciprocity    enhances the stability of alliances 
 Porter  and  Fuller,  1986;  Kogut,  1989;  Gulati,  1999 .  Through  reciprocity, 
partners are able to potentially reward or penalize one another’s behavior if and 
when  appropriate   Kogut,  1989;  Chung  et  al.,  2000 .  Interdependency  of 
resources is related to the relative bargaining power of the partners towards one 
another. If a resource is unique and essential to the innovation process, a partner 
has a greater bargaining power  Kauser and Shaw, 2004 . A balance of power and 
control  between  partners  enhances  alliance  stability  and  thus  indirectly, 
performance  Muthusamy and White, 2006 . Such a balance of power may shift 
                                                
10 W e  used  for  this  variable  insights  as  to  resource  fit   contingency  theory , 
interdependency  of  partners   network  theory ,  and  complementary  competences 
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during  the  alliance,  leading  to  a  possible  deterioration  of  the  stability  and 
underperformance of the alliance. 
The organizational learning capabilities within the alliance influence per 
formance. In co innovation alliances, firms seek to benefit from the resources of 
their partners, and increase their own capabilities. This may result in a situation 
in which a partner is no longer needed, because the benefits of cooperating do 
not any longer outweigh the costs of the partnership  Gomes Casseres, 1987 , 
which will change the bargaining power balance between the partners, and may 
lead to alliance instability  Harrigan and Newman, 1990; Yan and Gray, 1994 . A 
co innovation alliance can be considered as a race to learn: companies that are 
most effective in learning from the alliance enhance their competitive position 
more   Parkhe,  1991 .  A  higher  learning efficiency  by  one  partner  may  lead  to 
decreased dependency on the other partner in performing alliance tasks, which 
may improve the bargaining power of one partner  Yan, 1998; Park and Ungson, 
2001; Duysters and Heimeriks, 2002b .  
The relative importance of the partners’ contributions can shift in due 
course, which, in turn, also affects the relative bargaining power of the alliance 
partners. For a durable balance of power, the contributions of partners should 
remain  unique,  implying  that  a  competence  cannot  easily  be  traded,  or 
substituted, developed independently, or replicated within any reasonable time 
frame. If the partner’s contributions are unique, not traded or developed alone, 
the partner cannot easily be substituted for alternative partners and has a more 
durable bargaining power in the alliance  Doz and Hamel, 1998 . A balance of 
power also affects decision making or conflict resolution within the alliance. A 
partner  with  relatively  more  power  is  able  to  force  its  preferred  alternative 
solution when conflicts arise, and is less likely to propose intermediate solutions 
 ‘give  and  take’ .  In  addition,  greater  bargaining  power  gives  a  partner  the 
opportunity to impose more control on the alliance  Inkpen and Currall, 2004 . 
In the short term, the benefit from a dominant position may facilitate decision 
making and efficiency within the alliance  Park and Ungson, 1997; Garcia Canal 
et al., 2003 . In the longer term however, such asymmetry in the power balance 
might destabilize the alliance and decrease its efficacy  Park and Ungson, 2001 . 
An unequal balance of power creates uneven dependency and dissatisfaction in 
the partnership, therefore willingness to abstain from a high level of management 
control in order to enhance the level of cooperation might be beneficial in the 
longer term however, a high degree of foresight, mutual tolerance and trust is 
necessary  Inkpen, 1995; Steensma and Lyles, 2000 .     Chapter 4    
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We define our variable ‘balanced competences’ as a situation in which the 
competences of the co innovation alliance partners are both unique and durable. 
Based on the above mentioned observations, we state 
 
Hypothesis 3: BALANCED COMPETENCES 
Balanced competences are positively associated  




4.3.4    COORDINATION NEED
11  
 
Several  factors  affect  governance  structures  and  the  need  for  coordination 
between the alliance partners: control mechanisms, organizational structures and 
performance influence one another simultaneously  Geringer and Hebert, 1989; 
Yan and Zeng, 1999; Goerzen, 2005 . Coordination influences alliances perform 
ance and satisfaction of international strategic alliances positively  Kauser and 
Shaw, 2004 .  
Innovation is an uncertain process  Chesbrough, 2003b . Co innovation 
alliances face added complexity when involved in cooperation with external part 
ners as these partners have their own agendas, their own portfolio of strategies, 
competences and specific technological complexities. Complexity is one of the 
primary sources of underperformance in alliances  Park and Ungson, 2001 . We 
will discuss the impact the sources of complexity have on control mechanisms 
and organizational structures below.  
First, the nature of the innovation process adds complexity because uncer 
tainty is inherent to innovation, which results in a difficulty to control innova 
tion process and the impossibility to foresee all aspects a priori. Innovation is a 
creative  and  opportunistic  process,  which  needs  space  for  unexpected  occur 
rences  Drucker, 1985  or serendipity. Therefore, innovation processes can only 
be  organized  to  a  limited  extent   Hamel,  1998;  Moore,  2005 .  Capturing 
serendipity  requires  flexibility  and  adaptability   Estrin,  2009 .  Innovation 
involves a tension between a certain space for creativity and flexibility, on the 
one hand, and timeliness, product quality, efficiency and effectiveness, on the 
other   Leenders  et  al.,  2007,  Perez Freije  and  Enkel,  2007 .  Innovation  man 
                                                
11 This variable is based on insights regarding the aim of cooperating  network theory , 
complementary  competences   resource based  view ,  organizational  and  resource  fit 
 contingency  theory ,  the  organizational  context  and  barriers,  and  the  protection  of 
knowledge  organizational learning theory .        PERFORMANCE DRIVERS  
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agement requires a balance between those forces. Too much freedom, such as a 
change in specification during the entire innovation process, will cause ineffi 
ciencies, but too much rigidity can constrain innovators  Estrin, 2009 , as is illus 
trated by the quotation of a general manager of the innovative US company 3M 
in box 4.3. 
 
Box 4.3: People and sheep 
“If you put fences around people, you end up with sheep” 
Source: Eberl and Puma (2007: 14). 
 
Second, the organization and management of an alliance increases complexity, 
as the process of governance has a direct impact on performance  Madhok and 
Tallman, 1998 . This involves not only the initial governance structure of the 
alliance,  but  also  the  way  it  is  managed,  especially  when  unforeseen 
circumstances occur   which are inherent to innovation   require a change of 
governance structures. New situations will require new balances. Furthermore, 
the  likelihood  of  change  in  the  governance  structure  is  influenced  by     e.g., 
previous experiences   either with one another or in similar product areas   or by 
the importance of the alliance to the partners  Reuer et al., 2002 . Therefore, in 
co innovation  alliances,  several  balances  have  to  be  found  and  managed 
simultaneously.  
This  implies  a  flexible  structure  of  relationships  between  the 
headquarters of the partners and the alliance organization, which in turn requires 
a  balance  between  a  need  for  speed   fast  product  development,  and  timely 
knowledge transfer across markets and businesses  and a need for thoroughness 
 due to technological issues . Alliance management requires a balance between 
those  forces  which  involve  not  only  the  question  of  how  to  optimize  the 
governance structure, but also how to retain the capacity for flexible and quick 
response  Ghoshal and Gratton, 2002 . This balance is not only related to the 
degree of control exercised, but also to the way in which the control is carried 
out  Bamford et al., 2003; Kauser and Shaw, 2004 . The balance involves both 
formal and informal relationships, and affects technological issues, organizational 
values,  behaviors,  as  well  as  an  appropriate  business  model   Hamel  and 
Välikangas,  2003 .  If  partners  have  similar  governance  structures,  these 
complexities can be tackled more easily. We expect that more similarity leads to 
more  stability  in  the  co innovation  alliance,  and  consequently  better 
performance, as illustrated in Figure 4.4. 
     Chapter 4    
 
77 
 Figure 4.4: Performance and governance structure 
 
 
We examine the impact of experience, organization fit and competences on the 
coordination need of partners. 
If partners have experience with one another, this influences the coordina 
tion need. A successful pre alliance relationship between the partners reduces 
the  importance  of  a  formal  control  structure  due  to  increased  levels  of  trust 
 Yan,  1998;  Park  and  Ungson,  2001;  Duysters  and  Heimeriks,  2002b .  The 
governance structure and the level of trust between the alliance partners influ 
ence one another. If partners trust one another, they depend more on social and 
less on formal controls. If formal controls are used heavily, there is less develop 
ment of trust  Inkpen and Currall, 2004 . 
An organization fit influences a coordination need. A clearly communi 
cated fit of operational policies of the partners   as in management control and 
production procedures   contributes to alliance success  Duysters and Heimeriks, 
2002a .  If  such  a  fit  is  disturbed,  for  example  through  an  imbalance  in  the 
management  control  vis à vis  the  decision  structure,  partners  may  feel  an 
increased need for coordination  Steensma and Lyles, 2000 .  
Competences  and  inter partner  learning  influence  the  levels  of  desired 
coordination between the partners. One of these competences is the ability of 
partners to deal with differentiated and flexible structures. Not all partners are 
able or willing to handle such a differentiated fit, which is necessary for flexibility 
and innovation  Brown et al., 2002 . Inter partner learning affects the governance 
structure. A larger technological distance between the partners influences the 
control need of the partners. On the one hand, partners facing a larger techno 
logical distance tend to seek more coordination of activities in order to be able to 
implement the other’s technology. On the other hand, learning or R&D related 
motives of partners lead to a preference for less hierarchical governance modes 
 Makhija and Ganesh, 1997; Inkpen and Currall, 2004; Van de Vrande et al., 
2006 . Furthermore, if companies are confident of their ability to learn, they may 
even prefer some ambiguity in the governance structure of their co innovation 
alliances  Hamel et al., 1989 .        PERFORMANCE DRIVERS  
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In conclusion, we state that a low level of desired coordination leads to 
insufficient use of complementary resources, and a high level of coordination will 
impede the necessary flexibility, creativity and innovation  see Figure 4.5 .  
 
Figure 4.5: Performance and coordination 
 
 
We  define  our  variable  ‘governance  fit’  as  the  perceived  similarity  of 
governance structures of the alliance partners and our variable ‘coordination need’ 
as a high level of desired coordination for the co innovation project, which leads 
to 
 
Hypothesis 4a: GOVERNANCE FIT 
Similarity of governance structures of the alliance partners 
 is positively associated with the performance of a co-innovation alliance. 
 
Hypothesis 4b: COORDINATION NEED 
The relationship between coordination need of the alliance partners  
and performance of a co-innovation alliance is hill-shaped.     Chapter 4    
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4.4  RELATIONSHIP  DRIVERS 
 
4.4.1   TRUST
12 
 
Trust, alliance success, and performance influence one another. Trust can con 
sidered to be a key predictor of partnership success and performance, and lack of 
trust as one of the main reasons for failure  Cullen et al., 2000; Kauser and Shaw, 
2004 . Trust between the alliance partners has to grow gradually by having posi 
tive joint experiences, and can be destroyed just as easily. The development of 
trust can also be linked to an individual's positive or negative experience with 
others  Jennings et al., 2000 .  
 
Box: 4.4: The importance of trust 
 “A partnership works on the basis of trust and commitment or not at all” 
Source: Park and Ungson, (2001: 51). 
 
Cooperation within alliances requires willingness to accept dependence, which 
in turn requires the assurance or expectation that the other parties will meet the 
agreement. These expectations might be based on objective logic  facts  or based 
on subjective feelings, or beliefs concerning how an alliance partner will behave 
in a relationship.  
There is an emotional and a rational component attached to trust  Cullen 
et al., 2000; Nooteboom, 1996, 2000 . The subjective or emotional element of 
trust   known as benevolent, intentional or goodwill trust   implies a partner’s 
intention to perform according to agreement  Friedman, 1991 . Goodwill trust is 
linked to relational risk; if intentions fail, one may improve incentives or issue 
threats.  
The  subjective  element  of  trust  is  the  most  complicated,  because  if 
problems occur due to lack of intention, several excuses are possible, such as 
unfavorable  conditions  or  capability  shortcomings   Nooteboom,  2000 .  The 
rational component is known as competence trust or credibility trust, implying 
the confidence that a partner has the ability to deliver its obligations according 
to agreement. Competence trust refers to the expectation that partners have the 
ability  to  fulfill  their  roles.  This  is  related  to  performance  risk  and  can  be 
relatively  easily  evaluated     e.g.,  by  assessing  a  partner’s  resource  allocation. 
                                                
12 This variable is based on insights concerning personal and structural embeddedness 
 network theory , cultural fit  contingency theory , protection of knowledge  resource  
based  view  and  organizational  learning  theory ,  relational  capital,  and  organizational 
barriers  organizational learning theory .        PERFORMANCE DRIVERS  
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When a partner lacks this ability, one may give support in order to improve it. 
The two aspects of trust, goodwill trust and competence trust, are closely related 
to the calculation of different types of perceived risk in an alliance  Das and 
Teng, 1998, 2004; Lui and Ngo, 2004 . 
Trust relates to the confidence or predictability of the perceived consis 
tency in one’s behavior  Six, 2004 . Trust is dynamic, interactive and complex; 
dynamic, because it can be built but just as easily destroyed; interactive, because 
it  is  the  result  of  an  interactive  process  between  two  or  more  individuals 
experiencing each others’ trustworthiness. Trust is also complex, because it can 
be asymmetric  A trusts B, but not vice versa , there is no absolute certainty that 
trust will be honored, and it is practically impossible to prove, unless there is 
clear evidence of untrustworthy behavior. Furthermore, trust can be studied at 
interpersonal, intergroup and inter firm level, which in turn are linked to one 
another  Curral and Inkpen, 2002; Faems et al., 2008 . 
We elaborate upon the processes leading to the development of trust, as 
listed in box 4.5. 
 
Box 4.5: The positive effects of trust 
1.  Less uncertainty 
2.  Lower costs (transaction, coordination or governance)  
3.  Less bureaucratic complexity and more flexibility 
4.  More profitable 
5.  Better conflict resolution 
6.  More openness and consequently a better acquisition of knowledge 
7.  More perseverance and commitment 
 
 
Trust  can  lead  to  less  uncertainty,  which  is  extremely  important  in  an 
environment of high ambiguity and complexity. In these cases, trust can provide 
a sense of security in order to cope with the accompanying risks  Das and Teng, 
2004; Six, 2004; Gargiulo and Ertug, 2006 ; trust reduces relational risks of coop 
eration  Nooteboom et al., 1997 .  
Trust reduces opportunism in alliances, which has the effect of lowering 
the  following  costs:  transaction   Nooteboom,  1999b;  Klein  Woolthuis  et  al., 
2005 , coordination  Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999 , governance  Ring and Van 
de Ven, 1992 , and/or information processing cost  Gargiulo and Ertug, 2006 . In 
order  to  react  successfully  to  major  unforeseen  circumstances,  which  might     Chapter 4    
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disrupt the alliance, trust and goodwill are indispensible  Ariño and de la Torre, 
1998 , due to the fact that detailed contracts are no longer necessary. Mutual 
trust strongly reduces the necessity for bureaucratic complexity  Park and Ung 
son, 2001; Six, 2004 .  
The ability to change is enhanced by trust  Six, 2004  and therefore posi 
tively  related  to  the  strategic  flexibility  of  an  alliance   Young Ybarra  and 
Wiersema, 1999 .  
Trust is therefore the least expensive mode of governance  Jennings et al., 
2000  and relates positively to revenue growth, profitability and the market value 
of a strategic alliance  Jennings et al., 2000 .  
Trust  improves  social  relationships  that  facilitate  efficiency  and  problem 
solving and helps to overcome conflicting situations and unexpected difficulties 
 Park and Ungson, 2001; Six, 2004 . Investment in a trustworthy relationship is, 
on the one hand, especially important in long term oriented alliances. Short term 
alliances, on the other hand, may rely more on exploiting mutual benefits  Cullen 
et al., 2000 .  
When alliance partners trust each other, more openness in information sharing 
and knowledge accessibility can be expected  Inkpen, 2000 , which is vital in co 
development and co innovation. Trust assists learning, creativity and innovation 
 Six, 2004 ; trust leads to a better acquisition of knowledge, due to the fact that 
the inclination to share new knowledge further reduces the chance of self cen 
tered opportunism, which in turn will lead to the sustainability of the alliance 
 Ring and van de Ven, 1992; Park and Russo, 1996 .  
Furthermore, trust leads to more perseverance and commitment  Gargiulo and 
Ertug,  2006 ,  which  plays  a  significant  role  in  overcoming  alliance  problems, 
which   if not solved   may lead to termination  Kauser and Shaw, 2004 . 
We summarize some important items that facilitate building trust within 
co innovation alliances in box 4.6. 
 
Box 4.6: Building trust 
1.  Positive experience 
2.  Personal embeddedness and familiarity 
3.  Openness, honesty and integrity 
4.  Sharing of benefits and risks 
5.  Commitment and patience 
 
Through positive experience, the inclination of alliance partners to behave 
opportunistically will diminish, resulting in more predictable behavior, which in        PERFORMANCE DRIVERS  
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turn  leads  to  trust  in  one  another,  and  increased  embeddedness   Uzzi,  1997 . 
Trust, therefore is a result and origin of success in an alliance  Ring and Van de 
Ven, 1992; Mody, 1993; Gulati, 1995a; Inkpen, 2000; Jennings et al., 2000; Ink 
pen and Currall, 2004 . Through positive experience during an alliance, partners 
become more familiar with one another, which leads to a more open style of 
problem solving, with less legalistic conflict resolution, and a greater willingness 
to  adopt  the  partners  desired  course  of  action  Lin  and  Germain,  1998 .  The 
extent to which alliance partners have a history of positive experience will sig 
nificantly influence the degree of trust  Park and Ungson, 1997 .  
Personal embeddedness will build trust. Personal embeddedness is a neces 
sary condition for trust  Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; Handy 1995 , because trust 
is based on individuals or small groups: one cannot trust another company   only 
people can trust each other  Jennings et al., 2000 . Deliberately increasing per 
sonal capital will facilitate the trust building process.  
This implies a certain degree of openness between alliance partners, where 
individuals express ideas openly and freely to one another. Through open and 
direct communication partners understand and   to a certain extent   predict 
one another’s behavior by using implicit and explicit rules together with the rou 
tinized exchange of information  Jennings et al., 2000 . The level and quality of 
communication  between  the  partners  improves  if  partners  trust  one  another 
 Young Ybarra and Wiersema, 1999 . This facilitates organizational learning by 
reducing motivational or organizational barriers. Furthermore, partners tend to 
become less restrictive in protecting propriety know how when they trust their 
alliance partners. 
Through a shared vision or values, partners can build trust between one 
another. Clearly defined collaborative objectives will stimulate the initial devel 
opment of trust between partners  Inkpen and Currall, 2004 . In this case, part 
ners develop a mutual understanding concerning the tasks to be performed by 
each alliance partner and the accompanying behavior  Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998; 
Young Ybarra and Wiersema, 1999; Cullen et al., 2000 . Furthermore, they per 
ceive the benefits and risks of the alliances to be fair and mutually beneficial 
 Jennings et al., 2000 .  
In order to develop trust, patience and the commitment is essential. Trust 
cannot be built overnight and seldom comes easily  Jennings et al., 2000; Park 
and Ungson, 2001 . Because it takes time to realize a high level of trust among 
partners, firms tend to duplicate their existing ties with former partners instead 
of initializing new ones  Duysters and Heimeriks, 2002a .  
Trust is indispensible, but not the only condition for a co innovation alli 
ance. An appropriate mix between trust and  in formal controls should be estab     Chapter 4    
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lished  Poppo and Zenger, 2002 . In the literature, it has been argued whether 
control  and  trust  substitute  or  complement  one  another   Dekker,  2004;  De 
Man, 2006 .
13 Does more trust lead automatically to less control? Extensive use 
of formal control suggests a lack of belief in one’s goodwill or competence, and 
therefore results in a damaging effect on relational trust  Das and Teng, 1998 .  
If trust and control are complementary to one another, an increase in the 
level of trust results in a lower level of control  Das and Teng, 1998 . To a certain 
extent, the use of formal controls may be complementary to developing trust. 
Trusting  alliance  partners  will  develop  a  greater  awareness,  or  willingness  to 
become conscious, of the rules, routines and procedures each follows  Gulati and 
Singh, 1998 .  
Too much control however, will have a negative impact on the continua 
tion of trust
  Dekker, 2003 . Depending on the situation, a combination of both 
is needed, which depends on the level of relational uncertainty   i.e., the prob 
ability  of  opportunistic  behavior  and  business  uncertainty.  Relational  uncer 
tainty asks for more control, but business uncertainty for more trust
  Das and 
Teng, 1998; De Man, 2006 . Trust and control are considered as parallel con 
cepts and their relationship is of a supplementary character in generating confi 
dence. In addition, control mechanisms have an impact on the trust level, which 
moderates the effect of control mechanisms in determining the control level 
 Das and Teng, 1998 . Madhok  1995b  argues that trust and control are substi 
tutes: they form two different orientations for management, namely a relation 
based approach  trust  and contractual based approach  control . In this case, it 
can be stated that the more trust there is, the less control is needed. Inkpen and 
Currall  2004  came to the same conclusion. 
At  the  same  time,  if  formal  controls  are  used  extensively,  the 
development of trust tends to be slower  Inkpen and Currall, 2004 . Das and 
Teng  1998  conclude that trust and control are complementary: trust may not 
simply be a substitute for control; managers combining formal contract with a 
high  level  of  relational  governance  achieved  higher  exchange  performance. 
Poppo  and  Zenger   2002   and  Luo   2002   drew  a  similar  conclusion:  more 
performance  can  be  expected  in  cases  where,  in  addition  to  trustworthy 
cooperation, more specific contracts were made which contained more contin 
gency terms. 
Once the alliance partners trust one another, trustworthiness should be 
maintained. Trust between alliance partners can be created and expanded. Low 
levels of trust will clearly have a negative impact on alliance performance, as 
                                                
13 Also mentioned by Ring and Van de Ven  1992 , Nooteboom et al.  1997 , Das and 
Teng  1998  and Gulati  1995a, 1998 .        PERFORMANCE DRIVERS  
 
84 
described. At the same time, too much trust has also negative effects: it can lead 
to complacency, an acceptance of less than satisfactory outcomes from a rela 
tionship  Gargiulo and Ertug, 2006 . Furthermore, too much trust can lead to 
betrayal, blind faith with risk of malfeasance, less information exchange between 
partners, or unnecessary obligations  Gargiulo and Ertug, 2006 . This is illus 
trated in Figure 4.6. 
 
Figure 4.6: Performance and trust 
 
 
Source: Gargiulo and Ertug, (2006). 
 
We define our variable ‘trust’ as  1  the mutual intent to disclose information in 
an accurate and timely fashion,  2  the extent to which obligations are met,  3  
the mutual inclination to give responsibility to one another and  4  the willing 
ness and ability to share expertise. 
 
Based on above mentioned arguments, we suggest 
 
Hypothesis 5: TRUST 
The relationship between trust  
and performance of a co-innovation alliance is hill-shaped. 
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4.4.2    CULTURAL FIT
14  
 
Culture is often cited as a reason for alliances not accomplishing their objectives. 
According to Leisen et al.  2002 , seventy five percent of alliance failures can be 
attributed to various types of culturally related problems. Without cultural sen 
sitivity, an alliance might run a large risk of failure  Child and Faulkner, 1998 . In 
addition,  the  cultures  of  the  partners  should  be  compatible   Callahan  and 
MacKenzie, 1999; Duysters and Heimeriks, 2002a . Incompatibility between cul 
tures may lead to poor communication, resulting in ineffective decision making, 
complicated  problem  resolution  and  inadequate  leadership  styles.  Therefore, 
understanding  the  cross cultural  patterns,  and  dealing  with  them  effectively, 
should be considered essential  Prahalad, 1998 . 
Hofstede  1989: 390  defines culture as “collective programming of the mind 
that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another.” Different 
layers of culture can be distinguished from one another, which vary from very 
implicit and in depth, such as basic assumptions, norms and values, to explicit 
and superficial, as in specific jargon, status symbols, and rituals  Hofstede, 1980; 
Trompenaars and Hampden Turner, 1998 . The analysis of cultures can be made 
at different aggregation levels, ranging from national, organizational or group  or 
team , or even personal level. All these levels of culture will influence the out 
come  at  the  level  of  an  individual  alliance   Parkhe,  1991 .  We  focus  on  the 
national and organizational level, which we will discuss briefly. At the national 
level,  cultures  vary  on  dimensions  referred  to  as  power  distance,  uncertainty 
avoidance, individuality, masculinity, and time orientation  Hofstede, 1980 . At 
the corporate level, parameters are used such as communication, information 
evaluation,  decision making  routines,  leadership  style,  problem solving  style, 
conflict management style, time orientation and employment duration  Parkhe, 
1991; Isaksen and Tidd, 2006; Trompenaars, 2007 . 
Cultural values are often reported with a high level of generality. This is 
unjustified, due to the fact that individuals may not act according to the group’s 
perceived standards. To a certain extent, values and practices are shared, but at 
the same time, values and practices vary within groups and between groups fol 
lowing a normal distribution  Trompenaars and Hampden Turner, 1998 , as illus 
trated in Figure 4.7. Groups A and B have different norms and values; at the 
same time they have certain cultural elements in common  Cab . There is a risk 
                                                
14  This  variable  is  grounded  in  the  literature  on  cultural  fit   contingency  theory , 
protection of knowledge and core rigidities  resource based view , and aspects of cultural 
differences  organizational learning theory .  
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however, that the groups refer to one another in extreme stereotypes  sa and sb . 
For instance, the American and French cultures differ from one another; Ameri 
cans  might  stereotype  French  as  arrogant,  flamboyant,  hierarchical  and  emo 
tional, whereas the French view the Americans as naïve, aggressive, unprincipled 
and workaholics.  
Culture  is  not  a  static  construct;  cultures  will  change  in  due  course 
through  the  influences  of  multiple  interactions  with  other  cultures   Trompe 
naars  and  Hampden Turner,  1998;  Leisen  et  al.,  2002 .  In  addition  to  this, 
cooperation with other cultures may lead to friction. The level of cross cultural 
tension varies in the course of relationship building processes; differences in cul 
tural values are more apparent in the early stages of relationships than later on 
 Moss Kanter and Corn, 1994 . During the cooperation, rather than stereotyping 
others, who are culturally differently programmed, partners become more aware 
of their cultural identity.  
 
Figure 4.7: Joint elements and stereotypes of cultures 
 
Source: Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1998). 
 
They shift from an ethnocentric attitude   judging the other by their own 
standards   to a polycentric attitude   accepting and assimilating the cultural dif 
ferences of the partners  Hofstede, 1983 . A successful partnership replaces an 
initial ‘us’ against ‘them’ mentality, which is loaded with stereotypes, to a new 
perception of ‘us’  Sonnenberg, 1992 . Furthermore, people of different cultures 
may  exchange  practices,  consequently  adapting  to  one  another,  resulting  in 
fewer cultural tensions.     Chapter 4    
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Cultural similarity increases stability and facilitates easy problem solving 
within alliances  Lin and Germain, 1998; Demirbag et al., 2007 . Similarity of cul 
tural values may reduce misunderstanding between the partners, while culturally 
distant partners experience greater difficulty in interacting in the acquisition of 
knowledge  Lyles and Salk, 1996 . 
At the same time, for creativity and innovation, cultural differences are 
to a certain extent positive, due to the fact that they enrich decision making, 
and facilitate ‘unlearning’ or thinking out of the box, therefore, managers should 
be aware of the different cultural identities of the alliance partners, observe cul 
tural tensions, and pay attention to the potential advantages of those differences 
 Jagersma, 2005; Trompenaars, 2007 . Some friction between alliance partners 
could be considered as being productive  Hagel and Brown, 2005 . In this case, 
traditional business activities can be fruitfully combined with the development 
of exploratory new business activities simultaneously.
15 Consistent with cognitive 
distance  theory,  as  described  in  Chapter  3,  we  state  that  cultural  differences 
within a co innovation team facilitate the innovation process and outcome. Too 
many and too deep cultural differences however, might have negative effects, 
which they can lead to excessive friction within in the alliances, as illustrated in 
Figure 4.8.  
 
Box 4.7: Serendipity and innovation 
“Half of the great innovations in the world were a result of great insight, 
the other half happened by accident, 
 and none of them happened on schedule” 
Source: McNamee as cited in Estrin (2009: 25). 
 
Innovation means dealing with the development of new processes and 
products; inherently, mistakes and unexpected problems will arise. In order to 
address these, open and frequent communication in which information is shared 
effectively at all levels is essential for rapid problem solving  Eberl and Puma, 
2007;  Gibbs  and  Humphries,  2009 .  In  addition  to  this,  learning  from  one 
another’s mistakes and taking the necessary action is crucial  Estrin, 2009 , as is 
illustrated in box 4.8.  
 
                                                
15 This is known as ambidextrous  O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004 .        PERFORMANCE DRIVERS  
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Box 4.8: A culture of openness 
“A culture of openness means being ready to admit mistakes and learn from them.  
Fear of criticism and sanctions is the cause of intellectual immobility,  
which is fatal for innovation departments” 
Source: Eberl and Puma (2007: 43). 
 
 




We define our variable ‘cultural fit’ between the co innovation partners by the 
similarity  of  their  communication,  decision making,  leadership  and  problem 
solving styles and suggest 
 
Hypothesis 6:  CULTURAL FIT 
The relationship between a cultural fit between the alliance partners  
and performance of a co-innovation alliance is hill-shaped.     Chapter 4    
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4.4.3   ABILITY TO TRANSFER TECHNOLOGY
16 
 
Knowledge transfer is a critical factor in the ability of a firm to innovate  Cohen 
and  Levinthal,  1990 ,  which  involves  an  inside out  transfer,  in  which  internally 
developed  innovations  are  being  commercialized,  or  outside in  transfer,  were 
external  knowledge  is  being  internalized   Chesbrough,  2003ab,  2006 .  In  the 
previous chapter, we discussed absorptive capacity as one of the key concepts of 
organizational learning theory, which was considered to be a conditio sine qua 
non for inbound and outbound innovation  Spithoven et al., 2010 . We consider 
the ability to transfer technology as synonymous with absorptive capacity. Due 
to the fact that we are interested in implementation, we discuss the different 
components in more detail in the co innovation context.  
Technology  transfer  involves  a  set  of  organizational  routines  and 
processes through which firms value, acquire, assimilate or   if needed   transform 
and  exploit  knowledge.  Firms  sense  and  value  opportunities,  subsequently 
capturing them by acquisition, assimilation or transforming them into practices, 
which are already in use within the firm. In order to exploit them, these proc 
esses have to be managed  Crossan et al., 1999; Zahra and George 2002; Teece, 
2007; Todorova and Durisin, 2007 . We incorporate the process of technology 
transfer in our model: see Figure 4.9.  
Companies evaluate their technology transfer processes, by enabling the 
development of new technology transfer capabilities  see the feedback loop in 
Figure 4.9 . Firms are able to adapt their innovative business and collaborate 
more  effectively  through  strong  ‘dynamic  capabilities’   Teece,  2007 .  The 
effectiveness  of  technology  transfer  depends  on  common  ground  between  a 
firm and its partner’s knowledge base  Inkpen, 2000; Calighirou et al., 2003; 
Lenox and King, 2004 . Alliances tend to be more successful if and when their 
activities  are  close  to  the  in house  R&D.  Incremental  innovation  draws 
primarily on existing knowledge bases; absorptive capacity increases the speed 
and  frequency  of  incremental  innovations.  A  broad  range  of  loosely  related 
knowledge domains facilitates radical innovation  Helfat, 1997; Vanhaverbeke 
et al., 2003; Lane et al., 2006 . In conclusion, lower levels of knowledge transfer 
occur in unilateral contracts vis à vis bilateral cooperation.
  
 
                                                
16 We used for this variable insights concerning the tacitness of knowledge, protection of 
knowledge   resource based  view  and  organizational  learning  theory ,  core  rigidities 
 resource based  view ,  asymmetries  in  learning   organizational  learning  theory ,  and 
learning intent  organizational learning theory .  
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Figure 4.9: Technology transfer integrated in COINN 
 
Adapted from Todorova and Durisin, 2007. 
 
We define our variable ‘technology transfer’  as the extent to which the 
partners in the alliance are willing and able to transfer knowledge to and from 
their partners. Too much technology transfer can have a negative effect: it may 
lead  to  uncontrolled  information  disclosure  and  a  shifting  balance  of  power, 
resulting  in  instability  and  underperformance  of  the  alliance,  as  illustrated  in 
Figure 4.10. 
 
Figure 4.10: Performance and the ability in transferring technology 
 
 
Based on the above, we state 
Hypothesis 7: TRANSFER TECHNOLOGY 
The relationship between the ability to transfer technology  
and performance of a co-innovation alliance is hill-shaped.     Chapter 4    
 
91 
4.4.4   THE INVOLVEMENT OF MANAGEMENT
17 
 
Success  and  commitment  influence  one  another;  more  commitment  leads  to 
more success, and vice versa  Blankenburg Holm et al., 1996 . Managers tend to 
be more committed to their alliances if they are successful  Kauser and Shaw, 
2004 . In addition, their commitment is important for the performance of co 
innovation alliances  Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Mortara et al., 2009 . 
Many companies consider innovation as crucial for growth and future profitabil 
ity, but due to short term financial pressures, do not receive the necessary com 
mitment  at  every  level  in  the  organization,  from  the  top  downwards   Haour, 
2004; Lindegaard, 2010 .  
 
Box 4.9: Innovation and top management involvement 
 “Innovation needs the support of top management,  
New plants need care, protection and good fertilizer, 
The same applies to innovation” 
Source: Eberl and Puma (2007:36). 
 
Management involvement is important to co innovation because man 
agement plays a strategic role in the allocation of funds or other resources to co 
innovation  alliances,  and  is  in  the  position  to  obtain  a  resource  fit  with  the 
alliance partners. Top level managers decide upon the way a firm makes use of 
its partnership infrastructure and are able to reduce organizational barriers or 
decide  upon  the  development  of  organizational  competences     e.g.,  through 
selection, training or coaching of key personnel. The commitment op top level 
management is especially important in establishing trust between alliance part 
ners  Lampe and Spekman, 1997; Cullen et al., 2000 . It is important that the 
management of all alliance partners is equally committed, for if they are not, the 
partnership is likely to fail  Sonnenberg, 1992; Cools and Roos, 2005 .  
The role of management in co innovation projects is fourfold: making 
sense, role modeling, team building and support. In making sense, top managers 
motivate and engage their employees personally by coupling personal needs to 
the fundamental purpose of the organization. Increasing loyalty and motivation 
enhance performance due to the fact that “people work for money but die for a cause”. 
                                                
17  This  variable  is  grounded  on  insights  regarding  resource  fit   contingency  theory , 
structural and personal embeddedness, intensity of a network, networking capabilities  all 
network  theory ,  relational  capital,  external  cooperation,  managerial  support,  and 
organizational context and barriers  all organizational learning theory .  
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In  role  modeling,  top  managers  strive  to  obtain  the  desired  mind set,  which 
should be shaped from the top downwards in order to promote new values into 
the existing corporate culture. Management serves as a role model in establishing 
a sense of community together with values such the importance of innovation 
and creativity. The third role of management is to build a strong and committed 
team  of  alliance  managers.  Fourth  and  last,  they  support  the  co innovation 
activities when needed, persistently and consistently  Kets de Vries and Florent 
Treacy, 2002; Aiken and Keller, 2006 . 
The characteristics of top managers, such as personality, background and 
working experience, have an impact on the performance of alliances  Pansiri, 
2005 . In social learning theory, the distinction is made between internally as 
opposed to externally orientated managers; internally oriented managers, on the 
one hand, believe that the outcome is a consequence of their own actions, while 
on the other hand, externals assume that the outcome is a result of external fac 
tors, such as chance, luck or fate, powerful outsiders, or unpredictable complex 
environmental forces  Wijbenga and van Witteloostuijn, 2007 . Internal CEO’s 
are more inclined to pursue a relatively innovative strategy than external CEO’s 
 Boone  et  al.,  1996 .  Internals  CEO’s  are  more  inclined  to  search  for  new 
opportunities than externals, and seem to learn more from feedback and past 
experiences than externals. Furthermore, the professional background of a leader 
is relevant; a co innovation team is focused on development with external part 
ners  which  might  benefit  from  a  leader  with  a  background  from  outside  the 
company  Boone et al., 2005 .  
We define our variable ‘management involvement’ as the extent to which 
the  top  managers  of  the  alliance  partners  are  involved  in  the  co innovation 
alliances. Such involvement can become counter productive; management inter 
vention during the innovation process has a negative impact on project perform 
ance, while management facilitation leads to higher performance  Bonner et al., 
2002:  238 .  Excessive  involvement  by  top  managers  may  lead  to  too  much 
dependency on management, and less flexibility and motivation on the part of 
the co innovation team, as is illustrated in Figure 4.11. 
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Figure 4.11: Performance and management involvement  
 
 
Therefore, we formulate  
 
Hypothesis 8: INVOLVEMENT OF MANAGEMENT 
The relationship between involvement of the management  




4.4.5   INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS
18 
 
Personal attachments contribute to alliance performance, which should be main 
tained at several hierarchical levels during the various stages of the alliance. The 
success of co innovation alliances depends not only on the hard side of alliance 
management, such as financial or operational issues, but also on the soft side: the 
development  and  management  of  relationships  within  the  alliance.  A  balance 
between structural and personal embeddedness is preferable, as this stabilizes an 
alliance  Seabright et al., 1992; Madhok, 1995a; Child and Faulkner, 1998 , there 
fore, building and maintaining interpersonal relationships with counterpart part 
ners  is  important.  More  effective  co ordination,  communication  or  conflict 
resolution can be achieved with the help of interpersonal relationships  Kauser 
and Shaw, 2004; Trompenaars, 2007 . The interpersonal skills of key personnel 
are essential in this situation, which can be achieved by the selection of new per 
sonnel with the appropriate credentials, or the training and coaching of existing 
personnel in order to develop their capabilities further  Stober and Grant, 2006 . 
 
                                                
18 This variable is based on structural and personal embeddedness, intensity of a network 
and  networking  capabilities   all  network  theory ,  external  cooperation,  motivational 
barriers and relational capital  all organizational learning theory . 
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Box 4.10: Know-how and know-who 
“Success is the result of  
not only what you know but also who you know. 
Intercompany relationships are a key business asset, 
and knowing them is an essential managerial ability” 
Source: Moss Kanter (1994: 108). 
 
We discuss several aspects of personal relationships at several hierarchical levels 
during the various phases of the alliance. 
Personal relationships affect several aspects of the co innovation alliance 
because co innovation alliances often demand intensive interaction between the 
various  partners.  During  the  innovation  process,  disagreements  are  almost 
inevitable.  When  conflicts  are  not  effectively  resolved,  the  cooperation  will 
become  less  effective  and  the  innovation  is  likely  to  fail.  In  contrast,  when 
conflict  resolution  processes  are  properly  managed,  the  cooperation  will  be 
energized  Lin and Germain, 1998 . Personal relationships are vital in problem 
solving, stabilizing and strengthening the inter firm partnership. Furthermore, 
they facilitate knowledge transfer between alliance partners. The positive effects 
of relational based governance compared with contractual based governance are 
especially important in situations of high pressure or environmental turbulence 
 Madhok, 1995a; Lee and Cavusgil, 2006  and in dyadic alliances  Garcia Canal et 
al., 2003 .
19 
It is preferable to maintain personal relationships at several hierarchical 
levels between the co innovation alliance partners. Companies with strong per 
sonal relationships across the board share information widely, and tend to create 
more productive external relationships at several levels   i.e., at the strategic, 
tactical,  operational,  and  interpersonal  level.  Managers  should,  to  a  certain 
extent, be given the freedom to build and maintain relationships with their alli 
ance partner’s counterparts. However, freedom to act may be difficult for tightly 
managed companies with detail oriented managers; in these cases, communica 
tion  and  acquisition  of  knowledge  are  restricted.  Because  of  strict  internal 
barriers, alliance partners might face problems in realizing the full potential of 
their  relationships   Moss  Kanter,  1994 .  Maintaining  multi level  relationships 
between different organizations is highly interactive and therefore complex, due 
to the fact that the counterparts might possibly need to act within contradictory 
contexts. In order to deal with these complexities, the managers involved should 
                                                
19 In multi partner alliances, the effect of personal relationships is considered to be 
weaker.     Chapter 4    
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be highly adaptive  Boddy et al., 2000 . Janowicz Panjaitan and Noorderhaven 
 2008  conclude that informal learning behavior, such as spontaneous interaction 
and knowledge sharing, has a positive effect on the inter organizational learning 
of tacit knowledge, while too much formal learning behavior   e.g., programmed 
events and visits, might become counter productive at higher levels.  
 
Box 4.11: Relationships evolve 
“Relationships between companies begin, grow, and develop – or fail – 
much like the relationships between people.  
Just as in romances, alliances are built on hopes and dreams.  
Establishing many interpersonal relationships between partners  
helps resolve small conflicts before they escalate” 
Source: Moss Kanter (1994: 99). 
 
  Personal relationships are crucial in several phases of the alliance  Kauser 
and Shaw, 2004; Leenders et al., 2007 . Not only does the social structure affect 
inter firm alliance formation  Gulati, 1995b , personal ties also play a major role 
in the maintenance or prevention of the dissolution of alliances  Seabright et al., 
1992 . During all phases of an alliance, formal  structural  and informal  social 
psychological  processes interact. Ring and van de Ven  1994  distinguish three 
phases: a negotiation, commitment, and an execution phase. At the start of the 
relationship,  in  the  negotiation  phase,  alliance  partners  develop  expectations 
about one another’s motivations, and investigate terms and procedures for a po 
tential  relationship;  in  this  phase,  bargaining  is  usually  formal.  Later,  in  the 
commitment stage, partners might reach a mutual agreement, both formally and 
psychologically, when they feel more committed to the relationship. Finally, in 
the  execution  stage,  the  terms  and  governance  structure  are  established  and 
implemented.  If  the  unexpected  should  happen  within  the  co innovation 
cooperation,  misunderstandings  and  conflicts  among  the  parties  are  almost 
inevitable, which can be a reason for rethinking the terms of the relationship 
through renegotiation, followed by new commitment and execution. When there 
are significant imbalances between the formal and the informal processes in the 
negotiation, commitment and execution stages, the likelihood of the dissolution 
of the alliance is increased  Ring and van de Ven, 1994 . It is therefore important 
to build sound interpersonal relationships between the partners of an alliance 
during an extended courtship period   i.e., before the alliance is created. Staffing 
the alliance with managers who are able to interact properly with partners is        PERFORMANCE DRIVERS  
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probably  the  single  most  important  task  in  creating  new  alliances   Lei  and 
Slocum, 1991 .  
Personal relationships strengthen one another, but the contribution of 
these attachments to performance diminishes as the attachments become closer 
 Luo,  2002 .  Personal  relationships  may  become  counter productive,  if  they 
become too close and informal, because the loyalty of alliance managers might 
shift to other partners  Hamel et al., 1989 . Too much informality will a have 
negative effect, as it can lead to excessive dependency on personal relationships, 
complacency, and acceptance of less than satisfactory outcomes from the relati 
onship  Gargiulo and Ertug, 2006  that have to be managed in order become or 
remain productive. This is illustrated in Figure 4.12. 
 
Figure 4.12: Performance and personal relationships 
 
 
We  define  our  variable  ‘interpersonal  relationships’  as  the  extent  of  informality 
between alliance partners. Informal contacts arise from people’s need to relate 
to one another  Kratzer et al., 2005 . Based on the above, we have 
 
Hypothesis 9: INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS 
The relationship between informality  
and performance of a co-innovation alliance is hill-shaped. 
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4.5   SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this chapter, we discussed each driver by summarizing the forces that 
enhance or limit performance, which motivate the expected relationship with 
performance. We used four theoretical domains to construct our performance 
organizational and relationship variables, as listed in Table 4.3.  
We  predict  positive  correlations  to  co innovation  performance  of 
balanced competences, and governance fit. In addition, we expect hill shaped relations 
to performance of embeddedness, coordination need, trust, cultural fit, ability to transfer 
technology, involvement of management and interpersonal relationships. Last, we expect 
a  negative  relation  of  performance  to  the  need  to  agree  on  details  ex  ante 
 contract  need .  We  summarize  our  preliminary  hypotheses  of  the  expected 
relations between our drivers and performance in Figure 4.13.  
 
Figure 4.13: Summary of preliminary hypotheses        PERFORMANCE DRIVERS  
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Table 4.3: Theoretical contribution to the performance drivers  
ORGANIZATIONAL 



























































































































































































































Aim of a network           X                       X 
Size of a network     X                       X       
Diversity of a network 
and interdependency of 
its partners 
   X  X                            
Structure of a network     X                               
Context of a network                                X    
Intensity of a network                       X  X          
Position in a network     X  X                 X          
Networking capabilities                       X  X          
 Structural and personal 
embeddedness 
















Dynamism of a network                                X    
Experience & 
specialization 
   X                               
Selection-training-
coaching 
                     X  X          
External cooperation     X                               
Tacitness of knowlede                    X                
Dynamic circumstances                                X    





















Core rigidities                 X  X              X 
Market fit                                X  X 
Strategy fit                                   X 
Resource fit        X  X           X             


















Organization fit  X        X                 X  X    
Learning intent                    X                
Managerial support                       X             
Relational capital              X        X  X          
Capabilities        X           X                
Org. context and barriers  X        X  X        X             
Motivational barriers              X     X     X          
Divergent goals                                   X 
Protection of knowledge  X        X  X     X                
































Unlearning                    X                




5. RESEARCH DESIGN   
 
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter, we motivate our methodological choices and their implications 
for research design, our research activities, analysis techniques, and data collec 
tion. In addition, we discuss the appropriateness of several analysis techniques: 
exploratory factor analysis, confirmatory factor analysis, and structural equation 
modeling. Before analyzing our data, we screen our base dataset on missing val 
ues,  outliers,  sample  size,  and  normality.  We  motivate  the  choice  of  three 
groups  of  control  variables   regarding  the  alliance,  market,  and  strategy   as 
covariates in our analysis. After screening our data, we construct our definitive 
COINN model.  
 
The  scope  of  our  research  objectives  and  scope  imply  three  methodological 
choices: to choose between qualitative or quantitative research, to use secon 
dary or primary data, and how to deal with cross classified data. 
The first choice is to decide upon the use of secondary data or to collect 
primary data. Some empirical studies on alliance performance and innovation 
management use existing  secondary  sources to test their hypotheses  Gomes 
Casseres, 1987, 1989, 1996 , others collected data via the combination of newly 
developed and existing databases  Kogut and Singh, 1988; Agarwal, 1994 . In our 
case,  secondary  data  containing  information  on  the  perceptions  of  managers 
regarding co innovation and accompanied organization and relationships were 
not available; neither was data regarding the underlying motives of those man 
agers. Given the specific nature of our research   success indicating factors and 
processes of co innovation alliances   no data could be found in any existing 
database. Consequently, we had to develop our own database.  
Following this choice, we decided upon the industries and countries to 
be researched. The multi industrial scope involves certain research obstacles   
e.g., regarding different norms, business definitions or business models  Kumar 
and Nti, 1998; Parkhe, 1993b . Based on our literature review and practical con 
siderations regarding approachability, we decided to focus on certain industries, 
which we group in three categories:  a  the food industry,  b  the manufacturing 
industry, and  c  service industries. Because of time and budget constraints, as 
well as issues of access, we limited our research to the Netherlands and Belgium. 
The second methodological issue involves the choice between a certain 
qualitative or quantitative approach. In our research, we measure the percep 
tions of managers. Managers use subjective judgments on which to base their         RESEARCH DESIGN 
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decisions  Bell, 1996 . For collecting subjective or perceptual data, qualitative 
methods can be used   e.g., case studies   or quantitative methods, such as sur 
veys  and  questionnaire based  interviews.  The  research  objective  is  there  to 
develop and test a theoretical and evidence based model. This testing leads to a 
quantitative approach. For large scale studies, surveys are widely used. The top 
ics of our research are considered to be complex   assessment of the market 
environment of the co innovation projects   and sensitive   for instance, assess 
ment of personal relationships with partners. Such complex and sensitive items 
can easily lead to misinterpretations or non response in a large survey  Malhotra 
and Birks, 2007 . We have therefore chosen to use questionnaire based inter 
views. however, due to time and budget constraints, this means that the dataset 
will be limited. In order to deal with these constraints, we decided to conduct 
multiple interviews with our respondents, by obtaining multiple observations 
per respondent. 
The third methodological choice is how to deal with the cross classified 
data in our research. The problem of correlated data is common in the social 
sciences  Ghisletta and Spini, 2004 . In our research, relationships at several 
levels interact with one another: interpersonal relationships  “micro relations”    
e.g., between project managers of the alliance partners   influence to a certain 
extent the performance of the co innovation alliance at the “macro level”. These 
micro macro relationships have to be studied in a multi level approach  Snijders 
and Bosker, 1999; Zaccarin and Rivellini, 2002 . however, not all our data has a 
purely hierarchical, but rather a cross classified structure. Hierarchical relation 
ships identify unique combinations, while non classified data are not uniquely 
but simultaneously linked to other levels. In our research, 93  of the respond 
ing  companies  and  77   of  the  respondents  supplied  multiple  observations, 
resulting in a cross classified database, therefore our research has a mixed hier 
archical  multi level  and non hierarchical  cross classified  structure, which will 
be discussed in Section 5.2.  
 
 
5.2  RESEARCH MODEL AND DESIGN 
 
Our research is aimed at studying the effects of co variates across groups or clus 
ters rather than within a specific group or cluster. Figure 5.1 visualizes the nature 
of our dataset.  
 




Figure 5.1: Mixed hierarchical and non-hierarchical relationships  
 
 








Multiple Respondents reviewed a specific Project, while some Respondents judged several Projects. 
Multiple Respondents reviewed a specific Partnership, while some Respondents judged several 
Partnerships. Every Observation is attributed to a single Partnership, every Partnership to a single 
Project, and every Project to a single Company. 
 
 
Unique hierarchical relationships can be found between Company and 
Project, Project and Partnership, Partnership and Observation, and Respondent 
and Observation. A Project is uniquely attributed to a responding Company, a 
specific Partnership to a unique Project, and a specific Observation to only one 
Respondent   because  his  or  her  perception  is  measured .  Non hierarchical 
 cross classified   relationships  exist  between  Respondent  and  Project  and 
between Partnership and Respondent; Companies usually supplied several Pro 
jects, for some Projects multiple Partnerships were reviewed and most Respon 
dents submitted more Observations on different Projects. Many Projects are 
not uniquely related to Respondents, and vice versa. The same applies to Part 
nership: many Partnerships are not uniquely related to Respondents, and vice 
versa.  
Because of this mix of hierarchical and correlated or nested relation 
ships, our analysis has a multi level and cross classified character. Within cross 
classification, the effects of different “contexts” are studied, and within multi          RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
102 
level the performance at a higher aggregation level  Zaccarin & Rivellini, 2002; 
Field, 2009 . When data are correlated  or nested  within a cluster of observa 
tions in a particular group, inefficient or biased estimates of the regression coef 
ficients may lead to incorrect research conclusions  Ballinger, 2004 . In order to 
adjust  for  correlation  within  the  groups  of  correlated  data,  we  tested  the 
robustness of our data, with the use of a robust variance estimation technique, 
known as the Huber/White test: the “robust cluster” command in Stata.
1 In this 
routine, observations within a cluster are considered to be non independent, 
unlike clusters of observations that are considered to be independent  Stata, 
2009 .  
The degree of correlation of the observations can also be measured by 
the Intra Class Correlation  ICC  statistic, which is a factoring correlated  or 
contextual  variable. The ICC is a measure of the extent to which members of 
the same group are similar to one another rather than to members of other 
groups  Cohen et al., 2003; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007 . The ICC represents 
the proportion of the total variability in the outcome that is attributable to the 
correlated classes or clusters  Field, 2009; Cohen et al., 2003 . The ICC meas 
ures whether the scores from different groups are more discrepant from one 
another than scores within the same group  Cohen et al., 2003 . If the ICC is 
small, low variability can be attributed to a context variable and the effect of the 
context variable will be small  Field, 2009 . The ICC ranges from zero  com 
plete independence  to one  complete dependence . ICC can be considered as a 
measure of the reliability of an evaluation, but also as a measure of the reliability 
of the group mean  Bliese, 2000; Bogaert et al., 2009 . Within group effects can 
be completely different from between group effects  Snijders and Bosker, 1999 . 
When analyzing between group effects, the variability of the aggregated micro 
level units will be neglected, and the effects of within group variability will be 
lost. We have not used either of these ICC concepts because our dataset con 
                                                 
1  Zorn   2006   discusses  Huber/White  and  the  Generalized  Estimating  Equations 
technique  GEE . With GEE the existence of fixed effects of non independent data can 
be measured and the effects of co variates across groups or clusters can be tested. GEE 
indicates the effect if the average response of a cluster changes  Zorn, 2001; Ballinger, 
2004; Bogaert et al., 2009 . For adequate use of GEE however, the mean model should 
be correctly specified, possible missing values should occur completely at random, the 
number of clusters sufficient, and the observations in different clusters independent, 
although  within cluster  observations  may  correlate   Zorn,  2001;  Ballinger,  2004; 
Ghisletta  &  Spini,  2004 .  Zorn   2006   concludes  that  both  techniques  represent 
advantages in dealing with correlated data and considers the differences between GEE 
and  Huber/White  less  important  than  the  choices  concerning  the  unit  on  which 
observations are grouped. 
 




sists of clusters involving few observations. Due to this intra class variability, 
many classes will be close to zero, and ICC might not serve our aim of testing 
the robustness of our regressions. 
Our research design has elements of a multi level analysis, in which the cor 
relation structure between the levels should be fully specified. Our interest is to 
study the variability across rather than within certain clusters at the level of co 
innovation projects, partnerships and companies. The variability across respon 
dents however, is not our prime research interest. In order to deal effectively 
with our mixed structure, a common procedure with multi level data is neces 
sary in order to aggregate the micro level data to the macro level  Snijders & 
Bosker, 1999 . We therefore aggregated the data of multiple respondents to the 
level  of  project partnership,  and  checked  the  robustness  of  our  regression 
parameters  with  Huber/White.  In  doing  so,  we  made  a  comparison  of  the 
regression results of several subsets of our data. First, we took an a select sample 
“1” of one observation per company  N = 51  of our base dataset with correlated 
data. It can be assumed that no dependency on context variables is present in 
this sample. Second, we took the scores of partnerships with only one respon 
dent  N =118 , and combined these with aggregated scores of the partnerships 
with several respondents  39 observations of 20 partnerships . We then made 
the four subsets “2”, containing the single observations plus the average scores 
 subsample 2a , the maximum scores  subsample 2b   subsample 2c , the minimum 
scores, and the  Maximum Minimum  scores  subsample 2d  of multiple respon 
dent partnerships, respectively. 
 
This  aggregation  is  illustrated  in  Figure  5.2.  For  the  sake  of  robustness,  all 
regression analysis will be performed on all five datasets. 
 
Figure 5.2: Partly aggregated research design 
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5.3  RESEARCH ACTIVITIES 
 
In order to achieve our research objectives, we reviewed the applicability of 
insights from research on joint ventures and strategic alliances. We then inte 
grated insights from different theories that are relevant for co innovation into 
our  COINN model:  the  resource based  view,  contingency  theory,  organiza 
tional learning theory and network theory. 
Our  research  process  involves  the  development  of  the  conceptual 
COINN model, the design of a questionnaire, conducting survey based inter 
views,  statistical  analysis  and  ultimately,  construction  of  the  semi definitive 
model, which is based on the above mentioned activities together with feedback 
from senior managers. 
  We prepared our conceptual model, based on a review of the literature 
on joint ventures, strategic alliances, and innovation management in combina 
tion with open interviews with senior managers, consultants and researchers. 
We employed their expertise and experience as input for the COINN model. 
The managers were director strategic business development, director emerging 
technologies, vice president innovation, manager group research, director con 
nectivity program, director advanced technology center, and director collabo 
rative innovation  see appendix A . We developed a questionnaire, based on 
specific guidelines  Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007; Hair et al., 2010   
The use of a self reporting questionnaire in order to collect data from 
the same participant can potentially cause common method variance  CMV , 
which  may  generate  systematic  measurements  errors   Chang  et  al,  2010 
2 
because CMV potentially affects single method research. We undertook several 
procedural  and  statistical  remedies  in  order  to  reduce  potential  bias  due  to 
common method variance.  
First, in the test phase we investigated whether the data of the depend 
ent, independent and control variable data could be obtained from different and 
multiple sources  Podsakoff et al., 2003 . Due to time and budget constraints, 
we decided to use single sources.  
                                                 
2 Common method variance  CMV  is defined as “the variance that is attributable to the 
measurement  method  rather  than  that  of  the  constructs  the  measures  represent’’ 
 Podsakoff et al., 2003: 879 , or the bias amount of assumed covariance shared among 
variables  due  to  the  common  method  used  in  collecting  data.  Sometimes  such 
measurement errors are overstated  Graham, 2009 , or difficult to detect  Malhotra et al, 
2006 . There are numerous sources of CMV: social desirability, scale length, ambiguous 




Second,  in  order  to  avoid  social  desirable  or  benign  responses, 
respondents  were  guaranteed  anonymity  and  confidentiality,  if  so  desired 
through a written agreement  Podsakoff et al., 2003; Chang et al., 2010 .  
Third, in order to reduce item ambiguity, we avoided vague concepts 
and  pretested  the  draft  questionnaire  in  ten  semi structured  interviews  with 
senior managers and innovation experts. In the interviews, we tested whether 
the questions and definitions were easily understood and interpreted uniformly, 
and  whether  the  requested  information  was  available.  After  the  tests,  we 
clarified  the  instructions,  and  skipped  some  questions  regarding  specific 
financial performance ratios, because of different interpretations in different 
industries  or  lack  of  availability.  Survey  instructions  accompanied  the 
questionnaire, including definitions and norms  Krishnan et al., 2006 .  
Fourth, as procedural remedy to avoid CMV, we separated scale items 
of the dependent and the independent variables, which avoided the likelihood 
of  respondents  guessing  potential  relationships  between  the  dependent  and 
independent variables  Parkhe, 1993a .  
Fifth, we used a common medium to obtain our measurements in order 
to avoid biased covariation among our variables; each respondent followed the 
same guidelines and instructions. In order to obtain consistency in the answers 
and to avoid misinterpretations, the same interviewer carried out all interviews.  
Sixth,  in  order  to  avoid  “mood  state”  bias,  the  questionnaire  and 
necessary interviewing time was restricted.  
Apart from these procedural ex ante remedies, we undertook an ex post 
statistical test, namely the Haman’s one factor test,
3 which checked whether the 
data could be largely attributed to a single factor. We conducted an Exploratory 
Factor  Analysis  of  all  items  in  order  to  observe  whether  one  single  factor 
accounted for a majority of the covariance  Chang et al., 2010: 180 , as is listed 
in Table 5.1. The first  largest  factor accounts for only 10.1  of the variance, 
which implies that CMV is unlikely to be a major issue. 
 
Respondents were asked to give their perception on statements and mark their 
opinion on continuous scales. In order to obtain a good measure of the per 
formance of the co innovation projects, only projects that originated at least 
two years earlier were studied.  
The final questionnaire consisted of six sections   general characteris 
tics,  market,  strategy,  organization,  relationships  and  performance     with  in 
total 104 items, including control variables. The questionnaire  see appendix A  
                                                 
3 This test is considered to be incomplete because it might be insensitive and, therefore 
only supplies an indication of possible CMV  Podsakoff et al., 2003; Chang et al., 2010 .         RESEARCH DESIGN 
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consisted of some introductionary questions, 10 discrete 1 5 scales  4 nominal, 6 
ordinal  and 86 continuous interval scales ranging from 1 to 10. All scores were 
measured with the same measurement tool
4 at an accuracy of 0.1 cm.  
We then obtained 159 survey based observations of 109 projects from 81 
senior managers at 51 innovative companies in the Netherlands and Belgium  see 
Appendix D . This field research was followed by statistical analysis to test the 
hypotheses and to estimate the explanatory power of the underlying model.  
 
 
5.4   DATA COLLECTION  
 
In this section, we discuss the sources of data, and the numbers of participating 
companies and partnerships in our research.  
We obtained observations from several access gateways. Through our 
own network of previous work contacts, we received 65 observations from 38 
projects. During the research, we were introduced to network contacts, which 
resulted in another 49 observations from 33 projects. Furthermore, we organized 
a workshop, which resulted in 14 observations taken from 13 projects. Another 
20 observations relating to 16 projects were obtained through three institutions 
in the Northern Netherlands
5. Last, a further 11 cases from 9 projects were col 
lected via the networks of respondents,  
Fifty one  companies  contributed  to  our  research,  which  supplied  137 
partnerships. The sizes of the responding firms and their partners in these part 
nerships vary, as visualized in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. The largest proportion of the 
observations are derived from companies with sales between   250 million and 
   2.500  million   39   of  the  responding  companies  and  24   of  the  partner 
companies  and 250 and 2.500 employees  38  of the responding companies and 
25  of the partner companies . On average, responding companies supplied 3.6 
observations.  
The  largest  proportion  of  observations   25    were  derived  from 
companies  that  contribute  two  observations.  One  company  supplied  twenty 
observations, from twelve partnerships  8.8  of the total of partnerships . We 
observed the influence of this company on the regression results in our analysis. 
The headquarters of the companies and their partners are mostly located in the 
Netherlands   80   of  the  respondents,  and  62   of  the  project  partners .  In 
                                                 
4 Floor, thank you for your accuratly measuring of this! 
5  These  institutions  are  the  province  of  Groningen,  Samenwerkingsverband  Noord 
Nederland  SNN , a partnership of three provinces in the Northern Netherlands aimed 
at strengthening the economic position of these provinces, and Technologie Centrum 
Noord  Nederland   TCNN ,  an  innovation  support  organization  in  the  Northern 




addition, Belgium hosts 8  of the respondents and 10  of the project partners. 
The headquarters of the partners are located in the Netherlands  63  , Belgium 
 8  , and the USA  8  . Other locations are Germany, Canada, Japan, Austra 
lia, Switzerland, and Scandinavia. 
 
Figure 5.3: Size of responding companies and partners (sales) 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Size of responding companies and partners (employees) 
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5.5  ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES 
 
Based on the related literature, we endeavor to analyze the underlying structure 
of  organizational  and  relational  factors  on  the  performance  of  co innovation 
projects. In our research, we conducted an Exploratory Factor Analysis  EFA . 
In  contrast  to  other  data reduction  techniques  such  as  Confirmatory  Factor 
Analysis  CFA , EFA distills the common variance in the factor matrix, without 
forcing prior limitations on the observed variables. EFA uncovers underlying 
structures of variables, by defining factors in terms of sets of variables. As a 
result, every variable has a loading on each factor  Hair et al., 2010 . This differs 
from CFA, which tests a structured against an unstructured covariance matrix 
 Ullman, 2006  and consequently, enforces prior limitations on the observed 
variables.  This  requires  a  preceding  specification  of  variables  into  each  con 
struct, due to the fact that loadings are estimated where variables are related 
only to constructs, without cross loadings  Hair et al., 2010 . 
  In  Structural  Equation  Modeling   SEM ,  factor  analysis  and  multiple 
regression analysis are combined to estimate a series of interrelated dependence 
relationships simultaneously. This approach has certain advantages, in that its 
complex relationships can be analyzed by a combination of both discrete and 
continuous variables, whether observed or latent  Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007 . 
At the same time, SEM is more sensitive to deviation from multivariate nor 
mality and strong kurtosis in the data than other multivariate techniques, and 
requires a large sample size  Hair et al., 2010 . In order to minimize problems 
with multivariate normality, Hair et al.  2010  recommend 15 observations for 
each parameter estimated in the model, and a sample size of at least 200 to pro 
vide a sound basis for SEM estimation. As explained in Section 5.4, our database 
consists of 137 aggregated partnership observations, which is sufficient for mod 
els with a maximum of 9 parameters. As our model transcends this number, we 
do not match the criteria laid down by Hair et al.  2010  for SEM. Based on the 
above, in our context we conclude that CFA and SEM are inappropriate statis 
tical tools. We have chosen to conduct data reduction with EFA and multivari 
ate  regression  with  Huber/White,  including  robustness  checks  for  the  five 
above mentioned datasets. The results of these analyses will be reported and 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
For our statistical analyses, we made use of the statistical packages SPSS 
for Mac, version 17.0, Stata for Mac version 10.0, and Excel for Mac, version 
12.2.0. 




5.6  CONTROL VARIABLES 
 
We included three groups of control variables regarding the alliance, the market 
and  strategy  as  covariates  in  our  analysis.  The  control  variables  are  listed  in 
Boxes 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3, respectively. 
 
Box 5.1: Alliance control variables  
1.  Respondents’ role 
2.  Industry 
3.  Project duration and project life cycle  
4.  Number of partners  
5.  Partner nationality 
6.  Input of the firm and its partner 
7.  Size of the firm and its partner (in absolute, relative and efficiency terms) 
8.  Innovativeness of the firm and its partner  
9.  Importance of the project (as perceived by the firm and its partner) 
10.  Initial conditions 
 
Fist, we discuss alliance control variables. We assessed the influence of the 
role that respondents have in the co innovation alliance. Respondents indicated 
whether their role is project manager, strategic manager, advisor or a mixture of 
these roles. Project managers conduct operational day to day activities with the 
partner and might develop a greater personal loyalty, leading to a more positive 
evaluation in contrast to strategic managers, or advisors, who might engage in 
more marginal roles. We constructed separate dummy variables for the roles of 
the respondents. 
We took industry as a control variable, because variations in co innova 
tion performance may be expected in different industries or during various eco 
nomic  cycles.  We  categorized  our  projects  into  three  groups:  the  food  and 
healthcare  industry
6,  manufacturing
7  and  services  industries.
8  The  food  and 
healthcare industry is less affected by major economic cycles, compared to the 
                                                 
6 Consisting of projects in the market segments food ingredients, pharmaceuticals, food 
and  nutrition,  healthcare,  agriculture  and  food  chemicals,  and  fast moving  consumer 
goods.  
7 Consisting of projects in the market segments ICT and electronics, defense, durable 
energy,  non food  chemicals,  consumer  non food  industry,  and  industrial  non food 
industries. 
8 Consisting of intangible activities in the market segments logistics, utilities, consulting 
and financial services and media.          RESEARCH DESIGN 
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other groups. The motivation to cooperate varies according to the industry. In 
manufacturing  industry,  open  innovation  is  employed  to  gain  access  to  new 
technologies, while in the food and healthcare industry, it is used to find new 
ideas which generate new products or reduce the time to market, while in serv 
ice  industries,  the  nature  of  business  is  very  open   Mortara  et  al.,  2009 . 
Innovating  services  differs  from  innovating  products.  Innovation  in  services 
industries  differs  from  innovation  in  manufacturing  or  the  food  industry. 
Customers play a more central role in service innovation due to the fact that 
their  cooperation  is  needed  in  order  to  access  their  tacit  knowledge 
 Chesbrough, 2011 , which results in the use of another business model.
9 The 
three industrial groups form separate dummy variables.  
We evaluated the influence of duration of the project based on the year it 
started and its life cycle, as perceived by the respondents between startup and 
decline phase  see appendix A for definitions . Project maturity is important due 
to the fact that the longer the duration of the cooperation between partners, 
the more willingness to adapt and trust one another can be expected, resulting 
in a more open style of problem solving and a less legalistic approach  where 
partners rely on written agreements  in resolving conflicts. It can be expected 
that the longer a co innovation alliance exists, the better its performance   for 
example,  due  to  learning  effects.  In  addition,  only  successful  alliances  are 
allowed to continue or be integrated into one of the organizations, while the 
unsuccessful will be ended or sold  Mody, 1993; Lin and Germain, 1998; Child 
and Yan, 2003 . Park and Russo  1996  concluded that the failure rate of joint 
ventures  will  initially  rise  and,  in  the  case  of  surviving  a  mid life  crisis,  will 
decline, as is illustrated in Figure 5.5. The effective handling of a mid life crisis is 
considered to be one of the greatest challenges for alliance management  Segil, 
2004; Bamford and Ernst, 2005 . 
 
                                                 
9 In Porter’s value chain  1985, 1998 , service is considered to be a separate business 
activity  after sales service , whereas  according to Chesbrough  2011 , service should be 




Figure 5.5: Hazard rate of joint ventures 
 
Source: Park and Russo (1996). 
 
We measured linear and curvilinear effects of alliance longevity   i.e., the 
number of years since the project began, by calculating the linear and quadratic 
term of the duration. We included the life cycle of the alliance as a control vari 
able because a co innovation alliance offers flexibility, allowing firms with com 
plementary strengths to experiment with new technological, organizational, and 
marketing strategies, which is especially relevant in the early stages of its life 
cycle  Lambe and Spekman, 1997; Cools and Roos, 2005 . We measured life 
cycle on a Likert scale between 0  startup phase  to 10  decline phase .  
We selected the number of partners in the co innovation alliance as a con 
trol variable. Garcia Canal et al.  2003  concluded that in a dyadic alliance, the 
likelihood of meeting or exceeding expectations is higher than in a multi part 
ner alliance. On the one hand, when more partners are involved in an alliance, 
an increase in managerial complexity and governance costs can be expected. On 
the  other  hand,  additional  partners  bring  complementary  knowledge  and 
resources to the alliance. In order to quantify the optimum number of partners, 
we calculated the linear and quadratic term of the number of partners in the 
partnership. 
We observed the nationality of the partner vis à vis the focal firm through 
separate dummy variables to assess the effects of differences in national cultures 
 Hofstede, 1980 .  
The input of the firm and its partner is relevant because input can be 
considered as a measure of motivation and commitment, and thus of perform 
ance: the greater the input, the more commitment can be expected; When a 
firm supplies multiple input to an alliance, one might expect more commitment 
and grip on the alliance, through which a firm can steer and influence the alli 
ance in the desired direction. We evaluated the influence of multiple input of a 
firm and its partner through dummy variables for commercial, technological, 
financial and multiple input.          RESEARCH DESIGN 
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We took the size of a firm and its partner s , the relative size of a firm 
compared to its partner, and the sales per employee as separate control vari 
ables. Small and large firms may play complementary roles in alliances; small 
firms tend to be more flexible in developing new products, while large compa 
nies supply their alliances with their technological and market resources, spe 
cialist  knowledge,  and  advanced  production  methods   Nooteboom,  1994; 
Dougherty and Hardy, 1996; Fornoff, 2005 . Due to bureaucracy, implementing 
product  innovation  in  large  mature  organizations  might  run  into  difficulties, 
especially in the case of radical innovation  Vanhaverbeke and Peeters, 2005 . 
In addition, size differences between alliances partners may have an effect 
on their relative balance of power; large firms might be in a better position to 
capture the benefits of an alliance due to their financial, technological or market 
power  Sinha and Cusumano, 1991 , while the smaller companies might benefit 
from their specialized knowledge or resources. In order to limit the sharing of 
results, larger firms might prefer a small partner  Killing, 1982; Sinha and Cusu 
mano, 1991 . The different attitude of large multinational companies towards 
their alliance partners is illustrated in Box 5.2. The size of a firm can be meas 
ured by its assets  Kogut and Singh, 1988 , number of employees, or average 
turnover  Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994 . Agarwal  1994  concludes that a 
firm’s  assets  and  number  of  employees  generally  correlate  highly  with  one 
another. We therefore decided only to use the worldwide sales in Euro millions 
and the number of employees.  
 
Box: 5.2:   General Electric and small or large partners 
 “A large company like GE implements different strategies  
when forming global joint ventures  
with partners of comparable power, or with less powerful partners.  
GE attempts to restrict the scope of the collaboration 
 with companies of comparable power,  
but does not limit collaboration with smaller and less powerful firms, 
 in this case, GE allows the scope of the cooperation to be dictated by market forces”  
Source: Lampel and Shamsie (2000: 598). 




We measured the sizes of a firm and its partner in five classes.
10 For our calcula 
tions, we took the average of these classes and constructed new logarithmic 
variables. We investigated the influence of sales per employee on the perform 
ance.  
We evaluated the value of innovativeness as this has a positive impact on 
future sales growth  Stuart, 2000 . Innovativeness can be measured by R&D 
expenditures as a ratio of total revenue  Stopford and Wells, 1972; Dikova, 2005  
or by patent intensity   i.e., the total number of assigned patents compared to 
the average sales turnover. Assuming that innovative firms are attractive part 
ners for strategic partnering  Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994 , we calculated 
a firm’s innovativeness by way of three criteria:  a  the percentage of sales turn 
over spent on R&D,  b  the percentage of a firm’s sales generated by products or 
services introduced during the last three years, and  c  innovativeness as per 
ceived  by  the  partner’s  responding  management.
11  We  measured  the  firm’s 
innovativeness by means of ordinal scales in five classes, measuring R&D costs 
as percentage of total sales and the percentage of sales generated by new prod 
ucts or services during the three years preceding the interview. The respondents 
estimated the innovativeness of the partner on a Likert scale between 0  non 
innovative  to 10  highly innovative . 
We included the importance of the co innovation project  as perceived by 
the management of a firm and its partner  as a control variable as well. One 
might argue that the more important an alliance is, the more commitment can 
be expected from the co innovation alliance, which might correlate positively to 
performance. We calculated the importance of the co innovation alliance with 
the use of a Likert scale between 0  not important  to 10  very important . 
Last, we took initial conditions as a control variable, because they play a 
key role in the learning process within an alliance; unfavorable initial conditions 
may complicate the innovation process, due to feelings of frustration resulting in 
instability  or  underperformance   Doz,  1996 .  The  initial  phase  is  important 
because during this phase, potential future conflicts can be discussed, making 
the alliance more stable and crisis proof  Baum et al., 2000 . The initial condi 
tions were expressed on a Likert scale between 0  unfavorable  to 10  favorable . 
                                                 
10 For the definition of these classes, see appendix A  questionnaire . 
11 Hagedoorn and Cloodt  2003  conclude that, especially in high tech industries, four 
indicators of innovativeness overlap largely: R&D input, patent counts, patent citation 
and new product announcements.          RESEARCH DESIGN 
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Box 5.3: Market control variables 
1.  Market ambiguity 
2.  Market complexity  
3.  Market or technical risk  
4.  Market uncertainty  
5.  Technological importance in the market 
6.  Market life cycle  
7.  Market turbulence  
8.  Knowledge concentration in the industry 
 
 
We can expect a high level of market ambiguity, as discussed in Chapter 2 
due to the fact that traditional industrial boundaries are becoming increasingly 
fuzzy. Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven  1996  find more alliance formation in emer 
gent or highly competitive industries, where co innovation offers distinct advan 
tages, leading to better performance in highly ambiguous circumstances. Our 
respondents  judged  the  degree  of  ambiguity  in  the  market  on  a  Likert  scale 
between 0  very clear  to 10  highly ambiguous . 
The complexity of markets is relevant. Powell et al.  1996  state that, when 
the knowledge base of an industry is complex, innovation takes place in net 
works of learning, rather than in individual firms, resulting in better perform 
ance in highly complex circumstances, which we measured on a Likert scale 
between 0  simple  to 10  complex . 
We evaluated the influence of technical or market risk. In the case of high 
risk, companies tend to lower them by combining their skills and resources with 
alliance partners  Doz and Hamel, 1998 . Because of this, we can expect more 
commitment of the partners, which affects the success rate. At the same time, 
companies tend to control their alliances more tightly when high risk is per 
ceived, which may result in conflict between partners resulting in lower perform 
ance  Ring and Van de Ven, 1992 . We measured risk on a Likert scale between 
0  low risk  to 10  high risk . 
New advanced technologies can be developed in co innovation alliances, 
which offer certain advantages in coping with technical and market uncertainties 
                                                 




 Krishnan  and  Bhattacharya,  2002;  Chesbrough,  2004;  Andrew  and  Sirkin, 
2006 . In uncertain circumstances, firms tend to experiment through alliances 
and cooperate with less hierarchical governance  Burgers et al., 1993; Mody 1993; 
Akhter and Robles, 2004; Van de Vrande et al., 2006 . Technical and market 
uncertainties are related to one another; resolving technical uncertainty depends 
on how markets respond. In situations of high uncertainty, it is more difficult to 
assess business development projects due to an increased chance of unjustified 
approval  or  disapproval  of  projects     known  as  false  positives  and  negatives 
 Chesbrough, 2004 . By using co innovation alliances, the uncertainties of mis 
judgment can be reduced with the aid of insight from external partners, which 
affects the intensity and structure of alliances, and consequently, their perform 
ance.  Our  respondents  judged  uncertainty  on  a  Likert  scale  between  0   low 
uncertainy  to 10  high uncertainty . 
It can be expected that technological intensity may influence co innovation 
performance. Gassman  2006  concludes that, in high tech industries, even large 
companies lack sufficient capabilities in coping with emerging technologies, and 
are  therefore  more  inclined  to  cooperate,  which  is  in  line  with  Powell  et  al. 
 1996   and  Spekman  and  Isabella   2000 ,  who  found  a  positive  correlation 
between R & D intensity of an industry and the number of alliances in that 
industry. Our respondents indicated the importance of technology in the rele 
vant  market  environment  of  their  co innovation  projects  on  a  Likert  scale 
between 0  technology is not important  to 10  technology is very important . 
The market life cycle is relevant. In emerging or growing markets, more 
alliance formation may be expected  Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Lampe 
and Spekman, 1998 , with greater emphasis on the technological capabilities of 
potential alliance partners  Hitt et al., 2000a . In the early stages of new busi 
ness development, companies will have a relatively low level of commitment to 
invest company resources by seeking more reversible and less hierarchical gov 
ernance modes, as in alliances  Van de Vrande et al., 2006 . Alliances are espe 
cially useful in markets with growth opportunities that a company either cannot 
or does not wish to pursue individually  Cools and Roos, 2005 . Our respondents 
assessed the life cycle of their co innovations projects on a Likert scale between 
0  young emerging  to 10  old  in decline .  
During market turbulence, alliances tend to be more successful than joint 
ventures or acquisitions  Ernst and Halevy, 2000 . At the same time, turbulence 
can be regarded as a source of erosion and may cause the failure of alliances 
 Park and Ungson, 2001; Sethi And Iqbal, 2008 . In a rapidly changing environ 
ment,  such  as  in  high tech  industries,  the  costs  of  R&D  in  relation  to  sales 
become unaffordable   e.g., as a result of shortening product and technology life         RESEARCH DESIGN 
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cycles. In the case of discontinuous technological change, where existing tech 
nologies become obsolete and competitive positions consequently erode drasti 
cally, alliances become useful in acquiring complete new technologies in prefer 
ence to mergers, acquisitions or internal development  Eisenhardt and Schoon 
hoven, 1996; Lambe and Spekman, 1997 . Our respondents indicated the market 
turbulence on a Likert scale between 0  no change  to 10  fast change . 
Last, we assessed the influence of knowledge concentration in industry and 
its effect on alliance formation. In industries where the sources of expertise are 
widely dispersed, the locus of innovation will be found in networks of learning, 
rather than in individual firms  Powell et al., 1996 . We asked our respondents 
how concentrated the sources of expertise were in the industries relevant to the 
co innovation project on a Likert scale between 0  widely dispersed  to 10  con 
centrated . 
 
In the third group of control variables, we assessed the influence of strategic 
issues, as is listed in Box 5.4. 
 
Box 5.4: Strategy control variables 
1.  Motives 
2.  Operational flexibility  
3.  Strategic stability  
 
The motivation in entering co innovation alliances is relevant when a fit 
between the strategies of the partners and the alignment of the partner’s objec 
tives with the alliance is considered to be an important success factor for alli 
ance performance  Lorange and Roos, 1991; Parkhe 1993b; Saxton, 1997; Calla 
han and MacKenzie, 1999; Futrell et al., 2001; Duysters and Heimeriks, 2002a; 
Dikova,  2005 .  We  evaluated  the  influence  of  strategic,  technological  and 
financial motivation. Strategic motives are, for example, the desire to increase 
current  market  power  or  to  develop  new  markets.  Technological  motives 
involve  learning  objectives,  such  as  the  acquisition  of  new  technological 
competences  or  the  improvement  of  the  technological  portfolio   Hitt  et  al., 
1996; Lampe and Spekman, 1997; Draulans et al., 2003 . Financial or cost saving 
motives  are     e.g.,  sharing  cost,  exploiting  financial  synergies,  outsourcing 
peripheral activities, or obtaining government subsidies  Dussauge et al., 2000; 
Colombo,  2003;  Cools  and  Roos,  2005 .  Our  respondents  indicated  the 
importance of strategic, technological and financial motives on separate Likert 




We  assessed  the  influence  of  operational  flexibility  because  the 
environment  of  co innovation  changes  rapidly.  Flexibility  and  freedom  to 
explore new technologies plays an increasingly greater role  Buckley and Casson, 
1998; Strebel, 2003 . As stated before, in innovation, it is impossible to foresee 
every  possible  eventuality  or  challenge.  Therefore,  operational  flexibility  in 
design  and  execution  is  required,  both  from  managers  and  alliance  partners, 
which  enables  alliance  managers  to  determine  the  benefits  of  each  partner's 
organization   Spekman  et  al.,  2000;  Strebel,  2003 .  Following  Nooteboom 
 2000 , we separate managerial from organizational flexibility. Our respondents 
judged their flexibility on a Likert scale between 0  slow respond to external 
variation  to 10  fast respond . 
 
The strategic stability of the co innovation partners is relevant because 
the strategic priorities may change in time, which in turn may affect the attitude 
and commitment towards their alliances  Osborn and Baughn, 1990; Hennart et 
al.,  1999 .  Large  companies  usually  have  many  different  core  businesses  that 
compete within the company, resulting in a potential shift of priorities, which 
might  harm  the  commitment  towards  specific  co innovation  projects.  The 
respondents indicated strategic stability on a Likert scale between 0  hardly ever 




5.7   SCREENING OF THE DATA 
 
Independency of observations is essential in parametric testing. Our observa 
tions are to a certain extent correlated, as discussed in Section 5.2, and will be 
treated accordingly. 
First, we conducted a missing value analysis. We concluded that 13 cases 
contain more than 10  of missing values. The respondents in those cases were 
contacted by telephone in order to complement their scores on the missing val 
ues. In addition, we conducted a missing value analysis via SPSS: on average, the 
data contained 5.7 percent missing values. No single question exceeded the 15  
norm for deletion, as formulated by Hair et al.  2010 . Two cases were skipped 
because they contained too many missing values and some cases were excluded 




13 The remaining dataset consists of 157 cases. Patterns could 
not be found in the remaining missing data, which are missing at random.  
  Second, we checked the influence of outliers. Multiple regression is very 
sensitive to outliers  Pallant, 2007 , which is not uncommon in large datasets. 
When only a few outliers are found, no further action is considered to be neces 
sary. We undertook further screening where outliers were found by inspection 
of Cook’s distances
14 and critical values of Mahalanobis distances. According to 
Pallant  2007 , cases with a Cook’s distance value larger than 1.0 might be a 
potential problem, because they might have too much overall influence on the 
model. Critical values for Mahalanobis distance
15 are dependent on the number 
of independent variables included in an analysis. Our research contains three 
independent variables  commercial, technological and financial performance . In 
our research, the critical value of  
2 is around 14.8 with p < 0.05, or 13.3 with p < 
0.01   Tabachnick  and  Fidell,  2007 .  Field   2007   considers  the  Mahalanobis 
distance cut off point to be dependent on the sample size. In a sample size of N 
= 100 and 3 independent variables, Mahalanobis values above 15 are considered 
to  be  problematic   Field,  2007 .  We  conducted  outlier  tests  in  SPSS  and 
Stataand assessed the influence of observations with a large Mahalanobis on our 
regressions. We examined the cases with a Mahalanobis distance between 15 
and 20 further in order to decide whether to retain or to remove them from our 
analysis. The average Cook’s distance of this group is 0.00967 and no systemic 
outliers could be found,
16 we therefore decided to retain them.  
  Third, we discuss whether our sample size is sufficient, which affects Type 
I   unjustified  approval  of  an  hypothesis   and  Type  II  errors   unjustified  dis 
approval  of  an  hypothesis .  An  increase  in  statistical  power  is  likely  to  be 
achieved by increasing the sample size. In order to be able to detect smaller 
effect sizes, larger sample sizes are necessary at the desired   and power.
17 The 
minimum sample size differs from the number of factor loadings: if a factor has 
four or more loadings greater than 0.40, it is considered to be reliable regardless 
of the sample size. Factors with fewer low loadings should not be interpreted 
unless the sample size is greater than 150. According to Hair et al.  2010 , with a 
sample size of 100 and a   level of 0.01, the power level will be between 0.12 
                                                 
13  In  these  cases,  the  risks  are  not  shared,  the  cooperation  is  not  aimed  entirely  at 
innovation, or the duration of the cooperation is less than two year. 
14 Cook's distance measures the aggregate change in the estimated coefficients when 
each observation is excluded from the estimation. 
15  The  Mahalanobis  distance  gives  the  squared  distance  between  the  group  mean 
together with the associated F tests and p values. It measures the distance of cases from 
the mean s  of the predictor variables  Field, 2007 . 
16 The maximum individual Cook’s distance of a case within this group is 0.079. 




 effect sizes of 0.2  and 0.82  at moderate effect sizes of 0.5 . Sample size affects 
the possibility of generalization of the results by the ratio of observations to 
independent variables  Hair et al., 2010 : a minimum ratio of observations to 
independent  variables  of  5:1  is  necessary,  with  15  to  20  observations  per 
predictor  Hair et al., 2010 . When testing multiple correlation, Tabachnick and 
Fidell  2007  advise the following formula for minimum sample size: N   50 + 8 
m  where m is the number of independent variables  or N   104 + m for testing 
individual  predictors.  The  minimum  number  of  cases  however,  is  also 
dependent  on  the  normality  of  the  dependent  variables;  when  variables  are 
skewed, a larger sample is required. Our sample size of 159 observations, 109 
projects  and  137  partnerships  should  be  sufficient  given  our  3  independent 
variables. In multiple regression, sample size also affects the minimum R
2 that 
can be detected. With a sample size of 100, an   level of 0.01 and a p level of 
0.80, 10 to 15   of the variance can be explained  Hair et al., 2010 . Too many 
observations can also affect the results of multiple correlations, we therefore 
concluded our sample size to be sufficient. 
 Last, we examined the normality of our data, a fundamental assumption 
in multivariate analysis  Hair et al., 2010 . According to Hair et al  2010 , non 
normality  of  data  can  have  serious  consequences,  especially  in  research  with 
smaller sample sizes   i.e., with less than 50 observations. Testing significance is 
considered to be less useful with small samples  N < 30  and quite sensitive with 
large samples  N > 1000 . The impact of non normality diminishes when the 
sample size reaches 200 or more  Hair et al., 2010 . Using a sample size of 157, 
we checked the normality, kurtosis and skewness of each variable with the use of 
Q Q plots and descriptive statistics in SPSS and STATA.
18 Apart from this, our 
sample size allows for a Shapiro Wilk  S W , and a Kolmogorov Smirnov  K S  
test,
19  which  calculates  the  level  of  significance  of  differences  in  the  normal 
distribution. For the K S and S W test, a non significant result  p <.01  indicates 
normality. The Q Q plots show no consistent or systematic deviation from a 
normal distribution.  
Second,  we  conducted  an  outlier  test  using  Mahanalobis  distance 
analysis. In order to check outlying cases with regression results outside 3.27 x 
the  standard  deviation,  no  outlying  cases  are  identified  with  regressions  on 
technological  performance  and  financial  performance.  For  commercial 
performance  however,  we  found  two  outlier  cases   case  nr.  2  and  27 ,  which 
                                                 
18In a Q Q plot, we compare the cumulative distribution of the actual data values to a 
normal distribution. If the scores are normally distributed, the actual distribution line 
follows the line of the normal distribution. 
19 According to Field  2007 , the Shapiro Wilk test is more accurate.          RESEARCH DESIGN 
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contained  a  Mahanalobis  distance  larger  than  20  and  therefore  had  to  be 
examined further in order to detect potential measurement errors; no consistent 
or systematic error could be detected. We therefore concluded that we did not 
transgress the normality assumption necessary in multivariate analysis. 
 
 
5.8   SCALE EVALUATION 
 
In  this  section,  we  develop  our  scales.  We  evaluate  the  reliability, 
internal consistency and validity of our measures. We discuss construct validity, 
both convergent and discriminant validity, and extract factors with a Principal 
Component Analysis.  
We assessed the reliability of our scales   i.e., the absence of random 
error, as a scale should reflect the construct it is supposed to measure  Hair et 
al., 2010 . In our research, managers were asked to respond only once; we were 
therefore unable to measure temporal stability when assessing whether repeated 
measurements lead to the same results  a test retest . We therefore opted for 
internal consistency tests as reliability and validity are interrelated  Malhotra 
and Birks, 2007 . 
We examined the internal consistency of our scales   that is, the degree to 
which the items that make up the scale are measured within the same construct. 
Internal  consistency  is  linked  to  the  homogeneity  or  interrelatedness,  or  the 
dimensionality  of  items   Netemeyer  et  al.,  2003 .  A  measure  can  be  uni 
dimensional  using items from a single construct or factor  or multi dimensional 
 using items from more than one dimension or factor . As explained in Section 
5.5, we will conduct Exploratory Factor Analysis  EFA  in order to gain insights 
into the potential dimensionality of groups of items and scales. The number of 
factors  accounting  for  the  correlations  among  the  variables  represents  the 
dimensionality of a set of variables  Netemeyer et al., 2003 .  
When  testing  construct  validity,  we  investigated  the  relationship  with 
other constructs, both related and unrelated. We checked the convergent and 
discriminant  validity  of  our  variables.  We  measured  the  degree  of  shared 
correlation between two measures of the same construct  known as convergent 
validity  and the degree of shared correlation between two measures of different 
constructs, the extent to which a latent variable discriminates from other latent 
variables   discriminant  validity .  Discriminant  validity  implies  that  individual 
measures should represent only one latent construct; we therefore removed indi 




We first assessed internal consistency by calculating the Cronbach   val 
ues, which is a commonly applied statistic, although according to Hair et al. 
 2010:  687 ,  Cronbach     may  understate  convergent  validity.  The  values  of 
Cronbach   are dependent on the number of items on a scale. Pallant  2007  
suggests that when a scale consists of less than ten items, Cronbach   values 
tend to be quite small, and could be substituted by a calculation of the mean 
inter item correlation, alternatively, with an increasing number of items, even 
with the same degree of inter correlation, the Cronbach   value will increase 
 Hair  et  al.,  2010 .  A  minimum  level  of  0.70  or,  in  the  case  of  exploratory 
research, 0.60 is recommended for factors consisting of less than ten items. In 
the case of scales that consist of more than ten items the threshold of Cronbach 
  should be raised  Hair et al., 2010 . Our scales do not contain more than ten 
items.  
Our  second  assessment  of  internal  consistency  was  conducted  by 
observing the Eigenvalues  or latent root  of the factors, which represents the 
amount  of  total  variance  explained  by  a  given  factor,  and  expresses  the 
relationship between the scale items. We carried out screetests in which we 
plotted the Eigenvalues of all factors. Factors above the elbow contributed most 
to the explanation of the variance in the data set. 
Third, we measured convergent and discriminant validity by examining 
the  factor  loadings.  Latent  factors  should  have  a  high  factor  loading.  High 
loadings on a factor indicate high convergent validity, because they have a high 
proportion of variance in common. At the same time, low cross loadings make a 
scale distinctive from other scales: they suggest discriminant validity  Hair et al., 
2010 .  
Fourth, we calculated the average variance extracted  AVE , the average 
amount of variance in the observed variables that a latent construct is able to 
explain. AVE is computed as the total of all squared standardized factor load 
ings divided by the number of items. Whereas the shared variance  or factor 
loading  relates to the amount of variance in observed variables to other con 
structs  Farell, 2010 , the square of a factor loading represents the amount of 
variation that is explained  or “extracted”  by the latent factor. AVE can be con 
sidered as a summary indicator of convergence  Fornell and Larcker, 1981 .  
Hair et al.  2010: 686  mention thresholds, both for factor loadings and 
for AVE of 0.50. Netemeyer et al.  2003  refers to a maximum loading of ± 0.90. 
In the case of an AVE of less than 0.5, more error remains in the items than 
variance explained by the latent factor structure imposed on the measure  Hair 
et al., 2010: 687 . That is, the minimum average factor loading of a scale is 0.71.         RESEARCH DESIGN 
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Following Hair et al  2010 , we tested discriminant validity by comparing 
the AVE with the square of the correlation estimate between the dependent 
and independent variable. The AVE should be greater than the squared correla 
tion estimate because a latent construct should explain more of the variance in 
its item measures that it shares with another construct. According to Hair et al 
 2010: 688 , passing this test provides good evidence of discriminant validity.  
To  summarize:  the  square  root  of  a  bivariate  correlation  between  a 
dependent  and  independent  variable  should  not  exceed  the  minimum  AVE 
value  of  0.5.  That  is,  apart  from  potential  measurement  error,  the  bivariate 
correlation  should  be  lower  than  0.71.  In  Tables  5.10,  5.11,  and  5.12  all 
correlations are below this level, which indicates the discriminant validity of our 
variables. Furthermore, a Principal Component Analysis of all dependent and 
independent  variables  show  loadings  on  different  scales,  which  in  turn  show 
discriminant validity.  
Last,  we  will  elaborate  on  content  or  nomological  validity  later  by 
examining the degree that the summated scales result in accurate predictions in 
Sections 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5. We will discuss the existence of potential measurement 
errors  or  common  method   CMV   bias  in  Section  5.9   CMV  in  scales   and  
Section 6.6  CMV in regressions . 
 
In order to obtain scales for our dependent, independent and control variables, 
we  extracted  factors  with  a  Principal  Component  Analysis   PCA .  We  use  the 
Varimax  method  of  rotation  including  Kaiser  Normalization,  which  assumes 
that  the  underlying  factors  in  the  factor  analysis  are  independent  or  non 
correlated. Tabachnick and Fidell  2007:638  state that orthogonal rotation is 
easier  to  interpret.  A  Varimax  analysis  maximizes  the  dispersion  of  factor 
loadings  within  factors  across  variables,  which  results  in  more  interpretable 
clusters  of  factors.  In  order  to  assess  whether  the  scales  are  distinctive  and 
reliable,  we  conducted  the  Kaiser Meyer Olkin   KMO   test  for  sampling 
adequacy, which judges whether the result of the factor analysis is distinctive. A 
KMO  test  relates  the  sum  of  the  partial  correlations  to  the  sum  of  the 
correlations.  KMO  values  between  0.50  and  0.70  are  considered  to  be 
acceptable, and above 0.70 just as good.
20 In Tables 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4, we 
extracted  our  variables  with  PCA,  and  suppressed  all  variables  with  factor 
loadings  lower  than  0.40.  In  Appendix  F,  the  complete  PCA  including  low 
factor loadings can be found. 
                                                 
20 A Bartlett test of sphericity to check whether the variables in a scale are distinctive 
has not been conducted, because this test is recommended if there are fewer than five 
cases per variable  Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007 . Furthermore, the practical utility is 





In Table 5.1, we show the PCA of the independent variables that explain 74  of 
the variance. The KMO measure of sampling adequacy of independent variables 
is 0.60, which is just acceptable  Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007; Pallant 2007; 
Field, 2007 . In the following, we discuss the factors separately, including the 
internal consistency, the explained variance and the included questions. In the 
Principal  Component  Analyses,  the  independent  variables  of  our  COINN 
model appeared on different scales. 
We transformed the first factor into a six item scale, referred to as trust, 
with  a  Cronbach     of  0.85,  consisting  of  questions  concerning  disclosure  of 
information by the company and its partner  the questions 5.6a, and 5.6b, see 
appendix A , meeting the obligations of the partner  question 5.7 , the inclina 
tion to give responsibility to the partner  question 5.8a , and the willingness and 
ability to share the expertise of the company and its partner  the questions 5.9a 
and 5.9b . The inclination of the partner to give responsibility to the focal firm 
 question  5.8b   was  removed  because  of  its  cross  loading.  Similarities  of  the 
responding firm and its partner regarding governance structures  question 4.5  
were loaded onto this factor, but caused a drop in Cronbach  . We do not 
include this question separately as a single item scale, due to the fact that the 
AVE  0.30  is below the threshold.  
The second scale has a  Cronbach   of 0.82 and an AVE of 0.59. This 
scale, referred to as cultural fit, contains four questions concerning similarity of 
communication style  question 5.2 , decision making  question 5.3 , leadership 
 question 5.4 , and problem solving style  question 5.5 .  
The third factor involves a four item scale, referred to as contract need, 
has a Cronbach   of 0.81 and an AVE of 0.61. It consists of  questions concern 
ing the importance of agreeing upon the contract details in advance  questions 
4.7a and 4.7b , and agreement upon a formal contract to commit the partners in 
the alliance  questions 4.9a and 4.9b .  
We converted factor four in a three item item scale with a Cronbach   
of 0.80 and an AVE of 0.62, referred to as the ability to transfer of technology, con 
sisting of questions concerning the transference of knowledge  questions 5.12a 
and 5.12b  and building and retaining relationships with external partners  ques 
tion 5.12c .          RESEARCH DESIGN 
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The fifth factor is a three item scale, referred to as partner’s embeddedness, 
has  a  Cronbach     of  0.75  and  an  AVE  of  0.60.  It  consists  of  questions 
concerning  the  partner’s  role  in  its  other  partnerships   question  4.2b ,  the 
number of other partnerships  question 4.3b , and the level of experience with 
co innovation  question 5.10b .  
Factor six shows a three item scale, referred to as technical informality, 
has a Cronbach   of 0.66 and an AVE of 0.53. It consists of questions regarding 
the level of informality between the firm and its partner concerning financial 
issues, R&D issues and project management  questions 4.8c, 4.8d and 4.8e .  
The seventh factor loaded onto questions relating to the newness  or 
uniqueness  of the competences within the firm and its partner  questions 4.10a 
and 4.10b , and the ease of replacing the firm and its partner  questions 4.12a 
and  4.12b .  Both,  the  Cronbach     and  the  AVE  of  these  items  are  below  the 
thresholds (0.59 and 0.45, respectively  and observed a cross loading of question 
4.12b.  We  therefore  only  tested  question  4.10a   “Partners  competences  are 
new”  in our analysis, referred to as partner’s competences and expect a positive 
relation with performance, see Section 4.3.3.
21 
From factor eight, we could construct a two item scale with a Cronbach 
  of 0.79, referred to as commercial informality, consisting of questions concern 
ing the level of informality regarding strategic and marketing issues between the 
firm and its partner  questions 4.8a and 4.8b .  
Factor  nine  involves  a  two item  scale  with  a  Cronbach     of  0.65, 
referred to as a firm’s embeddedness, consisting of questions concerning the firm’s 
number of other partnerships  question 4.3a , and its level of experience with 
co innovation  question 5.10a .  
From  the  ninth  factor  we  built  a  scale  with  a  Cronbach     of  0.74, 
referred to as coordination need, consists of questions regarding the desired level 
of coordination in the co innovation venture by the firm and its partner  ques 
tions 4.4a and 4.4b .  
The items of the eleventh factor could not be used jointly due to insuffi 
cient internal consistency and discriminant validity  the Cronbach   is 0.45 and 
the AVE 0.18 , instead, we used the item with the highest factor loading, that is 
question 4.2a with the AVE of 0.70, referred to as firm’s partnership centrality. 
                                                 
21 In Appendices D and E, will we explore the joint influence of questions 4.10a and b 




The items of the twelfth factor suffered from insufficient internal con 
sistency and discriminant validity and were removed from the analysis. 
We  derived  from  factor  thirteen  and  fourteen  two  single item  scales 
referred to as the partner’s and firm’s management involvement  question 5.11b and 
5.11a, resectively .  
 
As can be observed in table 5.2, the PCA of our dependent variables resulted in 
a four scales that explain 58.9 percent of the variance. The KMO measure of 
sampling  adequacy  of  the  dependent  variables  is  0.70,  which  is  acceptable 
 Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007; Pallant 2007; Field, 2007 . The dependent vari 
ables of our COINN model loaded in the Principal Component Analyses on 
different scales. 
From the first factor, we constructed a three item scale referred to as 
commercial performance with a Cronbach   of 0.85 and AVE of 0.65, consisting of 
questions concerning marketing benefits, the sharing of risk and revenue, the 
ownership of intellectual property, and cash spending of the alliance  the ques 
tions 6.7, 6.8, and 6.9 . In the three items, we measured the proportion of the 
firm vis à vis its partner. Because we focus on the interests of the responding 
firm, we took the reverse values of the scores: high commercial performance 
indicates  that  the  focal  firm  generally  receives  more  rights  to  market  the 
alliances’ products, takes a larger proportion of risk, revenue and IP. 
The second factor showed high cross loading with question 6.2 and was 
therefore removed from the analysis. The remaining questions, concerning the 
contribution of the alliance to the competitive position of the focal firm, the 
reduction of risk and uncertainty, the break even period and revenue growth of 
the alliance  the questions 6.1, 6.3, 6.13, and 6.15 , showed a Cronbach   of 0.63 
and  an  AVE  below  the  threshold   0.38 ,  indicating  that  more  error  can  be 
expected  than  variance  explained  by  the  latent  factor  structure   Hair  et  al., 
2010: 687 . We therefore could not derive a scale from factor two.          RESEARCH DESIGN 
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Table 5.1: Factor analysis of the independent variables22 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES   Rotated Component Matrix  AVE 
Firm = Firm; Partner = 
Partner  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14    
5.6a Firm openness 
  communication 
0.76    
  
                                
  
5.6b Partner openness 
  communication 
0.85    
 
            TRUST          
  
5.7  Partner meets 
obligation 
0.71                                        
  
5.8a We give responsibility  0.42                                           
5.8b Partner gives 
  responsibility 
0.43                 0.42                      
  
5.9a Partner shares 
  expertise 
0.79                                        
  
5.9b Firm shares expertise  0.74                                         0.53 
4.5 Governance structure 
comparable  0.55           0.30 
5.2 Communication style similar   0.71                                        
5.3 Decision style similar   0.78               CULTURAL FIT             
5.4 Leaderships style similar     0.82                                        
5.5 Problem solving style similar  0.75                                      0.59 
4.7a Firm: details important        0.80                                     
4.7b Partner: details 
  important  
      0.78 
           CONTRACT NEED             
4.9b Partner: formal contract important  0.78                                     
4.9a  Firm:  formal contract important  0.75                                   0.61 
5.12a Technology transfer to extern   0.68                                  
5.12b Technology transfer from extern  0.81           ABILITY TO TRANSFER TECHNOLOGY    
5.12c Retain relations           0.85                                0.62 
4.2b Partner's role other partnererships         0.79                               
4.3b  Partner's nr. Other partnerships      0.80        PARTNER'S EMBEDDEDNESS    
5.10b Partner experience              0.73                             0.60 
4.8c Financial issues 
informal 
               0.72 
                          
4.8d R&D issues informal                 0.72     TECHNICAL INFORMALITY    
4.8e Project management issues informal           0.75                          0.53 
4.10a Partners  competence 
new  PARTNER'S COMPETENCES  0.74                
        
4.10b Firm's competence new             0.59                       0.45 
4.12a Partner can replace                0.41                         
4.12b Firm can replace                 0.45              0.56          
4.8a  Strategic issues informal     0.86                      
4.8b Marketing issues informal 
COMMERCIAL INFORMALITY 
   0.85                    0.73 
4.3a Firm's number of other 
  partnererships 
      0.70 
                 
5.10a Firm's experience    
FIRM'S EMBEDDEDNESS 
      0.77                 0.55 
4.4a Firm's coordination need             0.82                
4.4b Partner's coordination need  
COORDINATION NEED 
         0.85              0.69 
4.2a Firm's role in other 
partnererships 
   FIRM'S  PARTNERSHIP CENTRALITY        0.84 
         0.70 
4.6 Decision making control                                0.44             
5.1b Partner's status                                0.43             
4.11 Learning balance                                   -0.61        0.37 
5.11b Partner's  
management involvement 
   PARTNER'S MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT     0.77 
   0.60 
5.1a Status.firm                                      0.64       
5.11a Firm's  managemennt 
Involvement 
   FIRM'S MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT           0.84 
0.71 
Cronbach alpha  0.85  0.82  0.81  0.80  0.75  0.66  0.59  0.79  0.65  0.74  0.45  -- 
-
0.17  --   
Variance explained (%)  13.2  8.7  7.4  6.5  5.9  4.6  4.3  4.2  4.1  3.7  3.1  2.8  2.6  2.5   
Variance explained (cum %)     21.9  29.3  35.8  41.8  46.4  50.6  54.8  58.9  62.6  65.7  68.5  71.2  73.6   
Factor nr.  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14   
Note:  Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis, Varimax rotation with Kaiser Normalization converged in 32 iterations. 
    
                                                 




From the third factor, we derived a two item scale with a Cronbach   of 
0.75 and an AVE of 0.71, referred to as financial performance, consisting of and 
the extent of meeting financial and strategic objectives  the questions 6.16a and 
6.16b .  
The fourth factor showed shared variance with a Cronbach   of 0.61 of 
the contribution of the alliance to the innovation position of the focal firm, 
access  to  complementary  resources,  research  synergies  and  the  meeting  of 
learning  objectives   the  questions  6.4,  6.5,  6.6,  and  6.16c,  respectively .  We 
could not construct a four item scale due to insufficient AVE  0.44 , and there 
fore selected the question with the highest factor loading  0.74  in the measure 
of  technological  performance,  namely  the  access  to  complementary  resources, 
 question 6.5 . 
 
Table 5.2: Factor analysis of the dependent variables23 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES  Rotated Component Matrix  AVE 
   1  2  3  4    
6.7 Marketing benefits  0.83             
6.8 Sharing risk/revenue  0.88          
6.9 IP Ownership  0.84  COMMERCIAL PERFORMANCE    
6.10 Cash spending  0.65        0.72 
6.1 Contribution to competitive 
  position 
   0.62       
  
6.2 Possibility to integrate     0.45  0.55       
6.3 Less risk/uncertainty     0.59        
6.13 Break even     0.64       
6.15 Revenue growth     0.67        0.38 
6.16a Meeting financial objectives  0.87       
6.16b Meeting strategic objectives 
FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE  0.81     0.71 
6.4 Better innovative position     0.41     0.64    
6.5 Extra complementary 
  resources  TECHNOLOGICAL PERFORMANCE  0.74    
6.6 Research synergies        0.60    
6.16c Meeting learning objectives        0.49  0.57  0.44 
Cronbach alpha  0.83  0.63  0.75  0.61    
Variance explained (%)  23.9  17.8  9.3  8.0    
Variance explained (cum %)  23.9  41.6  50.9  58.9    
Factor nr.  1  2  3  4    
 Note: Principal Component Analysis, Varimax rotation with Kaiser Normalization, converged in 5 iterations. 
    
 
                                                 
23 The item numbers refer to the numbers of the questionnaire  see appendix A .         RESEARCH DESIGN 
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The Principal Component Analysis of our market control variables resulted in 
three factors that explain 61.5 percent of the variance. The market control vari 
ables of our COINN model loaded in the Principal Component Analyses on 
different scales. 
From  the  first  factor,  we  derived  a  scale  with  a Cronbach   of 0.77, 
referred to as predictability concerning risk and uncertainty  questions 2.3 and 
2.4 . An assessment of market complexity  question 2.2  loaded on this factor 
but reduced the Cronbach   and was therefore removed from the analysis.  
The second factor showed loadings on items of knowledge concentra 
tion and the technological intensity of the market in which the co innovation is 
active. Due to the insufficient internal consistency of these items, we separated 
this  factor  into  two  single item  scales,  referred  to  as  technological  intensity 
 question 2.5  and knowledge concentration  question 2.8 .  
The items of the third factor could not be used together; we retained 
the item with the highest factor loading regarding external turbulence  question 
2.7 . The results of the PCA of the market control variables are listed in Table 
5.3. 
 
Table 5.3: Factor analysis of the market control variables 
Rotated Component Matrix  AVE  MARKET CONTROL VARIABLES 
1  2  3    
2.2 Complexity  0.64    
2.3 Risk  0.85 
PREDICTABILITY 
  
2.4 Uncertainty  0.86        0.73 
2.5 Technical intensity     0.80     0.64 
2.8 Knowledge concentration     0.81     0.66 
2.1 Ambiguity        0.44    
2.6 Life cycle market      0.64    
2.7 External turbulence        0.81  0.65 
Cronbach alpha  0.77  0.54  0.41   
Variance explained (%)  27.4  19.3  14.8   
Variance explained (cum %)  27.4  46.6  61.5   
Factor nr.  1  2  3   
Note: Principal Component Analysis, Varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization converged in 5 iterations.  
 
The Principal Component Analysis of strategic control variables resulted in five 
factors that explained 75.2 percent of the variance. The strategic control vari 
ables of our COINN model loaded in the Principal Component Analyses on 
different scales. 
We constructed scales from factor 1 and 2 with a Cronbach   of 0.83 and 
0.61, respectively, referred to as partner and firm’s operational flexibility, consisting 




3.6b, and questions 3.5a and 3.6a, respectively . In addition to this, we made a 
single item scale referred to as strategic partner motives  question 3.1b .
24  
We translated the third factor into a scale with a Cronbach   of 0.66, 
referred  to  as  strategic  stability,  consisting  of  the  frequency  of  the  change  of 
strategic  priorities  of  the  firm  and  its  partner  in  general   questions  3.7a  and 
3.7b . We divided the fourth factor, due to insufficient internal consistency, into 
three single item scales: a firm’s cost motives
25  question 3.3a , partner cost motives 
 question 3.3b  and a firm’s strategic motives  question 3.1a . Last, from factor five, 
we constructed a scale, referred to as technological motives, containing questions 
concerning the increase of R&D output, and organizational learning  questions 
3.2a and 3.2b . The results of the PCA of the strategy control variables are listed 
in Table 5.4. 
 
Table 5.4: Factor analysis of the strategic control variables26 
STRATEGIC CONTROL 
VARIABLES     Rotated Component Matrix  AVE 
F. = Firm; P. = Partner  1  2  3  4  5    
3.4 Strategic match  0.63       
3.5b Partner's organizational flexibility  0.81      
3.6b Partner's managerial flexibility  0.87    
PARTNER'S FLEXBILITY 
0.70 
3.5a Firm's organizational flexibility  0.83    
3.6a Firm's managerial flexibility    0.78 
FIRM'S OPERATIONAL 
FLEXIBILITY  0.65 
3.1a Firm's strategic motives        0.58          
3.1b Partner's strategic motives  0.43        0.49    
3.2a Firm's technological motives  0.40  0.70    
3.2b Partner's technological motives    
TECHNOLOGICAL 
MOTIVES  0.73  0.51 
3.3a Firm's financial motives  0.85         
3.3b Partner's financial motives 
COST MOTIVES 
0.62        0.73 
3.7a Firm's change in strategic 
priorities     0.78       




   0.81     0.64 
Cronbach alpha  0.84  0.61  0.63  0.64  0.5   
Variance explained (%)  17.2  16.1  12.2  9.5  7.4   
Variance explained (cum %)  17.2  33.3  45.5  55.0  62.3   
Factor nr.  1  2  3  4  5   
Note: Principal Component Analysis, Varimax rotation with Kaiser Normalization converged in 9 iterations.   
                                                 
24 Question 3.4  strategic match  was removed from further analysis due to insufficient 
internal  consistency  with  question  3.1b   see  appendix  A   and  a  relatively  low  factor 
loading.  
25  Defined  in  a  narrow  sense:  by  sharing  development  costs,  saving  cost,  obtaining 
subsidies, and exploiting financial synergies.  
26 The item numbers refer to the numbers of the questionnaire  see appendix A .         RESEARCH DESIGN 
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Based on our subsample 2a  see Section 5.2  of single observations together with 
the average scores of multiple respondent partnerships, in Tables 5.5 and 5.6, we 
list  the  descriptive  statistics  of  the  dependent  and  independent  variables, 
followed by the descriptive statistics of the interval, ordinal and nominal control 
variables in Tables 5.7, 5.8, and 5.9.
27 In addition, we show the correlations of the 
dependent, independent, and control variables with performance in Tables 5.10, 
5.11, and 5.12, respectively. 
 
  Table 5.5: Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables 
Variable    N  Mean  Sd  Min  Max 
Commercial performance  137  6.0  2.5  0.0  10.0 
Financial performance  137  5.7  2.5  0.0  9.9 
Technological performance  134  6.9  2.9  0.0  10.0 
     
 
     
Table 5.6: Descriptive statistics of the independent variables 
   Variable  N  Mean  Sd  Min  Max 
1  Contract need  137  6.5  2.4  0.0  10.0 
2  Firm’s embeddedness  137  6.7  2.2  0.0  10.0 
3  Firm’s centrality  136  7.4  2.0  0.1  10.0 
4  Partner’s embeddedness  137  5.8  2.3  0.0  9.7 
5  Partner’s competences  135  7.2  2.7  0.0  10.0 
6  Coordination need  137  6.7  2.4  0.0  10.0 
7  Trust  137  7.3  1.8  0.0  10.0 
8  Cultural fit  137  5.0  2.4  0.0  9.0 
9  Technology transfer  137  7.2  1.9  0.0  10.0 
10  Firm’s management 
involvement  137  7.4  2.7  0.0  10.0 
11  Partner’s management 
involvement  137  6.9  2.8  0.0  10.0 
12  Technical informality  137  4.8  2.4  0.0  9.8 
13  Commercial informality  137  5.1  2.9  0.0  10.0 
 
                                                 
27  The  scores  are  aggregated  at  the  partnership  level  from  the  average  multiple 




Table 5.7: Descriptive statistics of the interval control variables 
Variable  N  Mean  Sd  Min  Max 
Alliance characteristics 
Project life  137  4.7  3.2  0.0  10.0 
Partner’s innovativeness  137  6.2  2.7  0.0  10.0 
Firm’s importance  137  7.0  2.5  0.0  10.0 
Partner importance  137  6.5  2.6  0.0  10.0 
Initial conditions  137  6.7  2.7  0.0  10.0 
Market characteristics 
Market predictability  137  5.7  2.6  0.0  10.0 
Technical intensity   133  7.8  2.3  0.0  10.0 
Knowledge concentration  134  6.7  2.6  0.7  10.0 
External turbulence  134  5.2  2.5  0.9  10.0 
Strategy characteristics 
Partner’s operational 
flexibility  137  5.8  2.7  0.0  10.0 
Firm’s operational 
flexibility  137  6.5  2.4  0.0  10.0 
Firm’s strategic motives  134  7.9  2.0  0.9  10.0 
Technological motives  137  6.7  2.2  0.0  10.0 
Cost motives  137  5.9  2.5  0.0  10.0 
Strategic stability  137  3.8  2.2  0.0  9.1 
 
Table 5.8: Descriptive statistics of the ordinal control variables 
Variable  N  Mean  Min  Max 
Alliance characteristics, ordinal scales 
Number of partners  137  3.3  1.0  9.0 
Firm’s size (000  )  137  989.6  0.7  3,750.0 
Partner’s size (000  )  137  787.2  0.7  3,750.0 
Firm’s size (employees)  137  5,737.6  13.0  37,500.0 
Partner’s size (employees)  137  4,520.9  13.0  37,500.0 
Sales difference (firm/partner)  137  1,663.4  0.0  55,970.2 
Employment difference (firm/partner)  137  129.4  0.0  2,884.6 
Firm’s sales per employee (000  )  137  0.7  0.0  10.6 
Partner’s sales per employee (000  )  137  0.6  0.0  10.0 
Firm’s new products  137  11.3  0.0  23.0 
Project duration (years)  137  11.3  1.0  28.0         RESEARCH DESIGN 
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Table 5.9: Descriptive statistics of the nominal control variables 
Alliance characteristics, nominal scales, N= 137, Min. = 0, Max. = 1 
   Industry dummies: food / manufacturing / service industry  
   Role: project managers role / strategic managers role / mixed role  
   Firm’s nationality: Netherlands / other 
   Partner nationality: Netherlands or Belgium / other 
   Firm’s input: commercial / technical / financial / multiple input  
   Partner input: commercial / technical / financial / multiple input  
 
 
Table 5.10: Correlations of the dependent variables  
      PC  PF  PT 
PC  Commercial performance        
PF  Financial performance  -0.09*      
PT  Technical performance  0.07*  0.18*    
1  Contract need  -0.08*  0.07*  -0.11* 
2  Firm's embeddedness  -0.39*  0.13*  0.05 
3  Firm's centrality  -0.15*  0.25*  -0.01 
4  Partner's embeddedness  -0.05  0.22*  0.06 
5  Partner's competences  0.07*  0.06*  0.18* 
6  Coordination need  -0.22*  -0.04  0.01 
7  Trust  -0.10*  0.16*  0.15* 
8  Cultural fit  0.03  0.18*  0.00 
9  Technology transfer  -0.22*  0.44*  0.22* 
10  Firm's management involvement  -0.06*  -0.02  0.23* 
11  Partner's management involvement  -0.11*  -0.04  0.02 
12  Technical informality  -0.08*  0.08*  0.10* 
13  Commercial informality  -0.10*  0.14*  0.15* 
      PC  PF  PT 
1  Market predictability  -0.10*  -0.04  0.00 
2  Technical intensity   0.11*  0.03  -0.01 
3  Knowledge concentration  -0.04  0.23*  0.00 
4  External turbulence  -0.17*  -0.12*  -0.01 
5  Partner’s operational flexibility  -0.16*  0.17*  0.14* 
6  Firm’s operational flexibility  -0.28*  0.22*  0.00 
7  Technological motives  -0.21*  0.14*  0.30* 
8  Cost motives  -0.10*  -0.11*  0.02 
9  Strategic stability  -0.14*  0.16*  0.04 
10  Project life cycle  -0.14*  0.06*  -0.25* 
11  Partner's innovativeness  0.10*  0.04  0.16* 
12  Partner's importance  -0.28*  0.11*  0.22* 
13  Initial conditions  0.06*  0.17*  0.19* 
14  Firm’s strategic motives  0.04   0.05  0.13* 
  Note: * p < 0.05.         




Table 5.11: Correlations of the independent variables  
      1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
1. Contract need                          
2. Firm's embeddedness  0.11*                        
3. Firm's centrality  -0.03  0.27*                      
4. Partner's 
embeddedness  0.13*  0.02  -0.04                    
5. Partner's competences  -0.07*  -0.14*  0.09*  0.02                  
6. Coordination need  0.17*  0.19*  0.08*  0.08*  0.16*                
7. Trust  0.13*  0.12*  0.06*  0.16*  0.10*  0.12*              
8. Cultural fit  -0.01  -0.10*  0.02  0.30*  -0.06*  0.08*  0.32*            
9. Technology transfer  0.23*  0.30*  0.08*  0.24*  0.16*  0.19*  0.36*  0.12*          
10. Firm's management 
involvement  0.13*  0.02  -0.07*  0.01  0.08*  0.17*  0.24*  0.13*  0.19*        
11. Partner's management 
involvement  0.19*  0.04  0.01  -0.04  0.10*  0.13*  0.22*  -0.01  0.17*  0.32*      
12. Technical informality  -0.07*  0.00  0.10*  0.09*  0.08*  0.02  0.08*  0.19*  0.01  -0.08*  0.00    
13. Commercial 
informality  -0.06*  0.13*  -0.01  -0.11*  0.06*  -0.08*  0.14*  -0.05  -0.02  -0.02  -0.07*  0.08* 




Table 5.12: Correlations of the control variables  
    1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13 
1. Market predictability                           
2. Technical intensity   0.11*                         
3. Knowledge 
concentration  -0.02  0.38*                       
4. External turbulence  -0.03  0.01  -0.01                     
5. Partner’s operational 
flexibility  0.06*  0.01  0.01  0.10*                   
6. Firm’s operational 
flexibility  0.29*  0.07*  0.20*  -0.20*  0.17*                 
7. Technological motives  0.31*  -0.06*  -0.03  -0.03  0.28*  0.35*               
8. Cost motives  0.27*  0.36*  0.02  0.19*  0.06*  0.18*  0.33*             
9. Strategic stability  0.03  -0.22*  -0.15*  0.13*  0.22*  -0.03  0.01  -0.01           
10. Project life cycle  -0.04  -0.18*  -0.09*  0.04  -0.16*  0.21*  -0.04  0.05  0.16*         
11. Partner's 
innovativeness  -0.05  0.07*  -0.08*  -0.14*  -0.11*  0.11*  0.18*  0.10*  -0.03  -0.01       
12. Partner's 
importance  -0.01  0.13*  -0.01  0.18*  0.45*  -0.09*  0.16*  0.23*  0.18*  -0.01  -0.15*     
13. Initial conditions  -0.02  0.03  0.12*  -0.05  0.15*  0.14*  0.05  -0.13*  -0.11*  -0.26*  0.08*  0.03   
14. Firm’s strategic 
motives  0.20*  0.15*  -0.03  0.02  -0.01  0.17*  0.20*  0.25*  -0.18*  -0.05  0.20*  -0.04  0.07* 
  Note: * p < 0.05.         
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Before testing the hypotheses, we evaluated our COINN scales in order 
to verify whether the main assumptions of OLS regressions are met  Pevalin and 
Robson, 2009: 288 303 . We assessed the normality of errors  homoscedasticity  
and checked whether the variance of errors is constant by observing scatterplots 
of predicted values against residuals. A lack of linearity in residuals would not 
invalidate our analysis, but would weaken it  Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007 . The 
Residuals versus Fitted  Rvf  plot of our scales is evenly distributed across the 
values  of  our  independent  variables.  We  found  no  distinctive  pattern  in  the 
residuals, and therefore concluded that they are evenly distributed.
28 Further 
more, a skewness kurtosis test did not reject the null hypotheses of normality on 
any of our scales.
 29  
 
 
5.9  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Given the scope of our research objectives, we have chosen to collect primary 
data in a quantitative research approach. Our data have a mixed hierarchical and 
non hierarchical structure. This partly multi level, partly cross classified, nested 
or correlated structure has an influence on the appropriate statistical treatment: 
we decided to deal with our data by partially aggregating our database and by 
constructing subsample datasets. 
We based our conceptual research model on four theoretical perspec 
tives,  designed  and  tested  a  questionnaire,  which  served  as  a  guideline  for 
interviews. We discussed our data collection, and screened our data on missing 
values, outliers, sample size and normality.  
In Chapter 6, we will discuss potential multicollinearity, the robustness of 
our regressions, potential misspecification of our model, and potential excessive 
leverage or influence of single observations. 
With the use of exploratory factor analysis, we constructed our defini 
tive model, which we test in the next chapter. This model consists of dependent 
variables   commercial,  technological  and  financial  performance ,  control 
variables, and independent variables. In Figure 5.6, we summarize the definitive 
hypotheses after PCA, and in Figure 5.7 our definitive COINN model.  
In our definitive analysis, we separate ‘embeddedness’ into separate scales, 
referred to as ‘firm’s embededdness’, ‘firm’s centrality’, and ‘partner’s embededdness’. We 
                                                 
28 The Rvf plots are available upon request. 
29 Through the SK test in Stata. A Shapiro Francia test confirms this conclusion. This 
test shows that our scales can be considered to be normally distributed, mostly at the 
0.01 significance level, except our scale commercial informality, which is significant at p 




limit  ‘balanced  competences’  to  a  scale,  referred  to  as  ‘partner’s  competences’. 
Furthermore, we separate ‘management involvement’ into separate scales for the 
firm  and  its  partner,  and  the  scale  ‘informality’  into  ‘commercial  and  technical 
informality’. The changes are underlined in Figure 5.6. 
 
Figure 5.6: Summary of definitive hypotheses (after PCA) 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Definitive COINN-model 
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As  indicated  in  Section  5.8   scale  evaluation ,  we  discuss  the  existence  of 
potential measurement errors in our scales.  
We based the dependent and the independent variables as well as most 
of  the  control  variables  in  our  COINN model  on  perceptions  of  the  same 
respondents,  which  may  cause  distortion  because  of  a  common  method  bias 
 CMV . In order to reduce potentially CMV errors, we took several procedural 
remedies and conducted statistical checks  see Section 5.3 . In Section 5.8, we 
based our scales on generally accepted norms of convergent and discriminant 
validity. We therefore conclude that in our scales, a CMV bias is rather unlikely. 
 
 Chapter 6 
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6.   RESULTS 
 
6.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter, we regress the COINN model, which consists of the 
scales of our independent organization and relationships variables, dependent 
variables  performance , as well as control variables. In different regression mod 
els, we test our hypotheses and discuss the results.  
 
 
6.2  MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION MODELS 
 
In order to test the influence of the independent variables on the predictor vari 
ables, we construct five multivariate regression models, as shown in Figure 6.1 
and Table 6.1. Each model adds new terms to the significant variables of the 
previous model.
1 In Model 1, we examine the influence of the control variables 
on performance; in Model 2, we add the organizational variables. In Model 3, we 
study potential curvilinear effects of these organizational variables, and in Model 
4, we add the relational variables to the model, followed by Model 5  curvilinear 
effects  of  relational  variables .  We  show  the  significant  regression  results  of 
these  models  in  Table  6.2   regression  on  commercial  performance 
2,  Table  6.3 
 technological performance , and Table 6.4  financial performance . The non signifi 
cant regression estimates are suppressed for practical reasons. The full regres 
sion tables are shown in Appendix F. We test the significance of the contribu 
tion of each model with a Wald test. In the model of commercial performance, all 
effects together explain 45.5    R
2  or 29.3   adjusted R
2  of the total variance. 
When  explaining  the  second  dependent  variable   technological  performance ,  all 
effects jointly explain 42.2    R
2  or 25.0    adjusted R
2  of the total variance. 
For the third dependent variable  financial performance , this is 59.5    R
2  or 43.2 
   adjusted R
2  of the total variance. 
 
In Section 5.7, we derived six organizational and seven relationship scales. We 
summarize the regression results of these scales in the Tables 6.5, 6.6, and 6.7,
3 
and subsequently discuss the results per indicator. 
                                                 
1 These models are based on the average subsample 2a as described in Section 5.2.  
2 The constructs is italic refer to the dependent and independent variables as defined in 
Section 5.9.  
3 In Tables A.1, A.7, and A.8 of Appendix D, we explore the regressions of the scales 




Figure 6.1: COINN regression models  
 
Table 6.1: COINN regression models 
Model 1  P  i =  i CONTR 
Model 2  P  i = Model 1* +    j OR j 
Model 3  P  i = Model 2* +  j   j (ORj)
2 
Model 4  P  i = Model 3* +  k  k REk 
Model 5  P  i = Model 4* +  k   k (RE)k
2 
Model 6  P  i = Model 5* +  k   k (mediation)k 
Where   
P, OR, RE, CONTR  CONTR = Control variables (C1… C10), P = Performance, OR = Organiza-
tional variables (OR1… OR, RE= Relational Variables (RE1 … RE5)
 4 
  =  Regression coefficients, i = 1…10, j = 1…8, k = 1 … 5 
 
We discuss first potential multicollinearity, the robustness of our regressions, 
and potential misspecification within our model.  
                                                 
4 Consisting of the scales with variables as defined in Section 5.8.  Chapter 6 
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Multicollinearity may distort the results of our regressions or even make 
them unstable, which would imply that they cannot serve as a basis for general 
conclusions  Hair et al., 2010 . We observed the bivariate correlation values, the 
value of which should be limited: Tabachnick and Fidell  2007  recommend a 
threshold of 0.5.
5 Consulting the correlation matrices in Chapter 5, revealed that 
multicollinearity is not an issue.  
We calculated the Variance Inflation Factor  VIF , indicating the relation 
ship between the scales via robust linear regression, taking into account the level 
of correlation in the data. The average VIF of our scales is 1.17 for all three 
predictors  values between 1.06 and 1.32 , which is far below the critical value of 
10 as suggested by Tabachnick and Fidell  2007 , Pallant  2007  and Hair et al. 
 2010 . We therefore conclude that multicollinearity is not a concern. 
In order to assess the robustness of our regressions, we checked the differ 
ences of the regression results using the different datasets 2a 2d, as discussed in 
Section 5.2  research design .
6 All regressions are robust   i.e., significant in most 
models     unless  otherwise  stated.  We  discuss  the  significant  associations  per 
variable hereafter.  
We tested whether our models contain omitted variables, with the use of 
the Ovtest in STATA. In Model 5 of all three types of performance  commer 
cial, technological, as well as financial , the hypothesis of omitted variables were 
not significant at p < 0.01. We could not detect misspecification. 
 
We visualize the significant associations in standardized graphs, in which we 
plot the dependent variables on Y axes, and the independent variables on X 
axes, following the legend in Figure 6.2. 
 
Figure 6.2: Legend of performance figures 
 
                                                 
5 Graham  2009  mentions that bivariate correlation should be lower than 0.7.  
6 The samples contain the same single observations, aggregated at the partnership level, 
but vary as to multiple observations. In subsample 2a, we took the average scores of the 
partnerships from which we obtained several observations, in subsample 2b the maximum 
score, in subsample 2c the minimum score, and in subsample 2d the difference between the 
maximum and minimum of the score of the partnerships. RESULTS 
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Table 6.2: Multivariate regressions with commercial performance 












NR.OF PARTNERS  1.71*  1.33*  1.32º  1.35º  1.31 
   (2.61)  (2.03)  (1.98)  (1.93)  (1.63) 
NR.OF PARTNERS  -0.20**  -0.16*  -0.15*  -0.16*  -0.15º 
(Quadratic)  (-3.28)  (-2.48)  (-2.29)  (-2.22)  (-1.91)  
  -0.24**  -0.22*  -0.22*  -0.20º  -0.22º 
   (-2.80)  (-2.55)  (-2.61)  (-1.86)  (-1.67)  
PARTNER'S STRATEGIC 
MOTIVES  -0.19*  -0.21*  -0.19*  -0.20º  -0.19 
   (-2.29)  (-2.19)  (-2.23)  (-1.89)  (-1.26)  



















   (-4.29)  (-4.45)  (-3.88)  (-3.20)  (-2.95)  
FIRM'S EMBEDDEDNESS    -0.24º  -0.08  -0.05  0.01 
     (-1.76)  (-0.11)  (-0.06)  (0.01) 
PARTNER'S COMPETENCES    0.05  -0.67º  -0.63  -0.65 
     (0.75)  (-1.86)  (-1.60)  (-1.46)  




























(Quadratic)      (2.05)  (1.88)  (1.68) 
 
 
_cons  9.153***  11.32***  10.73**  10.80**  11.36*  
 
 
  (7.08)  (6.18)  (3.06)  (2.74)  (2.14) 
 
 
N  134  132  132  132  132 
 
 
R-sq  29.0%  36.2%  39.7%  40.3%  41.5% 
 
 
adj. R-sq  25.1%  29.1%  29.5%  25.6%  21.7% 
 
 
F  15.02  1.63  1.00  0.30  0.39 
 
 
P > F  0.00  0.16  0.44  0.95  0.34 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, º p<0.1,* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and *** p<0.001. 
F-test: significance compared with the previous model. 
 
 Chapter 6 
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Table 6.3: Multivariate regressions with technological performance 
 
   TECHNOLOGICAL PERFORMANCE  
      MODEL 1  MODEL 2  MODEL 3  MODEL 4  MODEL 5 
FIRM'S MULTI INPUT  1.15***  1.00**  1.13**  1.12**  0.85 
   (3.59)  (2.74)  (2.72)  (2.71)  (1.89) 
FIRM'S INNOVATIVENESS  -0.01  -0.02  -0.04  -0.07  -0.09º 
   (-0.21)  (-0.49)  (-0.90)  (-1.59)  (-1.83)  
PARTNER'S IMPORTANCE  0.25*  0.26*  0.29*  0.34**  0.25º 
  (2.33)  (2.47)  (2.67)  (3.04)  (2.00) 



















   (3.53)  (2.78)  (2.45)  (1.80)  (1.70) 
CONTRACT NEED     -0.29*  0.24  0.26  0.29 
     (-2.31)  (0.44)  (0.45)  (0.51) 
COORDINATION NEED    -0.03  -1.29*  -1.32*  -1.61**  
     (-0.28)  (-2.59)  (-2.66)  (-2.94)  


























(Quadratic)        (2.42)  (2.55)  (2.91) 
TRUST           -0.05  -2.49º 
         (-0.28)  (-1.72)  
TRUST          0.19º 
(Quadratic)          (1.72) 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER        0.25  1.59º 
         (1.50)  (1.69) 
  0.25º  0.49  FIRM'S MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMEMENT 
     (1.78)  (0.91) 






















         (-1.87)  (-1.19)  
   _cons  0.03  1.85  2.65  1.80  7.31 
     (0.02)  (1.17)  (1.04)  (0.53)  (1.42) 
   N  134  132  132  132  132 
   R-sq  21.0%  25.7%  30.2%  37.6%  42.2% 
   adj. R-sq  18.6%  19.5%  20.4%  24.3%  25.0% 
   F  9.49  1.14  1.14  1.31  1.11 
   P > F  0.00  0.36  0.35  0.27  0.37 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, º p<0.1,* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and *** p<0.001. 
F-test: significance compared with the previous model. RESULTS 
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Table 6.4: Multivariate regressions with financial performance 
 
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE  
      MODEL 1  MODEL 2  MODEL 3  MODEL 4  MODEL 5 
PROJECT DURATION  0.25º  0.36*  0.30*  0.20  0.22 
   (1.94)  (2.44)  (2.07)  (1.10)  (1.17) 
PROJECT DURATION  -0.01*  -0.02**  -0.01*  -0.01  -0.01 
(Quadratic)  (-2.60)  (-3.16)  (-2.53)  (-1.26)  (-1.36)  
LIFE CYCLE PHASE  0.79*  0.86**  0.94**  0.61º  0.67º 
   (2.69)  (2.88)  (3.11)  (1.83)  (1.80) 
LIFE CYCLE PHASE  -0.07*  -0.08**  -0.09**  -0.05º  -0.06º 
(Quadratic)  (-2.68)  (-2.90)  (-3.17)  (-1.68)  (-1.75)  
PARTNER'S NATIONALITY  0.98º  0.82º  1.03*  1.04º  1.08º 
   (1.83)  (1.67)  (2.27)  (1.89)  (1.93) 
FIRM'S SALES P. EMPLOYEE  0.72***  0.66***  0.71**  0.59**  0.68**  
   (3.87)  (3.91)  (3.32)  (2.92)  (3.23) 
FIRM'S INNOVATIVENESS  0.11***  0.11**  0.11**  0.11***  0.11*** 
   (4.01)  (3.46)  (3.46)  (3.82)  (3.57) 
KNOWLEDGE 



















   (1.77)  (1.34)  (1.73)  (2.37)  (1.99) 
CONTRACT NEED     -0.11  -1.29***  -1.51***  -1.39*** 
     (-1.20)  (-3.53)  (-4.72)  (-3.90)  
CONTRACT NEED      0.096**  0.12***  0.11**  
(Quadratic)      (2.86)  (3.93)  (3.27) 
FIRM'S CENTRALITY    0.13  1.11***  1.30***  1.22*** 
     (1.07)  (3.71)  (4.75)  (4.29) 
FIRM'S CENTRALITY      -0.08**  -0.10***  -0.10*** 
(Quadratic)      (-3.16)  (-4.06)  (-3.83)  


























     (1.78)  (-0.32)  (-0.93)  (-0.71)  
CULTURE FIT           0.18º  0.28 
         (1.72)  (0.80) 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER        0.34*  0.17 
         (2.30)  (0.41) 






















            (2.16)  (-0.46)  
   _cons  -0.19  -1.86  2.40  -0.55  -1.05 
     (-0.15)  (-1.07)  (0.88)  (-0.21)  (-0.27)  
   N  132  130  130  130  130 
   R-sq  35.1%  41.3%  49.5%  58.1%  59.5% 
   adj. R-sq  29.1%  32.4%  38.6%  45.4%  43.2% 
   F  7.5  2.17  2.87  2.18  0.52 
   P > F  0.00  0.06  0.02  0.05  0.81 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, º p<0.1,* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and *** p<0.001. 
F-test: significance compared with the previous model. Chapter 6 
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6.3  RESULTS OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL DRIVERS 
 
The regressions with commercial performance are shown in Table 6.2  only the 
significant regressions  and in Appendix F, Table F.4  all regressions . The linear 
and quadratic terms of the organizational variables  Model 2  do not significantly 
contribute to the explained variance. When explaining the second dependent 
variable   technological  performance,  see  Table  6.3  or  Table  F.5 ,  the  linear  and 
quadratic terms of the organizational variables do not contribute significantly to 
the R
2 or the adjusted R
2. For the third dependent variable  financial performance, 
see Table 6.4 or Table F.6 , the linear terms of the organizational variables con 
tribute to the explained variance, with 6.2    R
2  or 3.3    adjusted R
2  at a sig 
nificance level of p < 0.1., while the quadratic terms of the organizational vari 
ables add 8.6   the R
2 or 16.8   to the adjusted R
2, significant at p < 0.05. 
 
 
Table 6.5: Regression results of organizational drivers  
 
Notes: NS = non significant; U-shaped = negative linear, positive 
quadratic effect, Hill-shaped = positive linear, negative quadratic effect. 
Positive, negative = positive, negative linear effect, respectively, 
º p<0.1,* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and *** p<0.001, 
M2 = significant in Model 2. 
 
 
In hypothesis 1, we predicted that contract need, defined as a strong tendency to 
agree upon details and a formal contract in advance, is negatively associated with 
performance. This hypothesis is supported in the case of financial performance, 
where the linear term is highly significant at p < 0.001 and the quadratic term at 
p < 0.01, resulting in a curvilinear U shaped effect on financial performance, see 
Figure  6.3.  As  far  as  technological  performance  is  concerned,  we  observed  the 











Contract need  NS  Negative (M2)*  U-shaped**/*** 
Firm’s embeddedness  Negative (M2)º  NS  NS 
Firm’s centrality  NS  NS  Hill-shaped**/*** 
Partner’s embeddedness  NS  NS   Positive (M2)º 
Partner’s competences  U-shapedº/*   NS  NS  
Coordination need  NS  U-shaped*  NS RESULTS 
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With financial performance, the optimum contract need is at a minimal level. 
Increasing  values  of  contract  need  cause  deterioration  in  financial  performance, 
although above an inflection point of 6.3, where the curvilinear effect exceeds 
the linear effect, the negative effect is reduced.  
The need to agree upon detail and a formal contract in advance has a 
negative  impact  on  financial  performance  because  it  involves  extra  governance 
costs  and  reduces  flexibility,  which  is  necessary  for  the  innovation  process. 
However, a strong contract need reduces to a certain extent the negative effect 
due to stricter cost control, resulting in potential cost savings. Contract need 
does not correlate significantly with commercial or technological performance.  
 




In hypothesis 2a and 2b, we predicted hill shaped associations with perform 
ance  of  a  embeddedness.  In  Section  5.8,  we  divided  embeddedness  into  three 
scales, firm’s and its partner’s embeddedness, and firm’s centrality in its network. We 
predicted that a combination of network experience, the number of partner 
ships and the centrality in a network, to be beneficial to a certain extent. At the 
same time, over embeddedness might be counter productive. The expected hill 
shaped  relation  is  found  in  the  regressions  with firm’s  centrality  with  financial 
performance, where above a substantial level  i.e. 6.7 , the curvilinear exceeds the 
linear effect  see Figure 6.4 . When firms play a central role in its networks, they 
are usually able to meet a larger proportion of their strategic and financial objec 
tives. We could not find support for hypothesis 2a on firm’s embeddedness and 
hypothesis 2b on partner’s embeddedness. We observed a negative effect in Model 2 
in  the  regressions  with  commercial  performance  of  firm  embeddednes  and  a Chapter 6 
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positive effect in Model 2 in the regressions with financial performance of part 
ner’s embeddedness.  
 




In hypothesis 3, we predicted a positive association between balanced 
competences and performance. We defined balanced competences as a combination of 
a high degree of newness  or uniqueness  of the competences of the firm and its 
partner, and difficulty in replacing both the firm and its partner. In Section 5.9, 
we  decided  to  limit  our  test  to  ‘partner’s  competences’  only.  We  observed  a  U 
shaped association of ‘partner’s competences’ with commercial performance with an 
inflection point of 5.8  see Figure 6.5 . We could not find a significant associa 
tion in general with technological or financial performance. We conclude that we 
only could test hypothesis 3 as far as partner’s competences is concerned and find 
proof in the regressions with commercial performance. 
If a partner’s competences are unique, the firm can expect a lower propor 









Hypothesis 4a regarding similarity of governance structures could not 
be tested  see Section 5.9 . 
In hypothesis 4b, we predicted coordination need of the alliance partners 
to have a hill shaped association with the performance; we expected that some 
coordination would improve the results, while too much coordination might lead 
to a loss of the necessary flexibility. Contrary to our expectations, we observed a 
U shaped curvilinear association of coordination need with technological performance, 
which is measured by access to complementary resources  see Figure 6.6 . Above 
the inflection point of 5.8, the negative effect of increasing need for coordina 
tion on technological performance is reduced. This positive trend above the inflec 
tion points, however, does match the negative linear correlations: as far as access 
to complementary resources is concerned, the optimal coordination between the 
alliance partners is at the lowest coordination level. We therefore find no sup 
port for hypothesis 4b; coordination need is not hill shaped related to perform 
ance. 
As discussed in Section 4.3.4, control mechanisms, organizational struc 
tures  and  performance  influence  one  another  simultaneously   Geringer  and 
Hebert, 1989; Yan and Zeng, 1999; Goerzen, 2005 . The similarity of governance 
structures in co innovation alliances has an impact on a need for coordination 
between the partners. As a result of recurrent negotiations within the partner 
ship, alliances have to contend with additional coordination and communication 
costs  García Canal et al., 2003; Christensen et al., 2005 , which explains the 
negative impact on technological performance.  
When  the  alliance  partners  have  different  governance  structures,  the Chapter 6 
 
147 
partners contribute to the co innovation by using different approaches and a 
variety  of  perspectives,  which  lead  to  greater  creativity   Mannix  and  Neale, 
2005 . Creativity encourages ‘out of the box’ thinking, leading to new methods 
or technologies. At the same time, coordination may constrain the team’s crea 
tivity,  flexibility,  and  development  progress   Bonner  et  al.,  2002 .  Involving 
external parties in the innovation process result in additional coordination costs 
 Christensen et al., 2005; Grönlund et al., 2010 . The negative effects of coordi 
nation can be mitigated by the positive effect of high levels of coordination in 
order  to  implement  the  creative  processes  efficiently.  Through  coordination, 
timeliness and product quality can be improved  Bonner et al., 2002; Leenders et 
al., 2007, Perez Freije and Enkel, 2007 .  
 
Figure 6.6: Coordination need and technological performance 
 
 
As  far  as  technological  performance  is  concerned,  the  negative  effect  of 
coordination cost is the lowest in the case of either highly differing opinions 
regarding the desired governance structures  more rewarding innovation but at 
the same time more difficult cooperation  or highly similar opinions regarding 
the desired governance structures  easy cooperation, but less rewarding innova 
tion . Medium levels of coordination offer the least benefit. On the one hand, 
low levels of coordination mean fewer coordination costs. On the other hand, in 
the case of high levels of coordination, we expect greater potential for integrat 
ing the co innovation into the exiting business. Medium levels of coordination 





6.4  RESULTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP DRIVERS 
 
In the regressions with commercial performance  see Table 6.2 , the linear and cur 
vilinear effects of the relational variables  Model 4 and Model 5, respectively  do 
not contribute significantly to explaining the variance. In order to explain the 
second dependent variable  technological performance, see Table 6.3 , the linear and 
curvilinear effects of the relational variables are according to the Wald test non 
also significant. As far as the third dependent variable is concerned  financial 
performance, see Table 6.4 , the linear terms of the relational variables  Model 4  
add 8.6   to the R
2 or 6.8   to the adjusted R
2  significant at p < 0.1 . The quad 
ratic terms of the relational variables do not contribute significantly. The regres 
sion results for relational scales are summarized in Table 6.6. 
 











Trust  NS  U-shapedº  NS 
Culture fit  NS  NS  Positive (M4)* 
Technology transfer  NS  Positive (M5)º  Positive (M4)* 
Firm’s management 
involvement  NS  Positive (M4)º  NS 
Partner’s management 
involvement  NS  Negative (M5)º  NS 
Technical informality  NS  NS   NS 
Commercial informality  NS  NS  Positive (M4)* 
Notes: NS = non significant; U-shaped = negative linear, positive quadratic 
effect, Hill-shaped = positive linear, negative quadratic effect.  
Positive, negative = positive, negative linear effect, respectively 
 º p<0.1,* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and *** p<0.001, 
 M4 = significant in Model 4, M5 = significant in Model 5. 
 
 
In hypothesis 5, we predicted that trust between partners would reveal 
a hill shaped relationship with performance. We defined ‘trust’ as the degree of 
openness between the responding company and its partners, the extent to which 
obligations are met by the partner, and the willingness and ability to share the 
expertise  of  the  company  and  its  partner.  We  did  not  find  support  for  our 
hypothesis regarding trust. In contrast to our expectations, in the regression with 
technological performance we observed an U shaped curvilinear effect, as illus Chapter 6 
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trated in Figure 6.7. As far as technological performance is concerned   measured 
by  access  to  complementary  resources     trust  will  cause  deterioration  in  the 
results,  although  after  an  inflection  point  of  6.6  the  negative  effect  will  be 
reduced. In our research, trust does not correlate significantly with commercial 
or financial performance. The average level of trust in our research, as listed in 
Table 5.3  descriptive statistics , is 7.3, when measured on a scale between 0 10, 
which includes a standard deviation of 1.8. We suggest that a high minimum 
level of trust might be considered as a ‘conditio sine qua non’ when entering into 
a co innovation cooperation  Park and Ungson, 2001:51, see Box 4.4 . Excessive 
trust between the partners will reduce the opportunities in gaining access to 
complementary resources due to the fact that the sharing of expertise between the 
firm and its partners becomes counterproductive leading to fewer opportunities 
in gaining access to the other’s additional competences.  
 
Figure 6.7: Trust and technological performance  
 
 
In hypothesis 6, we predicted culture fit to reveal a hill shaped curve when 
related to performance. We defined ‘culture fit’ as similarity of communication 
style, decision making, leadership, and problem solving style. Culture fit is bene 
ficial to financial performance, however not hill shaped related  see Figure 6.8 . A 
culture fit facilitates routine learning and exploitation,   that is refinement and 
the extension of existing technology aimed at efficiency. The more the partners 
resemble one another in terms of communication style, decision making, leader 
ship, and problem solving style, the better financial and strategic objectives can 
be met. We did not find any hill shaped relationships with performance and 




Figure 6.8: Culture fit and financial performance  
 
 
In hypothesis 7, we predicted the ability to transfer of technology to be hill 
shaped  when  related  to  performance.  This  involves  the  ability  to  transfer 
knowledge  to and from external partners  as well as building and retaining rela 
tionships with external partners. We observed different positive associations in 
transfer  of  technology,  strongly  with  technological  and  weakly  with  financial 
performance  See Figure 6.9, curves A,B, respectively . We could not find ample 
and robust proof for hypothesis 7 and conclude that it is not supported.  
 
Figure 6.9: Technology transfer and performance  
 
 Chapter 6 
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We expected that the effect of involvement of a firm’s management  hypothesis 
8a   and  of  the  partner’s  management   hypothesis  8b   to  be  hill shaped  when 
related to performance. In the regressions with technological performance   meas 
ured by access to complementary resources, we observed opposite effects; firm’s 
management involvement is considered to be positive, while a partner’s management 
involvement is negative, as is illustrated in Figure 6.10, curve A and B, respec 
tively. 
 




In this chapter, we tested our hypotheses only for linear and curvilinear 
 main   effects.  The  average  level  of  involvement  of  a  firm’s  management  in  our 
research, as listed in Table 5.3  descriptive statistics , is 7.4, measured on a scale 
between 0 10, with a standard deviation of 2.7. We suggest that a firm’s manage 
ment involvement might be considered as a “conditio sine qua non” when starting 
a co innovation alliance. In Appendix E, we explore the effect of interaction 
effects of management involvement, where we will discuss the influence of a 
firm’s management involvement as a moderating or mediating variable. We do not 
find support for both hypotheses 8a and 8b regarding firm’s and partner’s man 
agement involvement; in general, no significant hill shaped associations could be 
observed.  
 
In hypothesis 9, we predicted that the effect of informality between a firm and 
its partner to be hill shaped when related to performance. In Section 5.8, we 
decided to split this construct into two separate scales, technical informality 
 hypothesis 9a  and commercial informality  hypothesis 9b . We did not find RESULTS 
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proof for hypothesis 9a. We observed a positive effect in Model 4 of hypothesis 
9b in the regressions with financial performance. We could not detect any sig 
nificant hill shaped effects and therefore conclude that hypotheses 9a and 9b are 




6.5  THE EFFECTS OF CONTROL VARIABLES 
 
As can be observed in Table 6.2, in the regressions with commercial per 
formance, the control variables  Model 1  explain 29.0  R
2  or 25.1    adjusted R
2  
of the variance, which is significant at p < 0.001. In order to explain the second 
dependent variable  technological performance, see Table 6.3 , the control variables 
explain 21.0    R
2  or 18.6    adjusted R
2  of the variance, which is significant at 
the same level of p < 0.001. As to the third dependent variable  financial perform 
ance, see Table 6.4 , the control variables explain 35.1    R
2  or 29.1    adjusted 
R
2  of the variance, which is also significant at p < 0.001. In Section 5.7, we 
derived  ten  control  variable  scales.  The  regression  results  of  these  scales  are 
summarized in Table 6.7. 
When considering the alliance control variables, we did not find signifi 
cant effects for the role of respondent, industry, number of partners, multiple 
input of the partner, size  of the firm or its partner measured in sales or employ 
ees , size differences, partner innovativeness  estimate of the respondents , part 
ner sales per employee, firm’s importance, and initial conditions. 
Neither do we find significant estimates for the market control variables: 
predictability, and technological intensity, nor for the strategic control variables: 
strategic motives  both of the firm or its partners , cost motives  both of the 
firm and its partner , stability, and the flexibility of the partner. In Table 6.7, we 
summarize the significant effects of control variables. 
We calculated the duration of the projects and asked our respondents to 
judge the life cycle of the co innovation project  start up, growth, early maturity, 
later maturity or decline phase . In general, we observed a positive association 
with project duration and a hill shaped association with project life cycle  see 
Figure 6.11, curves A and B, respectively .  
The positive effect of project duration can be explained through the 
existence of learning effects: the longer a co innovation alliance exists, the bet 
ter its financial performance, i.e. the more strategic and financial objectives are 
met, which is in line with Mody  1993 , Lin and Germain  1998 , and Child and 
Yan  2003 . Second, one might expect that only successful alliances will be con 




Table 6.7: Regression results of the control variables  
Alliance control variables 






Number of partners  Hill-shaped*  NS  NS 
Project duration  NS  NS  Hill-shaped*
7 
Project life cycle  NS  NS  Hill-shapedº/** 
Partner’s nationality  NS  NS  Positiveº/* 
Multiple input of the firm  NS   Positiveº/***  NS 
Firm’s sales per employee   NS  NS   Positive**/*** 
Firm’s innovativeness (perception)  NS  Negativeº  Positive**/*** 
Partner’s importance  Positive**  Positiveº/**  NS 
Market control variables 
Knowledge concentration  NS  NS  Positiveº 
External turbulence  Positive*  NS  NS 
Strategic control variables 
Partner’s strategic motives  Negativeº/*
8   NS  NS 
Technological motives  NS   Positiveº/***  NS 
Firm’s flexibility  Negative**/***  NS  NS 
Notes: NS = non significant; U-shaped = negative linear, positive quadratic effect, 
Hill-shaped = positive linear, negative quadratic effect. 
Positive = positive linear effect, negative = negative linear effect. 
º p<0.1,* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and *** p<0.001. 
 
                                                 
7 In Model 1,2, and 3. 
8 Not significant in Model 5. RESULTS 
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In  the  following,  we  discuss  the  impact  various  control  variables  have  on 
performance.  
Co innovation alliances are aimed at the development of new products 
and services. When a project matures  or even reaches a decline phase , one 
might expect that financial results deteriorate. 
 





The number of partners has a significant curvilinear impact on commer 
cial performance  See Figure 6.12 . As far as the proportion of IP, profit and 
rights to market the products is concerned, an alliance with three partners is 
more attractive than with two or four partners. Within alliances that involve 
more than four partners, the risk of dilution of IP further reduces the commer 
cial performance. 
Similar nationalities of partner and focal firm have a positive effect on 
financial performance. When partners that share the same nationality cooper 
ate, we can expect easier exploitation of joint activities and lower coordination 
cost resulting in a better chance of achieving financial objectives. 
We  observed  a  positive  association  of  a  firm’s  multiple  input  and  the 
access  to  complementary  resources   “technological  performance” .  When  a  firm 
supplies multiple input   that is input concerning multiple aspects to the co inno 
vation alliance, such as commercial, technological, and financial aspects  it has 
more bargaining power in acquiring access to the complementary resources of 
the partner within the joint operation.  Chapter 6 
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Figure 6.12: Number of partners and commercial performance 
 
 
We found a positive association between a firm’s sales per employee and 
financial performance. In companies with higher sales productivity, employees are 
more focused on exploitation  achieving targets  than on exploration  out of the 
box learning .  
A perceived firm’s innovativeness has a positive impact on financial perform 
ance   i.e.,   the extent to which financial and strategic goals are met, while the 
access to complementary resources, known as technological performance has a nega 
tive impact. The positive association with financial performance is in line with 
Stuart  2000 , who concluded that innovativeness has a positive impact on future 
sales growth. Highly innovative firms, however, will face fewer opportunities in 
accessing the complementary resources of their partners due to the fact that 
they might already be ahead of them. 
The perception whether the co innovation project is important affects the 
commercial and technological performance positively. When partners perceive the 
cooperation as important, the partners are more inclined to supply know how or 
resources to the alliance.  
We observed a positive impact of two market control variables. When 
sources of expertise in the industrial environment of the co innovation alliance 
are concentrated   i.e., only available in a few knowledge sources   the co innova 
tion alliance is considered to be a means of improving a firm’s financial perform 
ance by acquiring faster and more price efficient unique knowledge: knowledge 
concentration affects financial performance positively. When the external condi 
tions of the co innovation project are changing rapidly, defined as external turbu 
lence, the commercial benefits of the co innovation alliance are considered to be RESULTS 
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important. In this case, the alliance is considered to be a means of improving the 
firm’s position in the market. 
Partner’s strategic motives influence the commercial performance of the focal 
firm negatively due to the fact that they strive to own rights to market the joint 
developed projects. When partners consider strategic and market considerations 
to be a major issue in order to enter into a co innovation alliance, they will be 
reluctant to grant marketing and IP rights to the focal firm. The technological mo 
tives of both the firm and its partner contribute positively and significantly to an 
improvement of technological performance due to the fact that the partners are 
more eager to embay their skills in the joint operation. 
A firm’s flexibility  the ability of an organization and its management to 
react quickly to external variations  negatively influences commercial performance. 
In order to develop IP and introduce new products into a market, companies 
need perseverance and determination. Companies that are used to being flexible 




6.6  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
In this chapter, we tested the hypotheses as postulated in Chapter 4 
with the use of multivariate regression models. We discussed the contribution of 
the organizational, relational, and control variables to the explanation of per 
formance and tested the direct effects, both linear and curvilinear. When the 
associations were contrary to our expectations, we clarified the differences. In 
the regressions with financial performance, we found support for our hypotheses 
concerning  contract  need   “negative  impact”   and  firm’s  centrality   “hill shaped 
related” . We do not find full support for the other hypotheses, as summarized 
in Table 6.8.  
 Chapter 6 
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Table 6.8: Summary of the testing of the hypotheses 
Hill-shaped = positive linear, negative quadratic effect. Positive = positive linear effect, negative = 




We could not find support for most of our hypotheses, which leads to the con 
clusion  that  the  performance  of  co innovation  alliances  cannot  be  explained 
universally, due to the fact that the relations of organizational and relationship 
drivers to performance are contingent upon various conditions that we list in 
Table 6.9. 
 
Predicted effect with performance  RESULT 
Organizational variables 
Contract need: (Hypothesis 1): 
Negative 
Full support as far as financial performance is 
concerned, with technological performance 
significant in Model 2 only. 
Firm’s embeddedness (Hypothesis 2a): 
Hill-shaped curvilinear  No support 
Firm’s centrality (Hypothesis 2b): 
Hill-shaped curvilinear 
Full support as far as financial performance is 
concerned 
Partner’s embeddedness (Hypothesis 2c): 
Hill-shaped curvilinear 
No support; positively related to financial 
performance in Model 2 
Partner’s competences (Hypothesis 3): 
Positive 
No support: U-shaped as far as commercial 
performance is concerned 
Coordination need (Hypothesis 4b): 
Hill-shaped curvilinear 
No support: U-shaped as far as technological 
performance is concerned 
Relational variables 
Trust (Hypothesis 5): 
Hill-shaped curvilinear 
No support: U-shaped related to 
technological performance 
Culture fit (Hypothesis 6): 
Hill-shaped curvilinear 
No support: positively related to financial 
performance in Model 4 
Technology transfer (Hypothesis 7): 
Hill-shaped curvilinear 
No support: positively related to 
technological performance in Model 5 and 
financial performance in Model 4 
Firm’s management involvement  
(Hypothesis 8a): Hill-shaped curvilinear 
No support: positively related to financial 
performance in Model 4 
Partner management involvement  
(Hypothesis 8b): Hill-shaped curvilinear 
No support: negatively related to financial 
performance in Model 5 
Technical informality (Hypothesis 9a): 
Hill-shaped curvilinear 
No support: positively related to financial 
performance 
Commercial informality (Hypothesis 9b): 
Hill-shaped curvilinear 
No support: positively related to financial 
performance in Model 4 RESULTS 
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Box 6.1: Explaining the performance of co-innovations alliances 
1.  Different aspects of performance 
2.  Differences across industry 
3.  Performance drivers shift during of the cooperation 
4.  Indirect and direct effects interact with one another 
5.  Performance drivers might also be considered as necessary conditions  
 
 
As discussed in Section 4.2, the performance concept is assessed relative to the 
various objectives driving an alliance. We have established evidence that proves 
that the relevance of the identified performance indicators varies according to 
the type of performance. For instance, we observed a positive effect of a high 
ability to transfer technology on the access to complementary resources  more tech 
nological performance . At the same time, a high ability to transfer technology weak 
ens the relative position towards the partner due to potential uncontrolled or 
excessive disclosure of information, and consequently a deteriorating of the rela 
tive ownership position as far as intellectual property is concerned  less commer 
cial performance  see Figure 6.9 . 
We observed different relationships to performance of our independent 
variables  across  industry.  Industrial  differences  play  a  role  due  to  the  different 
structure of industries. For example, in manufacturing industry, technical infor 
mality is to a certain extent beneficial in meeting financial objectives, whereas it 
is negative in the food industry due to strict food safety regulations  see Appen 
dix D, Figure D.7b .  
The relation of our indicators with performance varies according to the 
duration of the cooperation as well. For example, in mature projects, the partner’s 
embeddedness has a negative impact on meeting financial objectives of the focal 
firm due to the fact that the effect of potential IP leakage exceeds the novelty 
value of the partner’s network relationships. In contrast: in young projects, part 
ner’s embeddedness has a positive impact on meeting financial objectives. Here, the 
net effect of novelty value exceeds the disadvantages  see Appendix D, Figure 
D.3 . 
Considering indirect effects is an essential element in the explanation of 
the performance of co innovation alliances. We observed several mediating and 
moderating effects. For example, the ability to transfer technology mediates the 
relation of a firm’s and the partner’s embeddedness with performance. In the 
case of a high ability to transfer technology, a highly embedded firm benefits from its 
own network, while when a firm that has limited ability to transfer technology, 
benefits from highly embedded partners  See Appendix E, Figures E.6 and E.7 . As Chapter 6 
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far as the access to complementary resources is concerned, a partner’s embededd 
ness and a firm’s embeddedness reinforce one another  positive moderation  while 
the ability to transfer technology in combination with technological informality inter 
fere with one another  negative moderation  due to the risk of the unnecessary 
disclosure of information. 
Some indicators may be viewed as necessary conditions rather than perform 
ance drivers. We measured our indicators on a scale between 0 10 and observed 
some high average levels  see Table 5.3, descriptive statistics : the average level of 
firm’s management involvement was 7.4, of firm’s centrality 7.4 and of trust 7.3. 
We suggest that a high minimum level of some indicators might be considered 
as a ‘conditio sine qua non’ when entering into a co innovation cooperation indi 
cating that high initial levels are a prerequisite for starting the partnership  Park 
and Ungson, 2001 .  
 
As indicated in Section 5.8, we discuss the existence of potential meas 
urement errors in our regression results. We base our regressions on perceptual 
data  that  was  collected  in  a  single method  research  through  a  self reporting 
questionnaire, which may potentially generate systematic measurements errors, 
known as common method variance  CMV . As discussed in Sections 5.3 and 5.9, 
we took several procedural remedies, conducted statistical checks and used gen 
erally accepted norms of convergent and discriminant validity in order to reduce 
potential CMV distortion. In order to limit the risk of CMV further, we aggre 
gated our data and used observations of sets of responses from multiple respon 
dents. It is highly unlikely that several respondents responded with the same 
bias. Furthermore, we checked the robustness of our regressions. When we con 
sider the findings, many direct effects appear to be non linear or should be con 
sidered in conjunction with indirect effects, which in turn reduces the chance of 
CMV. 
 
In the next chapter, we will discuss the managerial implications and limitations 
of our research. We will elaborate on the practicalities concerning improving the 
performance of co innovation alliances. RESULTS 
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7  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
7.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter, we summarize our research. We identify factors and processes, 
which can be used in assessing the performance of co innovation alliances and 
stipulate significant associations with performance. We discuss the subject of 
improving the performance of co innovation alliances, the limitations in our 
study and suggest avenues for additional research. 
 
 
7.2  SUMMARY 
 
In Chapter 1, we introduce our research by defining key definitions, research 
objectives  and  research  questions.  We  define  co innovation  alliances  as 
business  relationships  in  which  two  or  more  independent  firms  or  research 
institutes work cooperatively, sharing both risk and reward, in clearly defined 
projects  that  are  aimed  at  the  development  and  commercialization  of  new 
products or services. In our study, we develop and test a theoretical and evi 
dence based framework. This serves as a basis for the development of a man 
agement tool in order to diagnose and improve the performance of co inno 
vation alliances. We develop such a framework through the identification of  
factors  and  processes  that  facilitate  or  complicate  performance  in  existing 
management research. 
 
In  Chapter  2,  we  discuss  the  relevance  of  our  research.  Customers  and 
competitors act increasingly on a global scale, the development of new tech 
nologies becomes increasingly expensive and complex, technology life cycles 
shorten, and products become more knowledge intensive. These trends imply 
new and intensified competition resulting in more organizational and manage 
rial  complexity.  In  order  to  deal  with  these  implications,  companies  are 
increasingly reliant on external partners, especially for new business develop 
ment, a phenomenon described by Chesbrough  2003a,b  as open innovation. 
We  focus  our  research  on  co innovation  alliances,  in  which  alliance 
partners cooperate exclusively, usually limited to a certain period, activity or 
geographic  location.  Through  this  cooperation,  companies  seek  to  obtain 
commercial, technological, and financial advantage. Commercial advantages are 
   e.g.,  scale  advantage  through  combining  sales  and  market  forces  or 
distribution channels. Technological advantages can be derived though more SUMMARY and CONCLUSIONS  162 
effective  learning,  resulting  in  a  shorter  time to market,  and  financial 
advantage  through  the  lower  cost  of  commercialization,  or  the  sharing  of 
development costs. 
 
In Chapter 3, we discuss the contributions of four theories to the explanation 
of  performance  of  co innovation  alliances.  First,  we  use  elements  of  the 
network theory; the aim and size of a network are relevant, the diversity of a 
network,  the  interdependency  between  partners,  the  structure,  context  and 
intensity  of  a  network.  We  discuss  networking  capabilities,  the  differences 
between structural and personal embeddedness, and the dynamic aspects of 
networks.  
Second,  the  resource based  view  is  useful  as  it  considers  firms  as 
bundles of competences that are a difficult to imitate. Competences have a 
both a tangible  technical  or intangible  social  dimension, and evolve gradu 
ally. Competences should be considered at the organizational or the personal 
level,  and  can  be  developed  internally   through  internal  experiences  or  by 
selecting personnel with the required competences  or externally   through the 
competences of partners, when companies are not able to acquire the required 
new internal competences in time. When knowledge is protected, sharing it 
with other partners becomes restricted. Existing core capabilities might evolve 
into  core  rigidities  where  they  become  counter productive  due  to  changing 
market conditions.  
Third,  contingency  theory  assumes  the  existence  of  an  optimal 
relationship,  compatibility  or  fit.  For  instance,  the  congruence  between  a 
market  environment  and  an  organizational  form,  leadership  style,  or  a 
governance structure  market fit , the extent to which a firm and its partners 
are aligned strategically  strategic fit , whether the resources of the alliance 
partners complement one another in order to innovate effectively  resource 
fit , whether organizational routines of the partners coincide  organization fit , 
or the organizational cultures are well matched  culture fit .  






4.  Exploration  and  exploitation  activities  require  both 
different learning styles and different optimal cognitive distance; more novelty 
                                                 
1 A firm's ability to value, assimilate, and utilize new external knowledge. 
2 The ability to synthesize and apply current and newly acquired knowledge, skills and 
capabilities. 
3 Unequal capacities to learn from alliance partners. 
4 Explains the trade off between novelty value and the ease of communication. CHAPTER 7  163 
value
5 is necessary in exploration. Learning processes at the individual, group, 
organizational and network level differ. We discuss two fundamental paradoxes 
in technology transfer: the information paradox
6 and the paradox of replication
7. 
Organizational learning may be enhanced through learning intent, managerial 
support,  relational  capital,  learning  capabilities,  and  the  appropriate 
organization.  Stumbling  blocks  in  the  learning  process  are  motivational 
barriers,  divergent  goals  at  both  the  individual  and  organizational  level, 
protection  of  knowledge,  cultural  differences,  and  organizational  barriers. 
When  learning  new  practices,  the  “unlearning”  of  obsolete  and 
counterproductive  practices  is  essential.  Apart  from  learning,  in  order  to 
prevent the risk of improper use, the protection of critical intellectual property 
is crucial, while at the same time maintaining an adequate balance between 
openness to new ideas as well as the protection of vital company interests. 
 
In Chapter 4, we define our conceptual framework. The dependent variables in 
this framework are commercial, technological and financial performance, which were 
related to independent organizational and relationship variables. We discuss 








We predict that contract need is negatively associated with performance, 
because  it  complicates  organizational  learning  and  creativity,  which  reduces 
the necessary flexibility.  
We predict a hill shaped association of embeddedness with performance. 
On  the  one  hand,  embeddedness  ensures  that  a  firm  is  more  attractive  to 
potential  partners,  and  may  improve  performance.  On  the  other  hand,  too 
much  embeddedness  can  lead  to  excessive  network  dependency,  insufficient 
flexibility, and less internal learning.  
We  predict  that  balanced  competences  are  positively  associated  with 
performance,  because  the  partners  depend  mutually  on  one  another’s 
                                                 
5 Sometimes, the term ‘novelty value’ may have a negative connotation, referring to a 
temporary  or  fashionable  newness.  We  use  this  term  in  the  positive  sense  as  it  is 
understood in the professional literature 
6 The disclosure of information in order to assess the value of information reduces the 
novelty value 
7 Knowledge replicated to external partners enables faster sales growth, but at the same 
time raises the risk of imitation. 
8 Defined as an emphasis on agreeing upon many details and a formal contract 
in advance. 
9 Defined as network intensity, experience, and centrality. 
10 Defined as the competences of the co innovation alliance partners that are unique 
and durable. 
11 Defined as the need of both the firm and its partner to coordinate the activities 
within the co innovation alliance. SUMMARY and CONCLUSIONS  164 
resources, thus increasing their own capabilities while maintaining a balance of 
power.  We  expect  a  positive  association  with  performance  of  similarity  of 
governance, because partners with similar governance structures are better able 
to  handle  the  complexities  that  are  inherent  in  the  co innovation  process. 
Similarity leads to more stability, and consequently to better performance.  
We  predict  the  coordination  need  to  be  hill shaped  associated  to 
performance, because too little coordination may lead to insufficient use of 
complimentary  resources,  while  too  much  coordination  might  impede  the 
necessary flexibility, creativity and innovation.  
We discuss the relational variables trust
12, culture fit
13, transfer of technol 
ogy
14, management support
15, and personal relationships
16.  
We predict trust between partners to have a hill shaped relationship 
with  performance.  Trust  may  reduce  the  uncertainty  of  alliance  partners 
towards one another, leading to lower governance costs, increased flexibility, 
commitment, and learning. However, too much trust can lead to complacency, 
acceptance  of  a  less than satisfactory  outcome,  risk  of  malfeasance,  less 
information exchange, or unnecessary obligations.  
We predict a hill shaped association of culture fit with performance due 
to an expected trade off between creativity and problem solving. On the one 
hand, cultural similarity increases stability and facilitates problem solving. On 
the other hand, cultural differences are to a certain extent positive for crea 
tivity and innovation, because they may enrich the decision making process 
and facilitate “unlearning” or thinking out of the box.  
We  predict  a  hill shaped  association  of  transfer  of  technology  with 
performance.  Transfer  of  technology  is  essential  both  to  learning  and  co 
innovation, but in excess may lead to uncontrolled information disclosure, and 
a shifting balance of power, resulting in instability and underperformance.  
We predict a hill shaped association of involvement of management with 
performance  because  management  decides  upon  the  allocation  of  funds  or 
other resources, which in turn may reduce organizational barriers. However, 
excessive involvement may lead to too much dependency on management, less 
                                                 
12  Defined  as  the  mutual  disclosure  of  information,  meeting  obligations,  and  the 
willingness and ability to share expertise. 
13  Defined  as  similarity  of  communication  styles,  decision  making,  leaderships  and 
problem solving styles. 
14  Defined  as  the  willingness  and  ability  to  transfer  technology,  both  to  and  from 
partners and to retain relations with partners. 
15 Defined in two separate scales, a firm’s management involvement and the partner’s 
management involvement. 
16 Measured by informality between the alliance partners in two separate scales, 
technical informality  concerning R&D issues and projects management  and 
commercial informality  concerning strategic and marketing issues . CHAPTER 7  165 
operational  flexibility,  less  learning  and  a  decrease  in  motivation  of  the 
innovation team.  
We predict a hill shaped association of interpersonal relationships with 
performance because informal contacts may strengthen interpersonal relation 
ships and facilitate the innovation process. However, when personal relation 
ships become familiar and too informal, loyalty of personnel might shift to 
other partners, causing the innovation project to become dependent on per 
sonal  relationships.  In  addition,  excessive  informal  contact  may  lead  to 
complacency, and the acceptance of less than satisfactory results.  
 
In Chapter 5, we discuss our research design. Our research objectives implied 
several  methodological  challenges  and  choices.  We  decide  to  conduct 
quantitative research using primary data, which was has a mixed hierarchical 
 multilevel  and non hierarchical  cross classified  structure. Consequently, our 
observations are to a certain extent correlated or nested. Because variability 
across  respondents  is  not  our  prime  research  objective,  we  aggregated  our 
database at the partnership level.  
We check the robustness of our regression parameters with use of the 
Huber/White routine. In addition, we construct subsamples of our database 
and  analyzed  whether  the  regression  results  remained  robust.  Our  research 
process involves the development of a conceptual model, the design and testing 
of a questionnaire, conducting survey based interviews, statistical analysis and, 
ultimately, the construction of the definitive model.  
We undertake several steps in order to reduce potential bias caused by 
common method variance. We discuss our data collection process, as well as 
the companies, projects, partnerships and respondents that participated in our 
research. We assess the influence of alliance characteristics
17, market condi 
tions
18 and strategic considerations.
19  
Before  analyzing  our  data,  we  screen  our  dataset  on  missing  values, 
outliers,  sample  size,  and  normality.  We  then  construct  our  scales,  using 
principal component analysis techniques. 
 
In Chapter 6, we present the empirical results of our multivariate data analysis. 
                                                 
17 Initial conditions, size of the firm and its partner, size differences, innovativeness, 
perceived importance of the project, number of partners, project life cycle, industry, 
and relationship of the respondent to the project.  
18  Market  ambiguity,  market  complexity,  risks,  market  uncertainty,  importance  of 
technological  aspects,  life  cycle  of  the  market,  dynamism  of  the  market,  and 
knowledge concentration in the industry.  
19 Strategic fit, strategic flexibility and strategic stability, technological motives, and 
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In several regression models, we include different parts of the research model 
and assessed the robustness of the regressions. We then decide whether or not 
our hypotheses are supported, as will be discussed in the following section. 
 
 
7.3  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The main objective in our study is to develop, test and explore both a theoreti 
cal and evidence based framework in order to diagnose and explain perform 
ance in co innovation alliances. The first research issue in our research is to 
identify factors and processes, which can be used in assessing the performance 
of co innovation alliances.  
The research results in a model containing the indicators as listed in 
Figure 7.1. The model serves a basis for a management tool that can be used in 
all of the phases: from strategic analysis, alliance preparation, partner selection 
co innovation design, management, and evaluation. Market and strategy char 
acteristics serve as input for a strategic analysis, to be followed by the prepara 
tion of a co innovation alliance, which includes a profile of the desired part 
ner s .  The  organizational  and  relationships  drivers  can  be  used  to  select 
appropriate partners. In addition, they may be used in designing, managing, 
and evaluating the co innovation alliance.  
 
Figure 7.1: COINN-model related to the co-innovation cycle 
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The second research issue is to detect the effects of the indicators with 
performance and study the opportunities for performance improvement. We 
list the relationship to the defined performance aspects in Table 7.1. 
 
Table 7.1: Associations with performance 
 





























Partner’s embeddedness  
       (M2) 
Cultural fit (M4) 
Technology transfer (M5) 
Commercial informality (M4) 
National similarity 





























    (M2) 
Partner’s strategic motives 
Firm’s flexibility 
Contract need (M2) 
Partner’s management 
involvement (M5) 












Partner’s competences  Coordination need 
Trust  Contract need 
Notes: M2 = in Model 2, M4 = in model 4, M5 = in Model 5. 
 
Following the explanation of the performance of co innovation alliances, we will 
discuss some of the practical issues concerning the improvement of perform 
ance, as listed in Box 7.1. 
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Box 7.1: Improving the performance of co-innovations alliances 
1.  Deal with paradoxes effectively 
2.  Consider various contingencies that influence one other 
3.  Be aware of shifting performance drivers during the cooperation 
4.  Co-innovation requires different individual traits and roles 
5.  In co-innovation emphasis is put on a transformational leadership style 
6.  Co-innovation demands organizational adjustments  
 
 
Improving the performance of co innovation alliances entails the abil 
ity to manage various paradoxes simultaneously. Measuring and subsequently 
improving the performance of co innovation alliances requires an integrated, 
holistic approach, in which several relevant aspects and contexts are considered 
simultaneously  Kerssens  van Drongelen and Cook, 1997; Westwood and Low, 
2003 . Improving the performance of co innovation alliances entails the ability 
to  manage  various  paradoxes  simultaneously.  In  such  an  approach,  several 
paradoxes should be dealt with; the paradox between trust and control  Dekker, 
2003; De Man and Rooijakkers, 2009 , between exploration and exploitation 
 Vanhaverbeke et al., 2003; Nooteboom et al., 2007; Rijnsdijk et al., 2009 . 
Another paradox is between cooperation and competition within the partner 
ship   between “sharing and growing the pie”  Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996; 
Hagel and Brown, 2005; Tjemkes, 2008 , which results in a selective openness 
to the partner. In addition, variation in performance drivers per type of per 
formance   commercial,  technological  and  financial   may  lead  to  paradoxes. 
Innovation involves both, creativity and flexibility on the one hand, and time 
liness,  product  quality,  and  efficiency,  on  the  other   Leenders  et  al.,  2007, 
Perez Freije  and  Enkel,  2007 .  For  example,  one  should  restrain  from  tight 
coordination  activities  in  order  not  to  limit  the  access  to  complementary 
resources   technological  performance ,  however,  coordination  and  contracts 
might be indispensable in order to obtain a fair share of commercial benefits or 
meet  financial  objectives.  Once  the  paradoxes  have  been  recognized,  one 
should prioritize aspects, manage the balance between conflicting priorities, 
and accept the consequences.  
As discussed in Section 6.6, the performance drivers are subject to sev 
eral contingencies; they vary across industry and project duration. Usually in co 
innovation, firms cooperate with partners that have complementary resources 
or competences. Partners that are active in different industries are motivated 
differently as performance drivers vary per industry. In addition, performance CHAPTER 7  169 
drivers influence one another. For example, the desired level of coordination is 
contingent upon a firm’s and the partner’s embeddedness, as well as its ability to 
transfer technology, and balanced competences  See Appendix E . It is essential to 
identify the relevant conditions and understand their impact on performance. 
 
We illustrate the complexity of improving performance of co innovation alli 
ances with the use of various moderation effects in Box 7.2. 
 
Box 7.2: Example of conflicting effects in co-innovation 
A combination of detailed contracts and highly coordinated activities improves the relative 
position of a firm towards its partner commercially. However in general, detailed 
contracts and coordination may reduce flexibility and therefore constrain the innovation 
process as well. In contrast, when a partner is highly embedded, detailed contracts with 
the partner do add to the financial and technological performance. 
 
 
The performance drivers will change gradually during the cooperation. 
It is important to be aware of the dynamic character of performance drivers, 
sympathize with those changes and adapt one’s strategy and behavior accord 
ingly. For instance, trust between partners is an indispensible condition in a co 
innovation alliance. Trust between the alliance partners will grow gradually by 
having  positive  joint  experiences.  More  trust  will  result  in  more  openness 
towards one another and involves the risk of potentially excessive disclosure of 
proprietary information or insufficient control. 
In open innovation, the emphasis has shifted from what you know to 
who you know. Intensive interaction and personnel relationships between the 
various partners are essential  Kauser and Shaw, 2004; Leenders et al., 2007; 
see Section 4.4.5 . In order to implement within a “connect and develop” approach 
successfully  Section 2.4 , a different mix of individual attitudes, competences, 
and personality characteristics, is required as opposed to the traditional R & D 
or closed innovation practice. In order put innovation into practice, employees 
should be allowed to move away from a “devil’s advocate” role and play more 
innovative roles, such as “expirimenter” or “collaborator”  Kelley, 2005 . 
 
In  conjunction  with  individual  differences,  in  co innovation,  a  shift 
towards  transformational  as  opposed  to  transaction  leadership  style  can  be 
expected. Transformational leaders tend to develop and empower their team 
members by providing support. They are usually charismatic, lead by example, SUMMARY and CONCLUSIONS  170 
and stimulate their team members to adapt personal interest to the organiza 
tion. By contrast, transactional leaders emphasize to clarify expectations of the 
team  members,  offer  recognition  when  individual  and  group  objectives  are 
achieved. They focus on rewards or discipline, while monitoring actively devia 
tion from standards  “management by exception”  and taking corrective action as 
quickly as possible  Carless et al., 2000; Goodwin et al., 2001; Bass et al., 2003 . 
 Implementation of co innovation has its effect on the organizational level 
as  well  as  co innovation  is  considered  to  be  an  innovation  of  the  business 
model. Value is created and captured with external entities that cooperate in 
innovative  ecosystems   Section  2.2;  Chesbrough,  2003b,  2006 .  The  success 
rate of co innovation can be increased by advanced management techniques, 
the use of knowledge centers in order to bundle the co innovation expertise, as 
well as training or executive coaching  Bamford and Ernst, 2002; Draulans et 
al., 2003; Lichtenthaler and Lichtenthaler, 2004; Sampson, 2005 .  
In  the  co innovation  practice,  the  organizational  culture  should  be 
adapted in order to transfer reluctance to learn from others, known as a “not 
invented here” mentality   to a “proudly found elsewhere” mentality  Section 
2.4 and Section 3.5 , resulting in an “open” culture that entails a polycentric 
attitude   accepting and benefiting from cultural differences between the part 
ners  Hofstede, 1983, Section 4.4.2 .  
Another organizational implication is the policy towards the protecting 
of  Intellectual  Property   IP .  Instead  of  keeping  IP  inside  the  company,  it 
should be traded in case it is not used. Instead of developing IP without con 
sidering the alternative to buy it elsewhere, it should be developed only if stra 
tegically interests are predominant  Chesbrough, 2003a .  
 
To summarize: improving the performance of co innovation implies both a set 
of practices using external sources, as well as an open mentality  Section 2.4 . 
We therefore consider the management of co innovation alliances as multi 
perspective multilevel challenge and discuss the management implications of 
co innovation alliances in Section 7.5. 
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7.4   LIMITATIONS  
 
 
Given de scope of our research  see Section 1.2 , it is subject to a number of 
limitations that we list in Table 7.2. Addressing these provides opportunity for 
further research. 
 
Box 7.3: Limitations of the COINN-research 
1.  Test of dyadic relationships  
2.  One-sided analysis 
3.  Test of general direct effects  
4.  Restrictions in multi-level research 
5.  Focus on quantity of performance drivers 
6.  Sample size constraints 
 
  
Although the co innovation alliances in our research consist of a varied 
number of partners, in the process of formulating our hypotheses   due to prac 
tical reasons   we focus on dyadic relationships within the alliance. Relationships 
between three or more partners differ from dyadic relationships  Garcia Canal 
et  al.,  2003 .  We  do  not  examine  the  added  complexity  of  multi partner 
alliances or virtual network cooperation in depth. We use the size of a partner 
ship as a control variable and found a significant hill shaped association with 
commercial performance. Further research could analyze the dynamics of  vir 
tual  multi partner networks more in detail  De Man, 2004 . 
We collect our data of the alliances mostly through one sided respondents. 
Although we take several precautions and took procedural remedies and statis 
tical checks to reduce the likelihood of biases, gathering more data from the 
perspective of the alliance partner would have enriched our database  Kumar et 
al., 1993 . 
As third limitation of our study: we base our hypotheses on theory con 
cerning the direct relations between organizational and relationship variables 
with performance and subsequently tested the hypotheses. We explore various 
effects of industry and project duration, as well as several indirect effects with 
out examining the theoretical foundation of these distinctions in depth  see 
Appendix  D  and  E,  respectively .  As  we  conclude  that  indirect  effects  and 
various contingencies play an important role in the explanation of co innova 
tion performance, further research could develop more detailed indicators that 
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In our multi level research, we focus on relationships and organizational 
aspects  of  inter organizational  cooperation.  We  refrain  from  examining  the 
consequences  of  different  individual  traits  or  team  composition  on  the 
innovation outcome. We will discuss further research into these areas in the 
next section. 
We focus on the quantity of performance drivers and quantified optimal 
levels of performance drivers   when significant   without having measured the 
effectiveness or quality of the drivers. For instance, we discuss the level of 
management involvement without considering the effects of different leader 
ship styles that influence the innovation performance in different ways  Bar 
tram, 2009 . 
We can test the effects of performance drivers on three aspects of per 
formance only separately due to a limited database of 137 aggregated observa 
tions. A larger database would have enabled us to analyze the different aspects 
of performance in relation to one another in a Structural Equation Model  see 
Section 5.5  or would have made it possible to study the indirect effects in more 
detail  see Appendix E . In addition, in our database of 137 observations, we 
observe a positive linear instead of the expected hill shaped curvilinear asso 
ciation with performance in the testing of six hypotheses: partner’s embeddedness, 
trust, culture fit, technology transfer, firm’s management involvement technical infor 
mality, and commercial informality. Additional research using a larger sample may 
result in significant negative quadratic associations, and consequently in the 
hill shaped relations. 
Last, most of the partnerships we examine were between Dutch and 
Belgium companies. At the national level, cultures vary on dimensions referred 
to  as  power  distance,  uncertainty  avoidance,  individuality,  masculinity,  and 
time orientation  Hofstede, 1980 . Due to the different scores on these dimen 
sions, the performance drivers in other cultures may vary. For instance, the 
contract  need  of  Americans  from  the  Japanese;  American  managers  normally 
prefer formal contracts in order to avoid conflicts and uncertainties, whereas 
Japanese  managers  prefer  mutual  discussion  to  formal  contracts   Park  and 




7.5   IMPLICATIONS  
 
Our research expands on the following theoretical implications.  
We contribute by investigating the impact of various elements of net 
work  theory  in  the  co innovation  context:  our  variable  embeddedness  used CHAPTER 7  173 
insights concerning the size of a network, and the influence of centrality within 
a  network.  In  our  variables  management  involvement  and  informality,  we  test 
aspects  of  the  intensity  of  a  network  and  both  structural  and  personal 
embeddedness.  
We contribute to the resource based view by observing the develop 
ment of competences in a dynamic environment. We evaluate the technical 
and  social  aspects  of  competences  at  the  organizational  and  personal  level, 
highlight internal and external acquisition of competences, and evaluate the 
impact of core rigidities on co innovation alliances.  
We contribute to contingency theory by researching a number of ‘fits’. 
Our variable balanced competences develops the concept of resource fit further. 
In addition, we investigate the influence of cultural compatibility in the vari 
able culture fit, market fit in the market control variables, and strategy fit in the 
strategy control variables.  
We contribute to organizational learning theory by elaborating on the 
concept of absorptive capacity  in our variable transfer of technology , and by 
using the cognitive distance and combinative capability concepts  in our driv 
ers, balanced competences and culture fit . Furthermore, we discuss the impact of 
differential learning, managerial support, and both motivational and organiza 
tional barriers on organizational learning.  
 
Our research has the following managerial implications.  
We  develop  a  basis  for  a  measurement  system  of  co innovation 
alliances that links performance evaluation to the objectives of the alliance. 
The result is a generic template that can be adapted to the specific evaluation 
requirements. 
We identify factors and processes that facilitate or hamper the per 
formance of a co innovation alliance. We establish evidence that proves that 
the relevance of these factors varies according to the type of performance   i.e., 
commercial, technological and financial performance. In addition, we gather 
evidence that some associations with performance are curvilinear. We indicate 
optimal levels of drivers. By optimizing the levels of the relevant drivers at the 
appropriate time, the performance of co innovation alliances can be improved.  
 
We consider the management of a co innovation alliance to be a multilevel and 
multi faceted  challenge,  in  which  organizations,  teams  and  individuals 
simultaneously interact with one another on financial and technological mat 
ters  Duysters, Heimeriks and Jurriëns,2002; García Valerrama and Mulero 
Mendigorri, 2005 . The multilevel multi perspective approach can be visualized SUMMARY and CONCLUSIONS  174 
in an input output model, as illustrated in Figure 7.2. By focusing attention on 
the  appropriate  levels,  one  can  expect  the  sum  of  the  total  required  input 
 point A in Figure 7.2  to be reduced to A*, with an advantage of A A* and the 
sum of the total realized output  point B in Figure 7.2  to be increased to B*, 
with an advantage of B B*, which represents an efficiency increase of  A A*  x 
 B B* . 
 
Figure 7.2: The COINN-Cube 
 
 
The suitability of management instruments, such as the Balanced Score 
card  BSC  and so called ‘stage gate’ business development concepts, can be put 
to the test in the co innovation practice. The BSC is both a strategic manage 
ment as well as a control system for performance measurement, developed by 
Kaplan and Norton  1992, 1993, 1996a, 1996b, 2000, 2001, 2004, 2006  and 
considered to be a powerful and widely used management tool  Gumbus and 
Lyons, 2002; Bible et al., 2006 . In the BSC, strategic goals are translated into 
measures relevant to performance, which are necessary in implementing strat 
egy while providing a balance between the long term strategy and short term 
actions, and between financial and non financial drivers. The BSC concept has 
been  evaluated  in  the  context  of  performance  measurement  of  R&D 
 Kerssens van Drongelen and Bilderbeek, 1999; Li and Dalton, 2003; Bremser 
and Barsky, 2004; Loch, 2008; Chiesa et al., 2009  and innovation  Davila et 
al., 2006 . However, it has not been adapted to the co innovation context.  
We propose to involve another technique in the management of R&D, 
innovation   or  new  business  development  projects  as  well:  the  stage gate 
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tion is divided into a number of stages, during which the various members of 
the innovation team complete clearly defined tasks simultaneously  Bell and 
McNamara, 1991; Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1993; Mason and Rohner, 2002; 
Bremser and Barsky, 2004; Grönlund et al., 2010 . In each phase, the inputs 
 “deliverables , criteria, and outputs are specified. The projects are then evalu 
ated in a “gate” by a set of both quantitative and qualitative criteria, such as a 
strategic ﬁt, expected ﬁnancial returns, and the intellectual property position. 
The output represents the actual results of the gate review, enabling “gate 
keepers” to decide upon whether and how to continue the project. Preceding 
stages  evoke  increased  budgets,  resulting  in  increased  commitments,  while 
risks and uncertainties are reduced  Cooper, 2008 .  
The process begins with the “ideation or discovery” stage, and ends 
with the review after introduction to the market. The sophistication of the 
stage gate approach, which includes the number of phases and the size of the 
teams, depends on the size and risk of a development project as well as the size 
of a company; smaller or less risky projects in smaller companies require fewer 
phases and smaller teams.
20 When an idea has been specified, the feasibility of 
a business project is examined in stage two. In the third phase, an operational 
prototype is developed, which is tested in phase 4, together with the proposed 
business plan. In these stages, the market launch is prepared. In phase 5, the 
product is formally launched, while all elements of the business plan are put 
into practice, enabling the venture to become fully operational. In this phase, 
the business model is tested and refined in order to prepare the decision in a 
post launch evaluation in which the decision is made whether to rollout or 
upscale the activities  Cooper, 2008 .  
The  stage gate  approach  is  visualized  in  Figure  7.3.  The  stage gate 
approach  is  widely  used  and  appreciated  as  it  provides  a  structure  for  the 
implementation  of  new  business  development.  If  well  implemented,  it  may 
speed up the new business development process  O’Connor, 1994 . At the same 
time,  it  can  be  time consuming,  resulting  in  time wasting  activities,  and 
bureaucratic  or  restricted  learning  opportunities   Sethi  and  Iqbal,  2008 . 
Therefore, the efficiency and ﬂexibility of the stage gate approach has been 
improved by allowing simultaneous execution of activities, and not waiting for 
perfect information before moving forward  Ettlie and Elsenbach, 2007; Coo 
                                                 
20 For example, Philips uses an extended methodology, which describes explicitly per 
phase  the  tasks  to  be  fulfilled  of  a  business  plan,  a  marketing  plan,  the  business 
development and sales function, and the tasks of a CEO, of the future management 
team, and supervisory board. The methodology consists of specific checklists regarding 
the  need  for  cash,  finance,  technology  &  engineering,  manufacturing,  logistics,  and 
service organization  Bell and McNamara, 1991; Mason and Rohner, 2002 .  SUMMARY and CONCLUSIONS  176 
per, 2008 . The stage gate approach should not be implemented as “a rigid 
book  of  rules  and  procedures  to  be  religiously  followed”  but  allows  project 
teams to decide upon selective execution of activities  Cooper, 2008: 224 . The 
approach has been adapted in order to adjust to changing market conditions   
e.g., by allowing rapid movement to another phase by way of a series of ‘‘build 
test feedback and revise’’ iterations, known as “spiral development”  Figure 7.3  
B , in which developers incorporate customer feedback into the design in the 
development stage, or construct demonstration mock ups for customers earlier 
in the process  Cooper, 2008 .  
In line with the open innovation approach  Chesbrough, 2003b  and 
following  Grönlund  et  al.   2010 ,  we  adapt  the  BSC  and  the  stage gate 
approach in order to make it applicable to open innovation activities. By way 
of illustration, we have integrated the stage gate process into our COINN 
Cube model  Figure 7.4 .  
 
Figure 7.3: Stage-gate model of business development 
 
Adapted from: Cooper (2008) 
A stage-gate process is a business development tool, consisting of a series of stages where essen-
tial activities are put into practice. In each gate, the decision is made which activities should be 
continued in the following stage. The number of stages, depending on the size and risk of the 
projects, varies between five (situation A - e.g., large radical innovation projects in multinational 
companies) and two phases (situation C - e.g., small incremental innovations in small companies). 
Through “spiral loops” with a series of ‘‘build-test-feedback-and-revise’’ iterations, project teams 
can develop a product design more rapidly. 
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Figure 7.4: The COINN-Cube including the stage-gate approach 
 
 





7.6  FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
We therefore suggest as avenues for further research  see Table 7.3. 
 
Box 7.4: Future co-innovation research issues 
1.  Influence of individual traits on co-innovation performance 
2.  Influence of team diversity on co-innovation performance 
3.  Development of co-innovation competences 
4.  Measuring and benchmarking co-innovation 
 
 
Although  individual  characteristics  play  an  important  role  in  the 
implementation and performance of open innovation  Stevens and Swogger, 
2009; Enkel, 2010 , they have not as yet been adequately researched  Inkpen 
and Dinur, 1998; Mannix and Nealy, 2005 .  
Team diversity,
 21 the degree to which team members differ, may affect 
group process and performance positively as well as negatively. According to 
                                                 
21 Kratzer et al.  2006  refer to team diversity as “team polarity”. SUMMARY and CONCLUSIONS  178 
Trompenaars  2007 , successful innovative teams make use of their diversity by 
sharing knowledge and expertise when executing the entire innovation process. 
Especially in the first and most creative phase of innovation, team diversity 
may enhance performance. In a later and less complex phase, however, too 
much diversity in the team might hamper innovation performance  Kratzer et 
al., 2006 .  
However, much is still unclear about the effects and antecedences of 
team diversity, such as the processes that affect performance, the contingency 
factors within these processes, or the role of context on team performance 
 Knippenberg and Schippers, 2007; Joshi and Roh, 2009; Stewart, 2010 . More 
in depth conceptualizing of diversity is necessary as co innovation entails dif 
ferent tasks, roles and responsibilities at various aggregation levels, on the indi 
vidual, team as well as on organization level.  
The optimal diversity in a team depends on a team’s involvement in the 
co innovation project: inter organizational, directly involved  team 1 in Figure 
7.5 , intra organizational, indirectly involved  teams 2a and 2b in Figure 7.5 , and 
extra organizational directly involved  teams 3a and 3b in Figure 7.5 .  
 
Figure 7.5: Team involvement in co-innovation projects 
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Another aspect is the relation between team diversity and individual traits 
as personality traits of a team’s members influence whether team diversity has 
a  beneficial  or  detrimental  effect  on  innovation  performance.  At  the  same 
time, the diversity in a team may determine which individual characteristics are 
beneficial to team results.  
The impact and antecedents of team diversity and individual compe 
tences on innovation outcome have so far been researched usually separately. 
Following Kearney et al.  2009  and Stewart  2010 , we argue that integrating 
these perspectives would be highly useful. We therefore propose an in depth 
multi level study of diversity, which includes dynamic and interactional effects 
between  the  individual  and  team  level,  together  with  the  effects  of  various 
innovation contexts  Boone and van Witteloostuijn, 2007; Buyl et al., 2010 .  
In  the  analysis,  the  potential  for  transformational  and  transactional 
leadership could be included as well as various functions of leadership, such as 
vision  development,  communication  of  the  goals,  to  gain  support  and,  ulti 
mately, to deliver operational results  Bartram, 2009, 2010 . We expect that 
desired individual attitudes, skills, and personality characteristics vary in differ 
ent phases in the innovation or in the case of different types of innovation 
 open as opposed to closed innovation or radical vis à vis incremental innova 
tion . A misfit between personal characteristics and a situation increases the 
likelihood of failure. Therefore, risk factors due to a lack of relevant knowledge 
or skill could be analyzed as well.  
In order to assess the characteristics of functional diversity, several con 
cepts for assessing individuals and teams are widely used, tested and validated, 
such  as  the  Myers Brigg  Type  Indicator  MBTI  and  the  so called  Big  Five 
model. These models describe generic individual preferences for behavior and 
attitude, such as a preferred problem solving style, but do not discuss specific 
individual competences, such as the capacity to deal with people who may have 
a different approach. In order to measure competencies,
22 considered to be 
essential  to  job  performance  in  the  co innovation  context,  a  more  detailed 
assessment is essential, such as the ‘criterion centric’ approach, which analyzes 
both individual and team performance based on performance criteria  Dries 
sen, 2005; Bartram, 2005, 2006; Trompenaars, 2007; von Stamm, 2008 , for 
instance  through  the  Occupational  Preference  Questionnaire  instrument 
 OPQ  instrument.  
                                                 
22 Baily, Bartram and Kurz,  2001  define competencies as “sets of behaviors that are 
instrumental in the delivery of the desired results”. According to them, this construct 
differs from the “competence” construct; the latter relates to performance and involves 
the description of tasks, functions and objectives, whereas competencies focus on the 
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When dealing with group diversity in innovation teams, the Belbin 
theory could be used  Belbin 1991; Dulewicz, 1995 , as well as the Kirton Adap 
tation Inventory  Index   Kirton,  2003 ,  or  the  innovative  roles  that  are 
described by Kelley  2005 . These instruments can assist managers in effec 
tively  dealing  with  individual  differences  within  teams   Trompenaars,  2007, 
2009 .  
Although the usefulness of competencies is context specific, almost no 
research evidence is known about the effectiveness in different situations  Bar 
tram, 2010: 11 .  
In Figure 7.6, we integrate the proposed multilevel research on per 
formance drivers at both individual and team level. We include dynamic and 
interactional effects and contextual factors as control variables as well  Boone 
and van Witteloostuijn, 2007, Buyl et al., 2010 . 
 




As  third  line  of  additional  research,  we  propose  an  evaluation  of 
instruments aimed at the development of co innovational competencies at the indi 
vidual  and  team  level.  Measuring  co innovation  performance  is  more  than 
choosing a standard set of metrics, such as BSC or stage gate approach; it is 
not the choice of a metrification system that determines its success, but an 
effective implementation  Kerssens van Drongelen and Bilderbeek, 1999 , for 
which empowerment and motivation of personnel are essential  Loch, 2008 . 
In the co innovation context, social skills, which include reﬂection on one’s 
own emotions, values and standards, are essential.  
The  development  of  co innovational  competencies  at  the  individual 
and team level could be enhanced through training or coaching at the individ 
ual  or  team  level.  The  added  value,  limitations  and  effectiveness  of  these CHAPTER 7  181 
instruments could be evaluated in the different phases, aspects and teams of 
the co innovation. Coaching differs from training, in that training refers to the 
acquisition of knowledge or skills by means of instruction, while coaching is 
generally defined as a “process of equipping people with the tools, knowledge, 
and opportunities they need to develop themselves in order to become more 
effective”  Feldman and Lankau, 2005: 830 . Executive coaching has become an 
important managerial instrument of support  Hackman and Wageman, 2005; 
Leedham, 205; Agarwal et al., 2009; Stevens and Swogger, 2009a,b . At the 
same time, there is clearly a lack of research concerning the effectiveness of 
executive coaching  Evers et al., 2006 .  
 
As last avenue for further research, the suitability of benchmarking tech 
niques can be tested in the co innovation practice by way of the Data Envelop 
ment Analysis  DEA , which identifies best practices by measuring the relative 
performance of a single case compared with a ‘best practice’  Zhu, 2003; Coo 
per et al., 2007 . The DEA technique measures the relative performance   i.e., 
the position of a single case vis à vis the best practice. DEA is a linear pro 
gramming method and managerial tool for assessing the efficiency, productivity 
or performance of units. In order to facilitate management in R&D organiza 
tions, the DEA technique has been used in combination with the BSC meth 
odology  Kuang Hua Hsu, 2005; Eilat et al., 2006a,b; Chen and Chen, 2007; 
García Valderrama  et  al.,  2009 .  However,  a  DEA benchmark  study  in  co 
innovation alliances has not as yet been carried out. With such a study, the 
advantages that are indicated in Figure 7.4, could be further quantified. 
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8. VERBETERING van de PRESTATIES van CO INNOVATIE ALLIANTIES 
Effectieve samenwerking met nieuwe zaken partners 
 
Zonder twijfel kan open innovatie, waarbij externe kennis in het innovatieproces 
wordt  toegepast,  de  prestaties  van  nieuwe  business  ontwikkeling  verbeteren. 
Het vergroot het rendement van productontwikkeling, versnelt de marktintro 
ductie  en  verlaagt  de  ontwikkelingskosten.  Open  innovatie  wordt  daarom 
beschouwd als het dominante innovatie model voor de toekomst  Hoofdstuk 1 . 
We  onderzoeken  co innovatie  allianties,  waarin  twee  of  meer  onafhankelijke 
bedrijven of onderzoeksinstellingen samenwerken aan een specifiek project, dat 
gericht is op de ontwikkeling en commercialisering van nieuwe producten of 
diensten, terwijl ze het risico en rendement van het project delen. Helaas is open 
innovatie moeilijk te implementeren, omdat er sprake is van extra complexiteit 
 Hoofdstuk 2 .  
De belangrijkste doelstelling van deze studie is het ontwikkelen en toet 
sen van een model waarmee de prestaties van co innovatie allianties kunnen wor 
den gemeten en verbeterd. Op grond hiervan wordt een managementinstrument 
ontwikkeld  waarmee  verschillende  projecten  en  partnerschappen  met  elkaar 
vergeleken kunnen worden. 
 
De onderzoeksvragen waren:  
 1   Welke  factoren  en  processen  spelen  een  rol  bij  de  diagnose  en  bij  het 
management van co innovatie allianties?  
 2   In  hoeverre  verschillen  deze  bij  verschillende  doelstellingen   commercieel, 
technologisch of financieel  ? 
 3   Welke veranderingen leiden tot hogere prestaties? 
 4   Hoe verhouden de factoren en processen zich tot elkaar? 
 
In  de  studie  worden  faciliterende  en  blokkerende  factoren  en  processen 
besproken  uit  de  netwerk ,  competentie ,  contingentie   en  organisatieleer 
theorie  Hoofdstuk 3 . Ook worden de resultaten gebruikt van eerder onderzoek 
naar  joint  ventures,  strategische  allianties  en  inter organisatorische 
samenwerking.  Gebaseerd  op  deze  invalshoeken  worden  hypotheses 
geformuleerd  Hoofdstuk 4 .  
Met  component  analyse  zijn  verschillende  schalen  geconstrueerd:  con 
tractbehoefte,  coördinatiebehoefte,  evenwichtige  competenties,  inbedding,  bedrijfsdomi 
nantie,  overeenkomstige managementstructuur,  vertrouwen,  culturele  passendheid,  tech 




Er is een model ontwikkeld betreffende de invloed van de schalen op de 
prestaties van co inn0vatie allianties in verschillende fasen van de co innovatie 
cyclus: bij de strategische analyse, de voorbereiding van de alliantie, de keuze van 
partners, het ontwerp, management en de evaluatie van co innovatie allianties. 
Daarnaast is de invloed onderzocht van verschillende marktcondities, strategie  
en  alliantiekarakteristieken  op  het  model.  Figuur  8.1  relateert  het  COINN 
model aan de co innovatie cyclus. 
 
Figuur 8.1: COINN model gerelateerd aan de co-innovatie cyclus 
 
 
Gebaseerd  op  gegevens  van  137  co innovatie  partnerschappen  van  51 
bedrijven  en  met  gebruik  van  multivariate  regressieanalyse  zijn  hypotheses 
getoetst. De studie vindt bewijs voor verschillende directe lineaire en curviline 
aire verbanden  Hoofdstuk 6 . 
Deze relaties verschillen sterk per type prestatie  commercieel, technolo 
gisch of financieel . Zo hebben we bijvoorbeeld enerzijds een significant positief 
effect vastgesteld tussen een hoog vermogen tot technologie overdracht en de 
toegang tot aanvullende middelen van de partner  “technologische prestaties”  en 
anderzijds een negatief effect met commerciële prestaties. Een hoog vermogen om 
technologie over te dragen kan de relatieve positie ten opzichte van de partner 
doen  verslechteren  als  gevolg  van  mogelijke  ongecontroleerde  of  overmatige   Hoofdstuk 8 
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openbaarmaking van informatie  Paragraaf 6.6 .  
Ook zijn er verschillen per industrietak. Zo constateren we dat informali 
teit ten aanzien technische aspecten in de maakindustrie tot op zekere hoogte 
nuttig  is  om  financiële  doelstellingen  te  bereiken,  terwijl  dit  in  de  voe 
dingsindustrie negatief uit pakt vanwege de strikte regelgeving omtrent voedsel 
veiligheid  Bijlage D . 
Daarnaast  veranderen  optimale  niveaus  van  de  prestatie indicatoren 
gedurende de looptijd van een project. In kortdurende projecten heeft de inbed 
ding van een partner in een groter netwerk bijvoorbeeld een positief effect op 
het bereiken van financiële doelstellingen van de onderneming, maar in langdu 
rige  projecten  een  negatief  effect.  De  meerwaarde  van  het  netwerk  van  de 
partner neemt gedurende de samenwerking af, terwijl de kans op weglekken van 
cruciale informatie toeneemt  Bijlage D .  
Tevens  hebben  we  meerdere  indirecte  verbanden  geïdentificeerd.  Bij 
voorbeeld: bedrijven die goed technologie kunnen overdragen, profiteren meer 
van het eigen netwerk, terwijl bedrijven die beperkte vaardigheden hebben om 
technologie over te dragen een groter netwerk nodig hebben en dan ook sterker 
van het netwerk van hun partners profiteren  Bijlage E .  
In ons onderzoek scoren de niveaus van het betrokkenheid van het manage 
ment van de responderende ondernemingen, de dominantie van de onderneming en 
vertrouwen uitzonderlijk hoog. Hoge initiële niveaus van deze indicatoren kun 
nen  als  voorwaarde  voor  het  starten  van  een  co innovatie  samenwerking 
beschouwd worden  Paragraaf 6.6 .  
 
We beschouwen het management van de co innovatie allianties als een vraagstuk 
dat simultaan vanuit meerdere perspectieven  het commerciële, technologische 
en financiële perspectief  en op meerdere niveaus  het individuele, team en orga 
nisatie niveau  belicht moet worden. Het meten en vervolgens verbeteren van de 
prestaties  van  co innovatie  allianties  vraagt  om  een  geïntegreerde,  holistische 
aanpak, waarbij verschillende relevante aspecten en contexten gelijktijdig moeten 
worden beschouwd. 
Innovatie omvat zowel de aspecten van creativiteit en flexibiliteit als ook 
aspecten als productkwaliteit en productie efficiëntie. Dit impliceert de nood 
zaak om effectief om te gaan met een aantal paradoxen: bij voorbeeld de paradox 
van  vertrouwen  en  controle  van  aandacht  voor  exploratie  en  exploitatie.  De 
paradox van samenwerking en concurrentie binnen de alliantie resulteert in een 




Daarnaast  leiden  de  verschillende  relaties  van  de  prestatie indicatoren 
met  commerciële,  technologische  en  financiële  prestatie  tot  paradoxen.  Zo 
beperkt  een  strakke  coördinatie  van  activiteiten  de  toegang  tot  aanvullende 
middelen  “technologische prestaties” , maar kan deze onontbeerlijk zijn voor het 
verkrijgen van een billijk aandeel van de commerciële voordelen of het bereiken 
van de financiële doelstellingen. Het is van belang deze paradoxen te herkennen 
en bewust de aspecten te kiezen die prioriteit verdienen, de consequenties van 
de  keuzes  in  te  schatten  en  het  dynamische  evenwicht  tussen  tegenstrijdige 
prioriteiten te managen  Paragraaf 7.3 . 
In co innovatie allianties werken ondernemingen vaak samen met part 
ners uit andere branches, aangezien deze aanvullende middelen hebben. Omdat 
de prestatie indicatoren verschillen per bedrijfstak zijn partners die actief zijn in 
verschillende bedrijfstakken ook verschillend gemotiveerd. Bovendien beïnvloe 
den  prestatie indicatoren  elkaar. H et  gewenste  niveau  van  coördinatie  is  bij 
voorbeeld afhankelijk van inbedding van de onderneming en diens partner, maar 
ook  van  de  vaardigheid  technologie  over  te  dragen  en  de  mate  waarin  de 
competenties van het bedrijf en de partner duurzaam uniek zijn  Paragraaf 7.3 .  
Het is essentieel om de relevante randvoorwaarden van de prestatie indica 
toren te identificeren en hun invloed op de prestaties te begrijpen. Bij voorbeeld: 
een combinatie van gedetailleerde contracten en een hoge mate van coördinatie 
verbetert de relatieve positie van een onderneming ten opzichte van haar partner 
wat betreft de commerciële prestaties. Daarentegen verminderen gedetailleerde 
contracten en een hoge mate van coördinatie van activiteiten de flexibiliteit, 
waardoor het innovatieproces bemoeilijkt wordt. Wanneer een partner sterk is 
ingebed, kunnen gedetailleerde contracten met de partner de mate waarin finan 
ciële doelstellingen behaald worden vergroten, evenals de toegang tot aanvul 
lende middelen van de partner  “technologische prestatie” . 
Daarnaast is het van belang om zich bewust te zijn van het dynamische 
karakter van prestatie indicatoren, op deze veranderingen in te spelen en strate 
gie en gedrag hierop aan te passen. Vertrouwen tussen de partners is bijvoor 
beeld een noodzakelijke voorwaarde in een co innovatie alliantie. Vertrouwen 
tussen de alliantiepartners zal geleidelijk toenemen door het hebben van geza 
menlijke positieve ervaringen. Meer vertrouwen zal resulteren in meer openheid 
naar  elkaar  toe,  maar  brengt  ook  het  risico  met  zich  mee  van  te  veel 
openbaarmaking van vertrouwelijke informatie  Paragrafen 4.4.1 en 7.3 . 
 
Het verbeteren van de prestaties van co innovatie heeft organisatorische en per 
sonele implicaties. 
Bij co innovatie is sprake van een aanpassing van het business model: er 
wordt waarde gecreëerd met behulp van samenwerking met externe entiteiten in 
innovatieve ecosystemen  Paragraaf 2.2 . Het slagingspercentage van co innova   Hoofdstuk 8 
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tie kan worden verhoogd door middel van geavanceerde management technie 
ken, het gebruik van een co innovatie expertisecentrum, opleiding of coaching 
 Paragraaf 7.3 .  
Een andere organisatorische aanpassing is ten aanzien van het omgaan 
met intellectueel eigendom  IP . Door middel van open innovatie wordt externe 
kennis  intern  gebruikt   "outside in"   en  intern  ontwikkelde  IP  verkocht  aan 
externe  partijen   "inside out" .  Deze  nieuwe  activiteiten  moeten  worden 
georganiseerd, terwijl het binnen een bedrijf ontwikkelen van nieuwe IP beperkt 
blijft tot strategische kennis  Paragrafen 2.2, 2.4 en 7.3 . 
Succesvol  implementeren  van  open  innovatie  vereist  andere  taken  en 
rollen, waarvoor een andere mix van individuele attitudes, competenties en per 
soonskenmerken nodig is in vergelijking tot de traditionele gesloten innovatie. 
Zo is een “open” organisatiecultuur van belang waarin culturele verschillen tus 
sen de partners aanvaard en benut worden. Weerstanden ten gevolge van een 
"not invented here" mentaliteit maken in dit geval plaats voor een "proudly found 
elsewhere" mentaliteit  paragrafen 2.4, 3.5 en 4.4.2 . 
In open innovatie is het accent verschoven van wat je weet naar wie je kent. 
Hierbij zijn goede personele relaties tussen de verschillende partners essentieel 
 zie Paragraaf 4.4.5 . Hierin verschilt de zogenaamde Connect & Develop benadering 
van  traditionele  Research  &  Development   Paragraaf  2.4 .  Vanwege  de  grotere 
nadruk op persoonlijke relaties kan verwacht worden dat een ondersteunende 
leiderschapsstijl tot meer resultaten leidt dan een controlerende leiderschapsstijl 
 “transformationeel” in plaats van “transactioneel leiderschap”, Paragrafen 7.3 en 7.6 .  
 
Ons  onderzoek  kent  een  aantal  beperkingen,  die  aanleiding  geven  tot  verder 
onderzoek.  
We hebben ons beperkt tot relaties tussen twee partijen. Allianties met 
meerdere partijen vertonen aanvullende complexiteit. Verder onderzoek zou de 
dynamiek van de  virtuele  multi partner netwerken meer in detail kunnen analy 
seren.  
Daarnaast hebben we onze analyse voornamelijk vanuit het gezichtspunt 
van het responderende bedrijf gemaakt, zonder het perspectief van de partner te 
onderzoeken. Hoewel we een aantal procedurele voorzorgsmaatregelen hebben 
genomen en statistische controles hebben uitgevoerd om de kans op de zoge 
naamde Common Method Variance vertekening
1 te verminderen, zou het verzame 
len van meer gegevens vanuit het perspectief van de alliantie partner onze data 
                                                
1 Variantie die is toe te schrijven aan de meetmethode in plaats van aan de te meten 





base hebben verrijkt.  
Voorts hebben we alleen directe effecten getoetst. We hebben effecten van 
bedrijfstakken en de duur van het project verkend evenals een aantal indirecte 
effecten. We kwamen tot de conclusie dat bedrijfstak, projectduur en indirecte 
effecten een belangrijke rol spelen bij de verklaring van co innovatie prestaties, 
maar  hebben  de  theoretische  onderbouwing  hiervan  niet  nader  onderzocht. 
Nader onderzoek zou meer gedetailleerde indicatoren kunnen opleveren.  
In onze research hebben we ons gericht op de effecten van relaties en 
inter organisatorische  samenwerking  op  prestatie.  We  hebben  afgezien  van 
onderzoek naar de gevolgen van verschillende individuele eigenschappen of samen 
stelling van teams op de resultaten.  
We richten ons op het kwantificeren van de optimale niveaus van de 
prestaties indicatoren zonder de effectiviteit of de kwaliteit van deze indicatoren 
te  meten.  We  bespreken  de  hoeveelheid  betrokkenheid  van  het  management 
zonder de effecten van verschillende leiderschapsstijlen te belichten.  
We baseren onze conclusies op 137 partnerships. Een grotere database zou 
ons in staat hebben gesteld de verschillende aspecten van de prestaties te analy 
seren in relatie tot elkaar in een Structural Equation Model  Paragraaf 5.5  of zou 
het mogelijk hebben gemaakt om de indirecte effecten in meer detail te bestu 
deren. Bovendien constateren we een aantal positieve lineaire verbanden met 
prestaties in plaats van de verwachte heuvelvormige  namelijk bij inbedding van de 
partner,  vertrouwen,  culturele  passendheid,  overdracht  van  technologie,  betrokkenheid 
van het management en informaliteit . Aanvullend onderzoek zou kunnen leiden tot 
de verwachte heuvelvormige verbanden indien ook de kwadratische relaties sig 
nificant zouden zijn. 
 
Ons onderzoek heeft de volgende implicaties voor het management. We hebben 
een basis ontwikkeld voor een meetsysteem voor het evalueren en verbeteren 
van de prestatie van co innovatie allianties. Het resultaat is een algemeen sys 
teem dat kan worden aangepast aan bedrijfsspecifieke vereisten van beoordeling.  
Wij beschouwen het management van een co innovatie alliantie als een 
vraagstuk, waarbij meerdere niveaus en meerdere aspecten op elkaar inwerken: 
individuen, team en organisaties, interacteren op commerciële, technologische 
en financiële aspecten, zoals gevisualiseerd in de COINN kubus in figuur 8.2. 
Door de prestatie indicatoren te doseren op de juiste niveaus, is te verwachten 
dat de som van de totale benodigde input  punt A in figuur 8.2  wordt verlaagd 
tot A*, met een voordeel van AA* en de som van de totale gerealiseerde output 
 punt B in Figuur 8.2  wordt verhoogd tot B*, met een voordeel van BB* en een 
rendementsverhoging van  AA*  x  BB* .   Hoofdstuk 8 
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Figuur 8.2: De COINN kubus 
 
 
In lijn met de open innovatie aanpak integreren we enkele beproefde technieken 
in  het  COINN  kubus  denkmodel:  de  Balanced  Scorecard   BSC   en  het  zoge 
naamde Stage gate business development concept.  
De BSC wordt beschouwd als een krachtig instrument voor het meten en 
verbeteren van prestaties  Paragraaf 7.5 . In de BSC worden strategische doelen 
vertaald in de benodigde maatregelen, waarbij deze in balans moeten zijn, zowel 
wat  betreft  de  financiële  als  de  niet financiële  factoren.  Het  BSC concept  is 
gebruikt bij het meten van prestaties van R & D afdelingen en bij innovatie in 
het algemeen, maar nog niet in de co innovatie context.  
Daarnaast betrekken we de Stage Gate benadering in ons meetsysteem. 
Hierbij wordt het proces van uitvinding tot commercialisering verdeeld in een 
aantal  stadia,  waarin  de  verschillende  leden  van  de  innovatie team  gelijktijdig 
taken uitvoeren. In elke fase worden de input criteria  "deliverables  en output 
criteria aangegeven. In elke “gate”, wordt de beslissing genomen welke activitei 
ten moeten worden voortgezet in de volgende fase. Het aantal fasen is afhanke 
lijk van de grootte en het risico van de projecten  Paragraaf 7.5 .  
 
We doen vier suggesties voor verder onderzoek.  
Allereerst is het zinvol de invloed van individuele kenmerken op co innova 




de implementatie van open innovatie zijn ze nog niet in detail onderzocht.  
Daarnaast stellen we voor de invloed van de diversiteit in teams nader te 
onderzoeken. We verwachten dat de optimale diversiteit in een team afhankelijk 
zijn van de relatie van een team tot de co innovatieproject, de persoonlijkheids 
kenmerken van de teamleden, de fase van de innovatie en het type innovatie.  
Het is niet zozeer alleen de keuze van een meetsysteem dat het succes 
van co innovatie bepaalt, maar vooral een effectieve uitvoering ervan. Om dit 
mogelijk  te  maken  zijn  voldoende  co innovatie  competenties  op  individueel  en 
teamniveau onontbeerlijk. Daarom stellen we voor als derde lijn van aanvullend 
onderzoek de effectiviteit te onderzoeken van instrumenten die gericht zijn op 
de ontwikkeling van deze competenties, zoals coaching en training.  
Als laatste suggestie voor nader onderzoek stellen we voor de geschikt 
heid van specifieke benchmarking technieken te onderzoeken in de co innovatie 
praktijk, bij voorbeeld de Data Envelopment Analysis, die ‘best practices’ identifi 
ceert door het meten van de relatieve prestatie van individuele ten opzichte van 
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APPENDIX A:   QUESTIONNAIRE  
       
PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT OF CO-INNOVATION 
Co-Innovation can boost the performance of your innovation activities. Through collaborating with 
outsiders—knowledge sources, customers, and even competitors—a firm can import lower-cost 
technology from the best sources in the world, increase it innovation output, introduce innovative 
products and services faster to the market. But Co-innovation can also evolve problematic: it has a 
relatively high failure risk. To prevent promising projects ultimately will under-perform, we are 
developing a diagnosis- and management-instrument: the “Co-Innovation Scorecard” COINN.  
 
With this instrument, managers can increase the performance and success rate of their Co-
innovation projects: Best practices and critical success factors will be identified for screening and 
evaluating of Co-innovation partners and –projects. 
 
The research is a cooperation between universities and innovative companies. The research is 
organized by the University of Groningen - CreateNewBusiness BV (drs Frans Stel) and supervised 
by prof. dr. A. Van Witteloostuijn (University of Antwerp and Utrecht) and prof.dr. E. Brouwer 
(University of Tilburg). 
 
Participating companies receive (at no charge!): 
1.  A general benchmark report that contains best practices and success factors,  
2.  An analysis containing strengths/weaknesses of participating projects, 
3.  If desired, a visit by the researchers to clarify the research results and conclusions.  
 
We’re evaluating the projects:  
1.  aimed at development of innovative products and services,  
2.  with at least 2 risk / reward sharing partners,  
 
We’re examining the personal opinions and perceptions of managers. Answering will take 30 
minutes. Your data will be treated confidentially and anonymously. A “Non Disclosure Agreement” will 
be signed on request. Only the generalized statistical scores will be published in scientific articles and 
a thesis. For more information, please visit: www.COINN.eu, for questions: info@coinn.eu 
 
We measure co-innovation with a specific partner. Please use for projects with more partners one 
questionnaire per partner.  
 
Our study covers 6 sections: general characteristics, market-environment, strategy, organization, 
relations and performance. 
 













PLEASE POSITION AN “X”  
ON THE AXES BELOW  
which reflects the situation  
of the OI-project best 
 
 
Thank you in advance for your cooperation! 
 





1.  GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS  
 
1.1     What is the name of your FIRM? 
1.2     What is your name:  
1.3     What is your job title: 
 
FIRM =  the part of your firm which acts as contract party in the project, e.g. Business Unit of Line  
 
1.4 What is your relation to the project? 
   Responsible for the day-to-day operations of the project including contacts with the partner 
   Ultimately responsible for strategic decisions of the project (continuation, funding, ending)  
   Advising management about the project 
   Other: …………………………. 
1.5     To which E-mail address can we send the research results: 
1.6    What is your company’s address: 
  
1.7 What is the industry of the project? 
 
   Aerospace 
   Agriculture 
   Automotive 
   Chemicals, oil and gas 
   Consumer packaged goods / retail 
   Defense 
   Electronics / computing 
   Financial services 
   Healthcare  
   Media 
 
 
(you can select more than one) 
   
 
   Metal products 
   Office automation 
   Pharmaceuticals 
   Semiconductors 
   Telecom 
   Transport 
   Utilities 
   Water management 
   Other. 
 
 
1.8. What is the start year of the activities of the project?                Start year is:   …. 
 
 Start year: calendar year in which of the first discussions with your partner, regardless of the juridical status of the 
proposed joint activities 
 
1.9     What is the lifecycle phase of your PROJECT ? 
 
life cycle phase of PROJECT  
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------| 
STARTUP                                                                                      DECLINE   
 
    
    0 = startup phase 
  25 =  growth phase 
  50 = early maturity phase 
  75 = late maturity phase 
100 = decline /restructuring  
 
1.10  What is the number of risk/reward sharing partners in the Co-innovation  Project?      … 
 
 
1.11 PLEASE SELECT ONE OF THESE PROJECT PARTNERS:   ……………………………………. 
What is the nationality of THIS selected partner:     ……………………………………. 
 
PARTNER =  the entity of your partner which acts as contract party in the project. 




1.12 What is the main input of YOUR FIRM:  
    (you can select more than one item) 
   Technical knowledge 
   Manpower 
   Finance 
   Market knowledge  
   Distribution channels 
   Other: …………………. 
 
 
1.13 What is the main input of your PARTNER:  
    (you can select more than one item) 
   Technical knowledge 
   Manpower 
   Finance 
   Market knowledge  
   Distribution channels 
   Other: …………………. 
 
 
1.14  What is the worldwide sales volume last year 
      YOUR FIRM (in  ) 
   <   1 mio   
   1 -    25 mio   
    25 -  250 mio   
   250–  2,5 bln    
          > 2,5 billion 
 
 
1.15 Sales volume last year PARTNER (in  ) 
 
   <   1 mio   
   1 -    25 mio   
    25 -  250 mio   
   250–  2,5 bln    
          > 2,5 billion 
 
 
1.16  What is YOUR FIRM’S number of employees? 
         1  -        25 
        25  -      250    
      250  -   2.500 
   2.500 -  25.000 
             > 25.000 
 
 
1.17      PARTNER’s  employees? 
         1  -        25 
        25  -      250    
      250  -   2.500 
   2.500 -  25.000 
             > 25.000 
 
 
1.18    R&D expenditure of your FIRM  
    (% sales in 2007) 
      0 -  2% 
      2 -  5% 
   5 - 10% 
    10 - 15% 
                 > 15% 
 
 
1.19 R&D expenditure of your PARTNER  
    (% sales in 2007) 
      0 -  2% 
      2 -  5% 
   5 - 10% 
    10 - 15% 
                 > 15% 
 
 
1.19   What percentage of your firms’ sales is generated by products introduced in the last 3 year? 
      0 -  2% 
      2 -  5% 
      5 - 10% 
    10 - 15% 
                > 15% 
 
 




NOT INNOVATIVE                                             VERY INNOVATIVE 
 
 
   0 = not innovative, hardly 
any new products 
  25 = slightly innovative 
  50 = considerably innovative 
  75 = substantially innovative 






1.21a     What is the importance of the Co-innovation project to your firm? 
 
Importance of the project to US … 
|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------| 
NOT IMPORTANT                                                                         IMPORTANT 
 
 
1.21a Importance of the Co-innovation project to your partner? 
 
Importance of the project to the selected PARTNER  
|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------| 
NOT IMPORTANT                                                                         IMPORTANT 
 
 
   
 
Project is of … 
 
   0 = minor importance 
  25 = some importance 
  50 = medium important 
  75 = affects core business 






2. MARKET  
 
2.1   To what extent is the external market environment   
 
UNCLEAR OR CONFUSING 
 
because it could be understood in more than one way (Ambiguity)? 
 
Ambiguity in industry 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
VERY CLEAR                                                                VERY AMBIGUE     
 




   0 = very clear 
  25 = some confusing elements 
  50 = market is confusing 
  75 = market is ambigue 
100 = market is very ambigue 
 
2.2    To what extent are elements of the external environment  
 
INTERCONNECTED OR RELATED TO EACH OTHER  
 
in a way that may be difficult to understand or to deal with (Complexity)? 
 
Complexity in industry 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
SIMPLE                                                                                    COMPLEX     
 
   
   0 = very simple 
  25 = mostly simple 
  50 = market is in certain elements 
simple, but other complex 
  75 = market is rather complex 
100 = market is very complex 
 
2.3.   To what extent might elements of  the market environment 
have a fair chance to  
 
 EVOLVE IN AN UNPLEASANT OR UNDESIRABLE WAY (Risk)? 
 
Risk in industry 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
LOW RISK                                                                                 HIGH RISK  
 
   
    0 = low risk 
  25 =  rather low risk  
  50 = some risk 
  75 = substantial risk 
100 = high risk 
 
2.4     To what extent is the external market environment    
 
UNCERTAIN, BOTH IN TECHNOLOGICAL AND MARKET SENSE, 
 
in such a way that it’s difficult for managers to judge projects? 
 
Uncertainty in industry 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
LOW                                                                                                    HIGH  
 
    
   0 = low uncertainty 
  25 =  rather low uncertainty 
  50 = some uncertain elements, 
some are clear 
  75 = substantial uncertainty 




2.5    How important is technology in your industry? 
 
Technological importance of industry 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
NOT IMPORTANT                                                                  IMPORTANT 
 
   
   0 = technology is hardly important 
  25 = … of some importance 
  50 = … important  
  75 = … a major key success factor 
100 = … the only key success factor 
 
2.6    What is the lifecycle of the MARKET of your project? 
 
Life cycle phase of MARKET 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
OLD (DECLINE)                                                      YOUNG (EMERGING) 
 
    
 
   0 = decline 
  25 =  mature, saturated 
  50 = substantial 
  75 = growing  
100 = emerging  
 





NO CHANGE                                                                      FAST CHANGE 
 
   
   0 = no change at all 
  25 =  some change 
  50 = considerable change 
  75 = sometimes some elements of 
some ‘external turbulence’ 
100 = very fast change: we can 
speak of ‘external turbulence’ 
 
2.8      How concentrated are the sources of expertise in the 
industries 
which are relevant to the project? 
 
Knowledge concentration in industry 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
WIDELY DISPERSED                                                   CONCENTRATED 
 
    
   0 = widely dispersed 
  25 =  dispersed to a certain extent 
  50 = sometimes dispersed, 
sometimes concentrated 
  75 = concentrated 





3.1a   How important are Strategic & Market motives to start the 
Project for your FIRM? 
 
 
Our Strategy & Market motives 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 




3.1b   How important are Strategic & Market Motives to start the 
Project for your PARTNER? 
 
Partners Strategy & Market motives 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 






    0 =  hardly important 
  25 = of some importance 
  50 = important  
  75 = a major key success factor 
100 = the only key success factor 
 
 
Strategy & Market motives are 
e.g: 
-  Faster market introduction, 
Increase market power, 
develop new markets, co-opt 
or meet competition, deal 
with government, faster  
sufficient market scale of a 
new product 
-  restructure activities, reduce 





3.2a    How important are Technological Motives to start the Project 
for your firm? 
 
Our Organizational & Technological motives 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
NOT IMPORTANT                                                                IMPORTANT 
 
 
3.2b   How important are Technological Motives to start the Project 
for your partner? 
 
Partners Organizational & Technological motives 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 




    0 =  hardly important 
  25 = of some importance 
  50 = important  
  75 = a major key success factor 
100 = the only key success factor 
 
Technological motives are e.g: 
-  increase R&D output, more 
organizational learning, get 
access to or develop 
technology get access to or 
develop competences, get 
access to or develop 
facilities.  





3.3a     How important are Financial Motives to start the project for 
your firm? 
 
Our Financial motives 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
NOT IMPORTANT                                                                IMPORTANT 
 
3.3b     How important are Financial Motives to start the project for 
your partner? 
 
Partners Financial motives 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 




Financial motives are e.g: 
 
-  Share development costs, 
investment opportunities, get 
access to financial 
resources, capture 
knowledge spillovers, exploit 
financial synergies 
-  cost saving, subsidies, 
 
 
3.4    To what extent are the strategies of your firm and the partner 
compatible?  
 
Our strategy and partner’s strategy … 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
MISMATCH:                                                                 PERFECT MATCH: 




    
Our strategy and partner’s 
strategy… 
 
    0 = don’t match: might  cause 
conflicts or be competitive 
  25 = might conflict at certain 
areas  
  50 = no harm, no synergy 
  75 = enforce each other slightly 
100 = enforce each other strongly  
 
3.5a    How fast can your firm respond to external variations? 
 
Our organizational flexibility 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
SLOW                                                                                                FAST 
 
 
3.5b    How fast can your partners’ organization respond to external 
variations? 
 
Partners’ organizational flexibility 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
SLOW                                                                                               FAST 
 




    0 = very slow 
  25 =  slow 
  50 = average 
  75 = rather fast 




3.6a    How fast can your management respond to external 
variations? 
 
Our managerial flexibility 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
SLOW                                                                                                FAST 
 
 
3.6b   How fast can your partners’ management respond to external 
variations? 
 
Partners’ managerial flexibility 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
SLOW                                                                                               FAST 
 





   0 = very low 
  25 =  low 
  50 = average 
  75 = rather high 
100 = very high 
 
3.7a    How many times are you changing the strategic priorities IN 
GENERAL? 
 
Our change of strategic priorities 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
HARDLY EVER                                                                  FREQUENTLY 
 
 
3.7b    How many times is your partner changing the strategic 
priorities IN GENERAL? 
 
 
Partners’ change of strategic priorities 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 







   0 = hardly ever (> 5 years) 
  25 =  sometimes  
  50 = every 3 – 5 years 
  75 =  









UNFAVORABLE                                                                    FAVORABLE 
    
    0 = unfavorable 
  25 = slightly unfavorable 
  50 = neutral or unknown 
  75 = slightly favorable 
100 = very favorable 
 
 
4.2a.   What is the role your firm plays in its OTHER partnerships? 
 
Our role in OTHER partnerships 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
MARGINAL                                                                                 CENTRAL 
 
 
4.2b.  What is the role your partner plays in its OTHER partnerships? 
 
Partner’s role in OTHER partnerships 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
MARGINAL                                                                                 CENTRAL 
 
    
   
 
    0 = plays usually a marginal 
role 
  25 =  plays sometimes a 
marginal role 
  50 = neutral or unknown 
  75 = plays sometimes a central 
role 





4.3a    In how many OTHER partnerships is your firm involved? 
 
Our nr of OTHER partnerships 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
HARDLY ANY                                                                                  MANY  
 
 
4.3b    In how many OTHER partnerships is your partner involved? 
 
Nr of partner OTHER partnerships 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
HARDLY ANY                                                                                  MANY  
 
   
   
 
 
    0 = hardly any relations 
  25 =  a few relations 
  50 = neutral or unknown 
  75 = many relations 
100 = very many relations 
 
 
4.4a   How much coordination is necessary in the project according 
to your opinion? 
 
Our coordination need 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
WEAK                                                                                         STRONG 
 
 
4.4b     How much coordination is necessary in the Project 
according to your partners’ opinion? 
 
Partners’ coordination need 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
WEAK                                                                                        STRONG 
 
    
    
 
 
   0 = hardly any coordination 
needed 
  25 = on certain aspects some 
coordination is needed 
  50 = neutral or unknown 
  75 = most activities should be 
coordinated 





4.5  We have the same opinion regarding the governance structure 
of the projects as our partner … 
 
Desired governance structure 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
DIFFERENT                                                                                     SAME 
 
   
   0 = we still disagree on the 
governance structure 
  25 = on certain aspect we 
agree, on others we 
disagree 
  50 = neutral or unknown 
  75 = only on minor aspects we 
disagree 
100 = we fully agree 
 
 
4.6  Which party is controlling the decision making in the Co-
innovation Project ? 
 
Control over decision making 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
CONTROLLED BY  
ONE PARTNER                                                                              BY ALL 
   
  0 = in general, decision making 
is dominated by a partner 
 25 = on specific items, decision 
making is dominated by a 
partner, on other items by 
the others 
 50 = control over decision 
making unclear,  
75 = only on a few specific items 
decision making is 
dominated by a partner 
100 = all partners control the 
project equally 




4.7a    How important is to agree upon the details of an project 
contract in advance for you? 
 
We want agreement on details IN ADVANCE 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
NOT IMPORTANT                                                                IMPORTANT 
 
 
4.7b    How important is to agree upon the details of an project  
contract in advance for your partner? 
 
Partner wants agreement on details IN ADVANCE 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
NOT IMPORTANT                                                               IMPORTANT 
 
  
   
 
   
 
    0 = not necessary 
  25 = only necessary at specific 
cases 
  50 = neutral or unknown 
  75 = important in certain cases 
100 = very important 
    
   
 
4.8  To which extent are the relation with your partner (in)formal? 
 
a. On Strategic issues, the relations with our partner are… 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
FORMAL                                                                                   INFORMAL 
 
b. On Marketing issues, the relations  are… 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
FORMAL                                                                                   INFORMAL 
 
c.  On Financial issues, the relations are… 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
FORMAL                                                                                   INFORMAL 
 
d.  On R&D issues, the relations are… 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
FORMAL                                                                                   INFORMAL 
 
e. On Project-management issues, the relations are… 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 










 0 = mostly attention to formal 
processes  
25 =  formal processes prevail 
over informal 
50 = equal attention to formal and 
informal processes 
75 = informal processes prevail 
over formal 




4.9a  How important is it for you to agree upon a formal contract to 
commit your partner? 
 
Our attitude towards a formal contract… 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
NOT IMPORTANT                                                                IMPORTANT 
 
 
4.9b    How important is it for your partner to agree upon a formal 
contract to commit you? 
 
Partner’s attitude formal contract … 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
NOT IMPORTANT                                                                IMPORTANT  
   




  0 = an informal agreement will 
be sufficient 
25 = some elements should be 
formalized  
  50 = neutral or unknown 
  75 = most elements should be 
formalized 
100 = it’s necessary to formalize 
the project contract 
   





4.10a    How new are the competences of our project partner for 
you? 
 
Partners’ Competences  
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
NOT NEW TO US                                                                             NEW 
 
 
4.10b    How new are your competences for your partner? 
 
Our competences  
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
NOT NEW TO PARTNER                                                               NEW 
 





    0 = not new 
  25 = some new elements  
  50 = neutral or unknown 
  75 = new to a large extent 
100 = completely new to us 
 




THEY LEARN FROM US                                                         WE LEARN 
                      FROM THEM 
   
   0 = the partners learn only 
from us 
  25 =  the partners learn more 
from us than we from 
them  
  50 = we learn from each other 
  75 = we learn more from them 
than they from us  
100 = we learn form the partners 
 
 
4.12a    How easy or difficult can your contribution to the project be 
replaced by your partner? 
 
Partner can replace 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
EASY                                                                                        DIFFICULT 
 
4.12b     How easy or difficult can your partners contribution to the 
project be replaced by you? 
 
We can replace 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
EASY                                                                                         DIFFICULT 
 
    
 
    
 
   0 = can be replaced easily 
  25 = can be replaced after 
some investments 
  50 = can be replaced after huge 
investments 
  75 = can’t be replaced at all 
100 = they depend on us, like we 
depend on them 
 
   
 





5.1a   How do you judge the (project specific) status  or reputation of 




UNKNOWN                                                                    WELL KNOWN 
 
 
5.1b   How do you judge the (project specific) status or reputation of 




UNKNOWN                                                                         WELL KNOWN 
 
    
    
 
    0 = unknown 
  25 =  rather unknown 
  50 = neutral  
  75 = rather wellknown 
100 = wellknown 
 
5.2   To what extent does your firm communication style differ from 




DISSIMILAR                                                                                 SIMILAR 
 
   
    0 = very dissimilar 
  25 =  somewhat dissimilar 
  50 = neutral or unknown 
  75 = rather similar 





5.3     To what extent does your companies decision making style 
differ from the way of decision making of your partners? 
 
Decision making style 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
DISSIMILAR                                                                                  SIMILAR 
 
   
    0 = very dissimilar 
  25 =  somewhat dissimilar 
  50 = neutral or unknown 
  75 = rather similar 




5.4     To what extent does your companies leadership style differ 




DISSIMILAR                                                                                  SIMILAR 
 
   
    0 = very dissimilar 
  25 =  somewhat dissimilar 
  50 = neutral or unknown 
  75 = rather similar 





5.5    To what extent does your companies problem solving style 
differ from the way of problem solving of your partners? 
 
Problem solving style 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
DISSIMILAR                                                                                  SIMILAR 
 
   
 
    0 = very dissimilar 
  25 =  somewhat dissimilar 
  50 = neutral or unknown 
  75 = rather similar 





5.6a    To what extent can you disclose information in an accurate 
and timely fashion to your partner? 
 
Our openness of communication 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
LOW                                                                                                    HIGH 
 
 
5.6b   To what extent can your partner disclose information in an 
accurate and timely fashion to you? 
 
Partners’ openness of communication 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
LOW                                                                                                 HIGH 
 
   
  
 
0 = highly restricted in sharing 
information 
  25 = discloses some 
information but mostly 
reluctant in sharing 
information 
  50 = large variations in 
openness 
  75 = discloses most information 
but sometimes reluctant in 
sharing information 




5.7   To what extent does your partner meet his / her obligations? 
 
Partner meets obligations 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
NOT MUCH                                                                                      MUCH 
 
    
    0 = partner doesn’t meet 
obligation  
  25 = … meets sometimes 
  50 = neutral or unknown 
  75 = …  meest mostly, usually 





5.8a   How often do you give responsibility to your project  
partners? 
 
Our inclination to give responsibility to partner 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
SELDOM                                                                                     ALWAYS 
 
 
5.8b    How often does your partner give responsibility to you? 
 
 
Partners’ inclination to give responsibility to us 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
SELDOM                                                                                      ALWAYS 
 
       
 
    0 = seldom  
  25 = sometimes 
  50 = neutral or unknown 
  75 = at many occasions 
100 = always 
 
5.9a   Our partner’s willingness and ability to share expertise with us 
can be rated as… 
 
Partners’ willingness/ability to share expertise 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
LOW                                                                                                 HIGH 
 
 
5.9b   Our willingness and ability to share expertise with them can 
be rated as… 
 
Our  willingness/ability to share expertise 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
LOW                                                                                                    HIGH 
 
    
   
 
    0 = low 
  25 =  rather low 
  50 = on some aspects low, on 
others high 
  75 = rather high 
100 = high 








NOT MUCH                                                                                   MUCH 
 
 




NOT MUCH                                                                                     MUCH 
 
    
   
    0 = no experience yet 
  25 =  some temporal 
experience with 1-3 
narrow defined project 
projects  
  50 = multiyear experience with 
1-3 projects  
  75 = multiyear experience with 
> 3 complex projects 
100 = multiyear experience with 
> 6 complex projects 
    




5.11a     How much involvement does your management have in the 
project? 
 
Our management involvement 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
LOW                                                                                                   HIGH 
 
5.11b   How much involvement does the management of your 
partner have  
in the project? 
 
Partner’s management involvement 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
LOW                                                                                                   HIGH 
 
    
 




    0 = no support 
  25 =  some distant support 
  50 = occasional support 
  75 = substantial involvement 
100 = strongly involved 
    
    
 
5.12    How do you assess your companies’ capabilities to… 
 
 
a. Transfer knowledge TO external partners 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
LOW                                                                                                 HIGH 
 
 
b. Transfer knowledge FROM external partners 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
LOW                                                                                                  HIGH 
 
 
c. Build and retain relationships WITH external partners 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 





    
 
    0 = low capacity -  
  25 = rather low capacity 
  50 = neutral 
  75 = rather high capacity 









6.1  How does the Co-innovation project contribute to the 
competitive position of your Line of Business? 
 
Attribution to competitive position 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
NOT MUCH                                                                                     MUCH 
 
    
   0 = not much 
  25 = slightly 
  50 = considerably 
  75 = substantially 




6.2  How do you asses the possibility to integrate the project in  
your business? 
 
Possibility to integrate project 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
NOT MUCH                                                                                     MUCH  
    
   0 = not possible at all 
  25 = slightly possible 
  50 = neutral or unknown 
  75 = partial fit 
100 = perfect fit 
 
 
6.3  Does the project offer opportunities to reduce your corporate 




NOT MUCH                                                                                     MUCH  
     
   0 = not possible at all 
  25 = slightly possible 
  50 = neutral or unknown 
  75 = some reduction of 
risk/uncertainty is possible 
100 = reduction of risk/uncertainty 
is absolutely possible 
 
6.4  How does the project contribute to your innovation position? 
 
Attribution to innovation position 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
NOT MUCH                                                                                     MUCH  
   
    0 = not much 
  25 = slightly 
  50 = considerably 
  75 = substantially 
100 = much 
 
 
6.5  Does the project offer opportunities to access  
        complementary resources? 
 
Access to complementary resources 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
NOT MUCH                                                                                     MUCH  
     
  0 = not possible at all 
  25 = slightly possible 
  50 = neutral or unknown 
  75 = opportunities on certain 
areas 




6.6  Does the project offer opportunities to exploit research  
            synergies? 
 
Exploit research synergies 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
NOT MUCH                                                                                     MUCH  
     
   0 = not possible at all 
  25 = slightly possible 
  50 = neutral or unknown 
  75 = opportunities on certain 
areas 








WE                                                        EQUAL                                            PARTNER 




6.8  How are the profits (or losses) allocated? 
 
Sharing of risk and revenue 
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------| 
WE                                                        EQUAL                                            PARTNER 
 
 
6.9  Who owns the Intellectual Property of the project? 
 
Ownership of Intellectual Property Rights 
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------| 
WE                                                        EQUAL                                            PARTNER 
 
 
6.10    Who invests cash? 
Cash spending 
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------| 
WE                                                        EQUAL                                            PARTNER 
 
 
6.11   Who invest time? 
Time spending 
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------| 
WE                                                        EQUAL                                            PARTNER 
 
 
6.12   What happens if more money is needed? 
 
Additional inputs coming from… 
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------| 
ONLY FROM US                                     FROM                                             ONLY FROM  
                                                                         ALL PARTNERS                        PARTNER OR OTHERS  
 
 
6.13    When will the project reach a break even situation?  
(positive cumulative cash flow)? 
 
Cumulative cash flow (break even in … years) 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
>10y                      5y                       3y                         2y                          1y 
 
   
   0 = break even > 10 years 
  25 = break even in 5 years 
  50 = break even in 3 years 
  75 = break even in 2 years 
100 = break even within 1 year 
 
 
6.14    What is at this moment your firm’s success rate 
with your OTHER projects (IN GENERAL)? 
 
Our project success rate 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
LOW                                                                                                  HIGH 
 
   
 
   0 =  low success rate 
  25 =  rather low success rate 
  50 =  sometimes succes 
  75 = rather high success rate 
100 = high success rate 
 
6.15    What is your expectation of the total revenue growth of the Co-
innovation  
Project in the near future (coming 5 years)? 
 
Total revenue growth next 5 years (%) 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 
<5 %                 5-10%                 10-15%                 15-20%                >20% 
 
 
    0 =       < 5 % 
 25  =   5 - 10 % 
  50 = 10 - 15 % 
  75 = 15 - 20 % 




6.16   What is the project performance of the co-innovation project? 
 
Meeting  financial goals 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 




Meeting  strategic goals 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 




Meeting  learning goals 
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| 








    0 = no performance at all 
  25 = meeting 35% of 
expectations 
  50 = meeting 65% of 
expectations 
  75 = meeting 100% of 
expectations 
  100 = exceeding expectations 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR ANSWERING! 
 
PLEASE SEND THE QUESTIONNAIRE TO: 
 
UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN / CreateNewBusiness BV 
 
C.o. drs F.G. Stel 
Vennebroek 12 
9472RD Zuidlaren – NL  
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Company  Pretest interviews and feedback 
Bekaert  J. Sijnave   
Brabantia  W. Marques 
DSM  Y. Engelen 
Fresfield Bruckhaus Deringer  W. V. Angeren   v.d. Elzen 
Friesland Foods / TIFN  J. Sikkema 
IBM  D.Schiferli,  
Indiegroep  W. Soens 
Hanze Hogeschool  F.J. de Graaf, M. Carriere 
Philips  J. Bell, M. Overwijk. B. Oudman, C. Kuiper, T. 
Doyle 
Purac  R. Zoetemeyer 
SBGG  F. Wijbenga  
Shell  G. Bol 
UMCG  E. Jippes,  
Unilever  G. Cross 
University of Hasselt  W. Vanhaverbeke 
University of Utrecht  T. Poot 
WRR  B. Booteboom 
 
Company  Network  
Province of Groningen  R. Hoppenbrouwers, J. Janssens 
RUG  G. Sanders, M. Pool 
Shell  G. Bol 
SNN  H. Emmens 
TCNN  A. Gielen 
TLG  T. Looijenga 
UMCG  E. Vermeer 
 
Company  Respondent 
Agfa  J. Claes 
Akzo  H. Kielstra and A. Luttmer  
Alan  J. Abma 
ASML  J. Benshop 
ATH Astron  A. Van Ardenne
1 
Avebe  M. Guissepin 
Barkmeijer  H. Veraart 
Batavus  R. Van Regelmortel, R. Beset 
Bioclear  J. Krooneman 
BZIM  W. Zomers 
Ceva  M. Gouda
1, J. Kuipers, R. Kuijpers, R. v. d. 
Putten 
DOMO  A. Groeneveld, F. Fox, E. Van Leusen, B. 
Klarenbeek, C. Timmer 
DSM Lifesciences  B. Poldermans 
DSM Materials  R. Kirschbaum
1 
Eco Protecta    C. Hartman 
Friesland Foods    R. Schoenmaker 
Fortis Venturing    K. Vandervelpen
1 
IBBT    N. Verplanck, AdV  
IBM    R. Reesen, N. Braat 
Innocore    T. Flipsen 
Johnson & Johnson    G. Lauwers 
Kievit    R. Kirpestein
1, P. Posthouwer, F. Systermans 
                                                 
1 Also pretest interview RESPONDENTS  224 
KVE    H. Van Engelen 
Leenstra    H. De Jong 
NDC    S. Mulder, P. Idema, P. Sijbersma, C. Anceaux, G. 
Zijlstra. W. Kunst 
Nedap    N. Kip 
Neopost    F. Bosveld 
New Trecious    J. Nelissen 
NOM    E. Blansjaar 
Oosterhof    R. Rinia 
Oranjewoud    H. Tjeersma, A. Wiersma, B. Smulders, G. Bos 
Organ Assist    A. V. d. Plaats, G. Rakhorsrt 
P2    W. Posthouwer 
Paques    E. Van Zessen, P. v. d. Heijden, C. Schulz, W. 
Anema 
Pezy    M. Rijken 
Philips Consumer Lifestyle    K. v. d. Wal
1, C. Engel 
Philips Medical Systems    A. Leenaarts. W. Crooijmans 
Proces    H. Banning 
Procter & Gamble    A. Convents 
Purac    P. Jansen, J. V. Breugel, E. Bontenbal, D. Visser 
Sping    R. Verdonk 
Stork    A. Offringa, Van Ingen, M. V. Lankveld 
Televic    B. Stubbe 
Thales    E. Dontle 
TNO ICT    J. Burgmeijer 
Unilever    R. Dirks, T. Koning, E. V. Buren 
V.d.Velden    E. Van Buren 
Wegener    H. Rimmelzwaan, S. v. d. Hout 
Wetsus    G.H. Euverink, C. Buisman 
Whirlwind    T. Bakker 
Winglove    P. Pekelharing 
IJsseltechnologie    R. Slingeland, J. Volker 
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APPENDIX D: EFFECTS of INDUSTRY and PROJECT DURATION  
 
Complementary to the testing of our hypotheses we will explore the different 
impact  on  performance  in  three  industrial  groups   manufacturing,  food  and 
service  industries   as  well  as  projects  of  differing  duration   both  young  and 
mature . We illustrate some examples in the following. 
Our entire dataset consists of 137 aggregated observations, of which 47 
were derived from manufacturing, 47 from the food sector, and 43 from service 
industries. In addition, identified by the median of the year that they began, we 
divided our database into 59 young projects  i.e. which began 2006 or later , and 
78 mature projects  i.e. which began before 2006 . Because of the reduced size of 
these smaller industrial or duration specific samples, we simplified our models 
by removing non significant variables from the analyses in order to deal with a 
minimum of at least five observations per independent variable, as discussed in 
Section  5.6   Hair  et  al.  2010 .  In  these  cases,  non significant  variables  were 
removed  from  further  regressions.  Furthermore,  we  simplified  our  COINN 
model; by concentrating on two rather than three performance measures. As a 
measure of financial performance we took the meeting of financial objectives 
and  as  a  measure  of  commercial  or  technological  performance,  the  relative 
ownership  of  IP   partner  versus  firm .  We  base  our  conclusions  on  these 
simplified models, which have on average seven observations per variable.
1  
We summarize the regression results of the industries in Tables D.1 and 
of  the  projects  of  differing  duration  in  Table  D.2  We  show  the  significant 
regression results in Table D.3  regression on with the manufacturing industry , 
Table  D.4   food  industry ,  Table  D.5   service  industries ,  Table  D.5   young 
projects , Table D.5  mature projects , and subsequently discuss the results. We 
visualize the significant associations in standardized graphs, in which we plot the 
dependent  variables  on  Y axes,  and  the  independent  variables  on  X axes, 
following the legend in Figure D.1.  
 
                                                 
1 In manufacturing, the numbers of observations per variable are for regressions with 
strategic  performance:  7,  with  learning  performance:  6,  and  with  meeting  financial 
objectives:  8.  In  the  food  industry,  the  numbers  of  observations  per  variable  are  for 
regressions  with  strategic  performance:  5,  with  learning  performance:  6,  and  with 
meeting financial objectives: 10. In the service industries, the numbers of observations 
per  variable  are  for  regressions  with  strategic  performance:  11,  with  learning 
performance:  5,  and  with  meeting  financial  objectives:  4.  For  young  projects,  the 
numbers of observations per variable are for regressions with strategic performance: 7, 
with  learning  performance:  10  and  with  meeting  financial  objectives:  5.  For  mature 
projects,  the  numbers  of  observations  per  variable  are  for  regressions  with  strategic 
performance: 8, with learning performance: 8 and with meeting financial objectives: 7. 
The  regressions  with  meeting  financial  objectives  in  service  industries  should  be 
interpreted with caution due to a limited number of observations per variable. EFFECTS OF INDUSTRY AND PROJECT DURATION 
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Table D.1: Exploration of effects per industry  
 
                                                 
2 In Model 5. 
3 In Model 4.  

























   Balanced competences: hill-shaped */º 
   Firm’s management involvement: 
      negativeº 
 
   Culture fit: positive*** 
   Number of partners: hill-shaped** 
   Firm’s innovativeness: positive*  

















   Contract need positiveº
2  
   Firm’s embeddedness: hill-shaped**/*  
   Partner’s embeddedness: 
      U-shaped**/* 
   Balanced competences: negativeº  
   Firm’s importance: negativeº
3 
   Partner’s importance: positive* 
   Firm’s strategic motives: positive** 
 
   Trust: hill-shaped* 
   Technical informality: negativeº 




















   Firm’s embeddedness: U-shaped*/º  
   Partner’s embeddedness:  
      hill-shaped**/* 
   Firm’s management involvement:  
      U-shapedº 
   Firm’s importance: negative**/* 
   Partner’s importance: positive*** 
   Firm’s flexibility: positive**  
 
   Partner’s embeddedness: U-
shaped**/*  
   Coordination need: U-shaped* 
   Trust: positive* 
   Technology transfer: positiveº 
   Firm’s management involvement: 
      negativeº 
   Project life cycle: hill-shaped* 
   Number of partners: hill-shapedº 
Notes: º p<0.1,* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and *** p<0.001. Appendix D    227 
 
 
Table D.2: Exploration of effects of project duration 
 
 








   Firm’s management involvement:  
      hill-shapedº 
   Technical informality: hill-shapedº 
   Number of partners: positive** 
   Partner’s importance: positive* 
 
   Contract need U-shaped**/* 
   Partner’s embeddedness: U-shapedº 
   Balanced competences:  hill-shaped*/º 
   Firm’s management involvement:  
      U-shaped */º 
   Partner’s management involvement: 
positive* 
   Commercial informality: hill-shaped* 
   Firm’s innovativeness: positive** 











   Firm’s embeddedness: positive** 
   Partner’s embeddedness:  negative** 
   Culture fit: hill-shapedº 
   Size difference (employees):   
      negative*** 
   Firm’s  sales per employee: negative* 
   Partner’s sales per employee:   
      negative** 
   Firm’s flexibility: positive** 
   Firm’s importance: negative* 
   Partner’s importance: positive*** 
 
 
   Contract need U-shaped* 
   Partner’s embeddedness:  
      U-shaped**/º  
   Coordination need: U-shapedº  
   Trust: hill-shaped** 
   Technical informality: hill-shaped **/* 
   Project life cycle: hill-shapedº 
   Number of partners: hill-shapedº 
   Firm’s innovativeness: positive* 
   Stability: positive*** 
Notes: º p<0.1,* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and *** p<0.001. 




Table D.3: Regressions with the manufacturing industry 
 
IP OWNERSHIP, MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
  MODEL 1  MODEL 2  MODEL 3  MODEL 4  MODEL 5 
NR. OF PARTNERS  0.01  0.01  0.005  0.01  0.011 
  (1.09)  (0.59)  (0.47)  (0.67)  (0.86) 
SIZE DIFFERENCE   -0.00***  -0.00***  -0.00***  -0.00***  -0.00*** 
(Employment)  (-5.50)  (-5.61)  (-5.44)  (-5.41)  (-4.22)  




















MOTIVES  (-0.48)  (-0.99)  (-0.91)  (-0.93)  (-0.93)  
BALANCED COMPETENCES  0.46º  1.50  2.28*  2.21º 
    (1.96)  (1.35)  (2.20)  (1.92) 










(Quadratic)      (-0.97)  (-1.85)  (-1.60)  
FIRM’S MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT    -0.32º  0.61 
        (-1.72)  (0.45) 









(Quadratic)          (-0.63)  
 
_cons  5.22*  3.16  -0.19  -0.28  -2.31 
 
  (2.82)  (1.53)  (-0.04)  (-0.07)  (-0.45)  
 
N  41  41  41  41  41 
 
R-sq  17.7%  22.7%  23.5%  27.4%  28.4% 
 
adj. R-sq  11.0%  14.1%  12.6%  14.5%  13.2% 
 
MEETING FINANCIAL OBJECTIVES, MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY  
  MODEL 1  MODEL 2  MODEL 3  MODEL 4  MODEL 5 
NR. OF PARTNERS  3.16**  3.16**  3.16**  3.29**  3.29**  
  (2.90)  (2.90)  (2.90)  (2.99)  (2.99) 
NR. OF PARTNERS  -0.30**  -0.30**  -0.30**  -0.31**  -0.31**  
(Quadratic)  (-3.25)  (-3.25)  (-3.25)  (-3.34)  (-3.34)  
FIRM’S 
INNOVATIVENESS  0.09*  0.09*  0.09*  0.06  0.06 
  (2.19)  (2.19)  (2.19)  (1.48)  (1.48) 



















  (4.23)  (4.23)  (4.23)  (4.93)  (4.93) 


















        (4.55)  (4.55) 
  _cons  -3.95º  -3.95º  -3.95º  -5.82*  -5.82*  
    (-1.70)  (-1.70)  (-1.70)  (-2.30)  (-2.30)  
  N  41  41  41  41  41 
  R-sq  47.4%  47.4%  47.4%  56.1%  56.1% 
  adj. R-sq  41.6%  41.6%  41.6%  49.9%  49.9% 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, º p<0.1,* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and *** p<0.001.  
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  Table D.4: Regressions with the food industry 
 
IP OWNERSHIP, FOOD INDUSTRY 
  MODEL 1  MODEL 2  MODEL 3  MODEL 4  MODEL 5 
FIRM’S 
IMPORTANCE  -0.24  -0.24  -0.24  -0.32*  -0.18 
  (-1.19)  (-1.19)  (-1.19)  (-2.28)  (-1.51)  
PARTNER 
IMPORTANCE  0.31º  0.31º  0.31º  0.31*  0.42*  
  (2.11)  (2.11)  (2.11)  (2.40)  (2.74) 
FIRM’S STRATEGIC 



















  (1.38)  (1.38)  (1.38)  (2.20)  (3.57) 
CONTRACT NEED        0.22  0.30º 
        (1.45)  (1.90) 
FIRM’S EMBEDDEDNESS      0.20  3.55**  
        (0.61)  (3.28) 
FIRM’S EMBEDDEDNESS        -0.28*  
(Quadratic)          (-2.88)  
PARTNER’S EMBEDDEDNESS      -0.38**  -1.60**  
        (-3.54)  (-3.46)  
PARTNER’S EMBEDDEDNESS        0.11*  
(Quadratic)          (2.57) 
BALANCED COMPETENCES        -0.02 
(Quadratic)          (-1.93)  
_cons  1.23  1.23  1.23  0.96  -6.70º 
  (0.77)  (0.77)  (0.77)  (0.38)  (-1.84)  
N  50  50  50  50  50 


























adj. R-sq  13.4%  13.4%  13.4%  23.4%  38.3% 
MEETING FINANCIAL OBJECTIVES, FOOD INDUSTRY (continued) 
  MODEL 1  MODEL 2  MODEL 3  MODEL 4  MODEL 5 
FIRM’S 



















  (2.10)  (2.10)  (2.10)  (1.63)  (1.96) 
TRUST        0.32  3.29* 
        (1.21)  (2.53) 
TRUST        -0.23*   
    (Quadratic)        (-2.31)   






















        (-2.18)  (-1.94) 
 
_cons  4.33***  4.33***  4.33**  4.32*  -4.79 
 
  (5.15)  (5.15)  (5.15)  (2.34)  (-1.09) 
 
N  50  50  50  50  50 
 
R-sq  15.0%  15.0%  15.0%  23.4%  29.9% 
 
adj. R-sq  13.2%  13.2%  13.2%  18.4%  23.6% 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, º p<0.1,* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and *** p<0.001. 
 




Table D.5: Regressions with services industries 
 
IP OWNERSHIP, SERVICES INDUSTRY 
  MODEL 1  MODEL 2  MODEL 3  MODEL 4  MODEL 5 
FIRM’S IMPORTANCE  -0.55*  -0.48*  -0.47**  -0.52*  -0.55**  
  (-2.85)  (-2.33)  (-3.07)  (-2.78)  (-3.09)  
PARTNER IMPORTANCE  0.57**  0.50**  0.53***  0.56***  0.53*** 
  (3.48)  (3.10)  (4.22)  (5.05)  (5.23) 



















  (3.49)  (3.77)  (3.45)  (3.92)  (3.56) 
FIRM’S EMBEDDEDNESS     0.44*  -0.98  -1.53*  -1.14 
     (2.78)  (-1.66)  (-2.21)  (-1.80)  
FIRM’S EMBEDDEDNESS       0.13*  0.17*  0.14*  
(Quadratic)       (2.31)  (2.64)  (2.42) 
PARTNER’S EMBEDDEDNESS  -0.22  0.75  0.92º  1.01*  
    (-1.42)  (1.40)  (1.88)  (2.32) 


























(Quadratic)       (-2.16)  (-2.60)  (-3.11)  
FIRM’S MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT    0.17º  -0.71 
         (2.03)  (-1.62)  






















(Quadratic)           (1.93) 
 
 
_cons  0.02  -1.40  0.15  0.50  0.74 
 
 
   (0.02)  (-1.55)  (0.17)  (0.39)  (0.66) 
 
 
N  46  46  46  46  46 
 
 
R-sq  39.1%  46.8%  51.0%  53.0%  56.4% 
 
  34.7%  40.2%  41.9%  42.8%  45.5% 
  to be continued on the next page   
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MEETING FINANCIAL OBJECTIVES, SERVICES INDUSTRY (continued) 
  MODEL 1  MODEL 2  MODEL 3  MODEL 4  MODEL 5 
PROJECT LIFE CYCLE  2.23***  2.14**  1.84**  1.28*  1.46*  
  (4.69)  (3.75)  (3.43)  (2.42)  (2.89) 
PROJECT LIFE CYCLE  -0.22**  -0.21*  -0.18**  -0.13º  -0.15*  
(Quadratic)  (-3.49)  (-2.91)  (-3.12)  (-2.12)  (-2.83)  
NR. OF PARTNERS  2.62*  2.75*  2.26*  0.94  1.43º 
  (2.62)  (2.65)  (2.52)  (1.11)  (1.75) 



















(Quadratic)  (-2.21)  (-2.15)  (-2.11)  (-0.96)  (-1.65)  
COORDINATION NEED     -0.18  -1.04º  -1.24*  -1.31*  
     (-1.75)  (-2.11)  (-2.21)  (-2.56)  
COORDINATION NEED       0.09*  0.10º  0.11*  
(Quadratic)       (2.21)  (1.93)  (2.59) 
PARTNER’S EMBEDDEDNESS     0.12  -0.59  -1.31**  -1.26*  
     (1.20)  (-1.20)  (-3.65)  (-2.90)  


























(Quadratic)      (1.47)  (3.72)  (3.05) 
TRUST         0.26   0.42*  
         -1.33  -2.45 
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY         0.47º  0.43º 
         (1.88)  (1.94) 






















(Quadratic)           (-2.24)  
 
_cons  -4.67*  -4.37º  -0.73  -0.10  -0.60 
 
  (-2.33)  (-1.92)  (-0.30)  (-0.05)  (-0.35)  
 
N  46  46  46  46  46 
 
R-sq  35.8%  38.7%  48.0%  60.3%  66.9% 
 
adj. R-sq  29.5%  29.3%  36.8%  48.9%  56.2% 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, º p<0.1,* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and *** p<0.001. 
    




Table D.6: Regressions with young projects 
 
IP OWNERSHIP, YOUNG PROJECTS 
 
 
  MODEL 1  MODEL 2  MODEL 3  MODEL 4  MODEL 5 
NR OF PARTNERS  0.023**  0.023**  0.023**  0.025*  0.027* 
  (2.78)  (2.78)  (2.78)  (2.08)  (2.57) 



















   (2.37)  (2.37)  (2.37)  (2.20)  (1.46) 
FIRM'S MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT      0.061  0.93º 
        (0.69)  (2.03) 
FIRM'S MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT        -0.08º 
(Quadratic)          (-1.68) 
TECHNICAL 
INFORMALITY        0.07  0.75º 
TECHNICAL 






















(Quadratic)              (-1.69) 
 
 
_cons  1.45º  1.45º  1.45º  0.66  -1.87 
 
 
  (1.78)  (1.78)  (1.78)  (0.51)  (-1.63) 
 
 
N  59  59  59  59  59 
 
 
R-sq  11.3%  11.3%  11.3%  11.9%  20.1% 
 
 
adj. R-sq  8.2%  8.2%  8.2%  5.4%  10.8% 
MEETING FINANCIAL OBJECTIVES, YOUNG PROJECTS 
  MODEL 1  MODEL 2  MODEL 3  MODEL 4  MODEL 5 
FIRM’S INNOVATIVENESS  0.17**  0.17**  0.16*  0.24***  0.24*** 
  (3.23)  (3.06)  (2.66)  (3.70)  (3.78) 





















   (1.94)  (2.17)  (2.22)  (2.06)  (1.49) 
CONTRACT NEED    -0.36º  -1.22º  -1.33*  -1.63**  
    (-1.88)  (-1.91)  (-2.20)  (-3.06)  
CONTRACT NEED       0.08  0.09º  0.10*  
(Quadratic)      (1.53)  (1.72)  (2.31) 
PARTNER’S EMBEDDEDNESS    0.13  1.15*  1.10º  1.07º 
    (0.95)  (2.05)  (1.73)  (1.82) 
PARTNER’S EMBEDDEDNESS      -0.09  -0.09  -0.10º 
(Quadratic)      (-1.62)  (-1.52)  (-1.71)  
BALANCED COMPETENCES    0.25  1.43º  2.31*  2.32*  
    (1.32)  (1.86)  (2.26)  (2.12) 


























(Quadratic)        (-1.47)  (-2.18)  (-1.89)  
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MEETING FINANCIAL OBJECTIVES, YOUNG PROJECTS (continued) 
FIRM'S MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT      -0.36*  -1.31*  
        (-2.11)  (-2.60)  
FIRM'S MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT        0.08º 
(Quadratic)        (1.80)   
PARTNER'S MANAGEMENT 
INVOLVEMENT      0.23º  0.26*  
        (1.76)  (2.12) 
COMMERCIAL 
INFORMALITY        0.30º  1.31*  
        (1.69)  (2.64) 
COMMERCIAL 






















(Quadratic)              (-2.28)  
 
 
_cons  1.87  1.71  -2.33  -5.20  -3.13 
 
 
  (1.64)  (0.79)  (-0.74)  (-1.41)  (-1.05)  
 
 
N  59  59  59  59  59 
 
 
R-sq  23.6%  31.5%  34.7%  44.0%  51.4% 
 
 
adj. R-sq  20.9%  25.0%  24.3%  30.9%  37.4% 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, º p<0.1,* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and *** p<0.001. 
 
 
Table D.7: Regressions with mature projects 
 
IP OWNERSHIP, MATURE PROJECTS 
  MODEL 1  MODEL 2  MODEL 3  MODEL 4  MODEL 5 
FIRM’S SALES PER 
EMPLOYEE  -0.31*  -0.45***  -0.45***  -0.42**  -0.34*  
  (-2.63)  (-4.59)  (-4.59)  (-3.54)  (-2.60)  
EMPLOYMENT 
DIFFERENCE  -0.00***  -0.00***  -0.00***  -0.00***  -0.00*** 
  (-10.81)  (-7.21)  (-7.21)  (-6.85)  (-7.40)  
FIRM’S IMPORTANCE  -0.50**  -0.39**  -0.39**  -0.39**  -0.40**  
  (-3.32)  (-2.78)  (-2.78)  (-2.88)  (-3.01)  
PARTNER IMPORTANCE  0.46***  0.42***  0.42***  0.42***  0.44*** 
  (3.67)  (3.72)  (3.72)  (3.75)  (4.10) 



















  (3.52)  (3.49)  (3.49)  (3.62)  (3.75) 
FIRM’S EMBEDDEDNESS     0.37**  0.37**  0.39**  0.32**  
     (3.06)  (3.06)  (3.16)  (2.75) 


























     (-3.25)  (-3.25)  (-2.83)  (-3.02)  
           
           






















(Quadratic)           (-1.87)  
 
 
_cons  2.12  1.63  1.63  1.72  0.91 
 
 
   (1.71)  (1.04)  (1.04)  (1.08)  (0.63) 
 
 
N  78  78  78  78  78 
 
 
R-sq  36.8%  46.9%  46.9%  47.4%  49.5% 
 
 
adj. R-sq  32.4%  41.6%  41.6%  41.3%  42.8% 




MEETING FINANCIAL OBJECTIVES, MATURE PROJECTS (continued) 
  MODEL 1  MODEL 2  MODEL 3  MODEL 4  MODEL 5 
PROJECT LIFE CYCLE  1.16**  1.14*  0.88º      
  (2.76)  (2.62)  (1.92)      
PROJECT LIFE CYCLE  -0.09*  -0.10*  -0.07º      
  (-2.43)  (-2.47)  (-1.87)      
NR. OF PARTNERS  2.01º  1.75º  1.58º      
  (1.92)  (1.79)  (1.65)      
NR. OF PARTNERS  -0.23*  -0.19  -0.17      
(Quadratic)  (-2.23)  (-1.91)  (-1.75)      
FIRM’S INNOVATIVENESS  0.09*  0.08º  0.09º  0.10*  0.11*  
  (2.03)  (1.69)  (2.03)  (2.19)  (2.37) 



















  (2.44)  (3.66)  (3.78)  (3.27)  (4.29) 
CONTRACT NEED     0.15  -0.06  -0.31  -1.37*  
     (1.16)  (-0.09)  (-0.41)  (-2.25)  
CONTRACT NEED       0.02  0.04  0.11*  
(Quadratic)       (0.31)  (0.62)  (2.09) 
PARTNER’S EMBEDDEDNESS  0.38**  -0.15  -0.41  -0.89º 
     (3.57)  (-0.31)  (-0.76)  (-1.93)  
PARTNER’S EMBEDDEDNESS    0.06  0.09º  0.13**  
(Quadratic)       (1.43)  (1.76)  (3.05) 
COORDINATION NEED     -0.18º  -1.16*  -1.28*  -1.04º 
     (-1.69)  (-2.21)  (-2.35)  (-1.97)  


























(Quadratic)       (1.86)  (1.84)  (1.61) 
TRUST         0.22  2.71**  
         (1.27)  (3.34) 
TRUST           -0.18**  
(Quadratic)           (-2.94)  
TECHNICAL INFORMALITY      0.11  1.30*  
         (0.49)  (2.39) 






















(Quadratic)           (-2.90)  
 
_cons  -2.93  -4.41*  -0.47  3.48  -1.91 
 
  (-1.09)  (-2.19)  (-0.19)  -1.74  (-1.33)  
 
N  78  78  78  78  78 
 
R-sq  20.0%  30.4%  38.9%  36.2%  48.6% 
 
adj. R-sq  13.2%  21.2%  27.6%  26.7%  39.2% 




Contract  need,  an  obligation  to  agree  upon  details  and  a  formal  contract  in 
advance, is negatively associated with meeting financial objectives. In the initial 
phase of innovation, a certain space for creativity and flexibility in order to cope 
with  unforeseen  circumstances  is  especially  necessary  with  the  added 
consequence  that  meeting  financial  objectives  will  be  affected  negatively 
particularly in young projects  Figure D.2, curve B . Although less prominent, 
the effect in mature projects remains negative  curve A . The optimum contract 
need is at a minimal level. Increasing values of contract need cause deterioration in Appendix D    235 
meeting financial objectives, although above an inflection point of 6.3  in mature 
projects  or 8.1  in young projects , the negative effect is reduced.  
 





Especially  for  young  companies,  cooperating  with  others  is  essential 
 Shan et al., 1994; Baum et al., 2000 . More embeddedness of partner’s implies 
more  novelty  value,
4  due  to  the  fact  that  the  partner  has  more  network 
relationships,  or  more  co innovation  experience.  This  learning  effect  is  most 
beneficial when alliance activities are complex and uncertain  e.g., in the initial 
phase of innovation  Sampson, 2005  or when companies are inexperienced in 
young cooperation, when there is much to be gained from the alliance partners. 
The  cumulative  benefits  of  partner’s  embeddedness  tend  to  decrease  after  a 
certain level  see Figure D.3, curve A . In this case, a company may exceed its 
capacity in handling the huge amount of information to be derived from the 
partner’s network relationships, or the information may start to become out 
dated.  At  the  same  time,  the  partner’s  network  relationships  will  not  only 
transfer knowledge to, but also start to learn from the co innovation alliance as a 
co innovation  alliance  can  be  considered  to  be  a  “race  to  learn”   see  Section 
4.3.3 .  
In mature projects, the partner’s embeddedness has a negative impact on 
meeting financial objectives of the focal firm due to the fact that the effect of 
potential  IP leakage  exceeds  the  novelty  value  of  the  partner’s  network 
relationships  Figure D.3, curve B . In mature projects, a positive net balance of 
                                                 
4 Sometimes, the term ‘novelty value’ may have a negative connotation, referring to a 
temporary or fashionable newness. We use this term in the positive sense as it is under 
stood in the professional literature.  EFFECTS OF INDUSTRY AND PROJECT DURATION 
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transfer of knowledge transfer to and from the co innovation alliance only can be 
reached if a huge variety of network resources of the partner offer sufficient 
additional novelty value.  
 
 





Balanced  competences,  a  situation  in  which  the  competences  of  the  co 
innovation alliance partners are both unique and durable, have a different impact 
on the meeting of financial objectives. Young projects usually benefit financially 
from balanced competences, but at a diminishing rate  see Figure D.4, curve A . 
Above an inflection point of 7.3, the negative curvilinear effect surpasses the 
positive  linear  effect.  In  general,  we  observed  a  hill shaped,  though  limited, 
association  curve B . 
To  a  certain  extent,  balanced  competences  are  beneficial;  however,  too 
many balanced competences may be dysfunctional. In this case, companies become 
over  dependent  on  their  co innovation  partners,  resulting  in  a  counter pro 
ductive or sub optimal cooperation in which the other partners might supply 
more  promising  or  innovative  solutions,  or  the  cooperation  may  lead  to 
insufficient flexibility when dealing with changing market circumstances.  
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We defined ‘trust’ as the degree of openness between the responding company 
and its partners, the extent to which obligations are met by the partner, and the 
willingness and ability to share the expertise of the company and its partner. 
Trust to a certain level is beneficial, particularly in the food industry  see Figure 
D.5   curve  A ,  in  mature  projects   curve  B .  Above  inflection  points  of  7.4 
 mature projects and food industry , however, too much trust will cause deterio 
ration in the financial results.  
Due to strict safety regulations in the food industry, meeting obligations 
by the partner openness are vital and willingness and ability to share the exper 
tise are essential to the cooperation. The importance of trust in meeting the 
financial objectives in mature projects can be explained by the fact that trust 
between the alliance partners cannot be built overnight; it will grow gradually by 
having positive joint experiences  Jennings et al., 2000; Park and Ungson, 2001 . 
At  the  same  time,  too  much  trust  has  also  negative  effects:  it  can  lead  to 
complacency,  an  acceptance  of  less than  satisfactory  outcomes  from  a  rela 
tionship,  less  information  exchange  between  partners,  or  unnecessary 
obligations  Gargiulo and Ertug, 2006 .  
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Figure D.5: Different effects of trust and performance 
 
 
Especially  in  the  manufacturing  industry,  a  culture  fit  has  a  positive 
impact  on  meeting  financial  objectives   Figure  D.6,  curve  A .  The  more  the 
partners  resemble  one  another  in  terms  of  communication  style,  decision 
making, leadership, and problem solving style, the better the financial results. 
Cultural  similarity  increases  stability  and  facilitates  easy  problem  solving. 
Similarity  of  cultural  values  reduces  misunderstanding  or  difficulty  in  the 
exchange  of  knowledge  between  the  partners   Lyles  and  Salk,  1996;  Lin  and 
Germain, 1998; Demirbag et al., 2007 . 
 
Figure D.6: Differences of culture fit across industry  
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Especially in mature projects and in the manufacturing industry, technical infor 
mality   is  hill shaped  when  associated  with  meeting  financial  objectives     see 
Figures D.7a and D.7b, curves A, both with inflection points of 4.8 . In contrast 
with manufacturing industry, technical informality in the food industry, is negative 
linearly related when meeting financial objectives  curve Figure D.7b, curve B . 
Here, any informality regarding R&D and project management has a negative 
financial impact due to strict food safety regulations.  
 
 
Figure D.7a: Differences of technical informality across project age  
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The number of partners has a significant curvilinear impact on meeting financial 
objectives in the manufacturing  Figure D.8, curve A  and in service industries 
 curve B .
5 Especially in manufacturing industry, cooperation between more than 
two companies is financially attractive. However, when more than 5 partners are 
involved in the co innovation alliance, the risk of additional coordination costs 
or dilution of revenues is likely to surpass the additional value added. 
 
 
Figure D.8: Differences of the number of partners across industry  
 
 
   
 
 
The importance of the co innovation alliance, as perceived by a firm and its 
partner,  affects  IP  ownership  in  different  ways.  When  partners  perceive  the 
cooperation  as  important,  partners  tend  to  own  a  larger  share  of  the  jointly 
developed IP  Figure D.9, curves A, B C, D, and E , because the partners are 
more inclined to supply know how or resources. At the same time, if the focal 
companies perceive the cooperation as important, they tend to own a larger share 
of  curves E, F, G , because they may be less inclined to supply their resources or 
technology due to the fact that the firm has already done so. We observed these 
effects especially in service industries  curves A and G , and in mature projects 
 curves B and F .  
 
                                                 
5 The results for meeting financial objectives in service industries should be interpreted 
with caution due to a limited number of observations per variable. Appendix D    241 






A firm’s innovativeness, measured as percentage of research and development 
expense of the sales, has a positive impact on meeting financial objectives of 
the co innovation alliance. Especially in the food industry innovative firms 
benefit financially  Figure D.10a, curve A , although small effects can also be 
observed in manufacturing industry  Figure D.10a, curve B . In the case of 
young  co innovation  alliances,  innovative  companies  tend  to  derive  more 
financial benefit from the partnership  see FigureD.10b, curve A , although 
the benefit will shrink in more mature projects  Figure D.10b, curve B . EFFECTS OF INDUSTRY AND PROJECT DURATION 
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Figure D.10b: Differences of firm’s innovativeness across project age  
 
 
The ability of a firm and its partners to change its strategic priorities, 
referred to as strategic stability, positively affects meeting financial objectives in 
the  manufacturing  industry   Figure  D.11a,  curve  A ,  where  companies  in  the 
service industry that are able to adjust their activities in order to meet market 
needs, referred to as operational flexibility, tend to profit more from their co 
innovation alliance although less prominently  curve B .  Appendix D    243 
 
In mature projects, it is more important to adjust strategic priorities to 
changing market conditions than in young projects  see Figure D.11b, curves A 
and B . 
 




Figure D.11b: Differences of stability across project age  




In conclusion: considering effects of industry and project duration is essential in 
the explanation and improvement of the performance of co innovation alliances.  
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APPENDIX E:   EFFECTS OF INTERACTION 
 
In this appendix, we investigate some indirect effects in order  a  to explore new 
ground in search of new theory and  b  improve our management tool through 
data mining. We discuss some mediation and moderation effects between two 








An analysis of the effects of interaction is complicated due to the fact that many 
variables can potentially interact with one another. In various studies, the prob 
lem of cross validating findings has been addressed  Parkhe, 1993b; Park and 
Ungson, 2001; Gilsing et al., 2007 .  
Depending on the values of a third variable   some effects of interaction 
might cause variation in the regressions between independent and dependent 
variables   Jaccard  and  Turrisi,  2003 ,  known  as  moderation  and  mediation 
effects. Those effects differ from one another; in the case of moderating effects, a 
third variable influences the direction or strength of the relation between an 
independent  and  dependent  variable,  while  in  mediating  effects,  the  relation 
between an independent and the dependent variable runs through a third vari 
                                                 
1 We do not discuss other interaction effects, such as effects between more than two 
independent variables, or combinations of mediation and moderation  see e.g. Muller et 
al. 2005 .  EFFECTS OF INTERACTION 
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able  Baron and Kenny, 1986 . In this case, a regression is compared with an 
indirect  regression  between  the  independent  and  the  dependent  variable.  In 
Figure E.2, we explain the differences between moderation and mediation.  
With moderation, the direction or strength of the relationship between 
independent variable X and dependent variable Y changes under the influence 
of  moderating  variable  Mo.  We  measure  moderation  by  adding  interaction 
 product  terms to the regression models of Section 6.2. In order to deal with a 
minimum of observations per variable of at least five per independent variable, 
we simplified our models by removing non significant variables from the analy 
ses  Hair et al., 2010 .  
With mediation, the direct relation c is compared with the indirect effect 
of a and b, assuming that a, b, and c are all significant. Mediation is known as 
full mediation if relation c is no longer significant, when a and b are removed 
from the analysis. In other cases, we speak of partial mediation. With media 
tion, a mediating variable Me influences the relation that an independent vari 
able X has with a dependent variable Y. In other words, X affects Y because X 
affects Me, and Me, in turn, affects Y  Peacher et al., 2007 . 
 




We measured mediation by conducting Sobel Goodman tests in STATA, which 
indicate whether an indirect  mediator  effect is significant  Baron and Kenny, 
1986  and found significant effects of the organizational scales firm’s embeddedness, 
balanced competences, and coordination need, as well as of the relationships scales 




Table E.1: Mediation effects  
 


























Firm’s centrality  NS  NS  NS 
Partner’s embeddedness  NS  NS  Trustº 
 












competencesº  NS  NS 






































NS  NS  NS 
Technical informality  NS  NS  NS 
Commercial informality  NS  NS  NS EFFECTS OF INTERACTION 
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In order to analyze the impact of the mediation effects, we divided our 
database at the median of the mediating variables and calculated the bivariate 
correlation coefficients between both the dependent and independent variables 
of the two samples separately and discuss some of the major changes in the coef 
ficients.  
In  the  regressions  with  commercial  and  financial  performance,  firm’s 
embeddedness mediates various variables. Firms that have experience with many 
partnerships value detailed contracts positively in order to improve the relative 
position towards the partner as far IP, market rights and revenue is concerned
2 
 see Figure E.3, curve A , whereas they value coordination positively as a means 
of achieving financial and strategic objectives
3  Figure E.4, curve A . In contrast: 
firms  without  networking  experience  value  contract  details  or  coordination 
more negatively  Figures E.3 and E.4, curves B, respectively . 
 





In the regressions with technological performance, balanced competences 
influences various variables. The impact of a firm’s management involvement on the 
extent to which complementary resources could be obtained depends on a situa 
tion of balanced competences; especially when the competences of the firm and its 
partner are not unique and easy to replace  “low balanced competences” . A firm’s 
management involvement will have a positive impact on the accessibility of com 
                                                 
2 Referred to as commercial performance. 




4  Figure E.5, curve B . 
 






Figure E.5: Balanced competences mediate a firm’s management 




The ability to transfer technology serves as an important mediating variable as 
well. In the case of a high ability to transfer technology, a highly embedded firm 
                                                 
4 Referred to as technological performance. EFFECTS OF INTERACTION 
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can achieve better financial results  Figure E.6, curve A , whereas if they lack the 
ability to transfer technology, highly embedded partners add to achieving beter 
financial results  Figure E.7, curve A . 
 
 





Figure E.7: Technology transfer mediates partner’s embeddedness 
on financial performance 
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A better ability to transfer technology from and to others, involves on the one 
hand a higher learning efficiency and higher absorption capacity, while on the 
other hand entails more potential leakages of intellectual property. A co innova 
tion alliance can be considered as a “race to learn”  see Section 4.3.3 .  When 
highly embedded firms   with more network relationships and experience   have 
much ability to transfer technology, they can make effectively use of their own 
networks. In contrast, many network relationships of the partner are needed 
only in the case of a limited ability to transfer technology. 
As far as the access to complementary resources is concerned, a partner’s 
embededdness and a firm’s embeddedness reinforce one another  positive moderation  
while the ability to transfer technology in combination with technological informality 
interfere with one another  negative moderation  due to the risk of unnecessary 
disclosure of information. 
 
We illustrate the complexity of improving performance of co innovation alli 
ances with the use of various moderation effects. 
A combination of detailed contracts  “contract need”  and highly coordi 
nated  activities   “coordination  need”   improves  the  relative  position  of  a  firm 
towards the partner as far IP, market rights and revenue is concerned  see Fig 
ure E.4 .
5 However, contract need has a negative influence on financial perform 
ance  see Chapter 6 . Partner’s embeddedness moderates the negative effect posi 
tively  see Figure E.5 : when the partner is highly embedded, detailed contracts 
with the partner are considered to be necessary in order to achieve financial and 
strategic objectives. A high degree of partner embeddedness improves the techno 
logical performance of a firm by improving opportunities to access complemen 
tary resources  curves AD and BD in Figure E.6 . As discussed in Chapter 6, 
coordination of activities between the firm and its partners however, reduces 
the possibilities to access complementary resources due to the fact that flexibil 
ity is restricted  see the U shaped curve in Figure 6.6 and the U shaped curves 
AB and CD in Figure E.6 . We observed a positive moderation between coordi 
nation need and partner’s embeddedness. 
 
                                                 
5 In the regressions with commercial performance including moderation variables, only 
the interaction term is significant.  EFFECTS OF INTERACTION 
 
252 






Figure E.9: Coordination need  and partner’s embeddedness  
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Figure E.10: Coordination need  and partner’s embeddedness  




Improving the performance of co innovation alliances entails the ability 
to  deal  with  the  paradoxes  between  different  aspects  of  performance.  For 
example,  on  the  one  hand  one  should  restrain  the  coordination  of  activities 
tightly  in  order  not  to  limit  the  access  to  complementary  resources 
 technological performance .  On the other hand, coordination and contracts 
might be indispensable in order to obtain a fair share of commercial benefits or 
meet financial objectives.  
The desired level of coordination is contingent upon a firm’s and the 
partner’s embeddedness, as well as its ability to transfer technology, and balanced compe 
tences. 
 
In conclusion, the consideration of indirect effects is an essential element in the 
explanation and improvement of the performance of co innovation alliances.  EFFECTS OF INTERACTION 
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Table F.1: Factor analysis of the independent variables  
 Rotated Component Matrix  INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
4.2a Firm's role other partnerships  0.00  0.02  -0.03  0.07  -0.11  0.03  0.10  -0.07  0.17  0.01  0.84  0.01  0.04  -0.03 
4.2b Partner's role other partnerships  -0.08  0.13  -0.02  -0.03  0.79  0.01  0.17  -0.11  0.08  -0.08  0.01  0.13  0.16  0.06 
4.3a Firm's number of other partnerships  -0.06  -0.17  0.02  0.16  -0.06  0.04  -0.08  0.29  0.70  0.14  0.08  0.13  0.01  -0.04 
4.3b Partner's number of other partnerships   0.05  -0.01  0.05  0.20  0.80  0.07  -0.04  -0.04  -0.04  0.08  -0.09  -0.06  -0.12  -0.19 
4.4a Firm's coordination need   -0.08  -0.08  0.14  0.12  0.02  0.01  0.20  -0.04  -0.01  0.82  -0.05  -0.25  0.07  0.13 
4.4b Partner's coordination need   0.11  0.14  0.05  0.03  -0.04  0.02  0.03  -0.07  0.12  0.85  0.15  0.17  -0.04  -0.02 
4.5 Governance structure comparable  0.55  0.38  0.03  0.02  0.04  0.09  0.03  -0.07  0.01  -0.11  0.05  0.37  -0.23  0.22 
4.6 Decision making control  0.10  -0.06  -0.07  -0.01  0.13  -0.03  0.34  0.12  0.14  0.22  0.44  0.14  -0.04  -0.09 
4.7a Firm: contract details important  -0.04  0.02  0.80  -0.12  0.12  -0.07  -0.09  -0.08  -0.05  0.03  0.00  -0.18  0.19  0.20 
4.7b Partner: contact details important   0.14  0.01  0.78  -0.03  0.06  -0.14  0.01  -0.25  -0.03  -0.03  0.05  0.03  0.07  0.07 
4.8a Strategic issues informal  0.13  0.00  -0.04  -0.13  -0.07  0.02  -0.08  0.86  -0.02  -0.04  -0.03  0.02  -0.12  0.04 
4.8b Marketing issues informal  0.07  -0.04  -0.04  0.00  -0.11  -0.10  0.11  0.85  0.07  -0.06  0.03  -0.04  0.06  -0.02 
4.8c Financial issues informal  0.14  0.10  0.01  -0.07  -0.05  0.72  -0.17  0.00  0.14  0.15  0.14  0.25  0.03  0.24 
4.8d R&D issues informal  0.04  0.11  -0.01  -0.02  -0.05  0.72  0.25  -0.11  -0.22  -0.09  -0.12  -0.06  -0.28  -0.06 
4.8e Project management issues informal  -0.13  0.08  -0.20  -0.07  0.14  0.75  0.01  -0.01  -0.07  -0.02  -0.01  -0.08  0.13  -0.28 
4.9a Firm:  formal contract is important  -0.12  -0.14  0.75  0.15  -0.01  0.02  -0.05  0.20  0.20  0.14  -0.16  0.09  0.06  -0.02 
4.9b Partner:  formal contract is important  0.02  -0.02  0.78  0.19  -0.05  0.01  0.07  0.04  -0.06  0.06  0.00  0.14  -0.07  -0.17 
4.10a Partner's competence are new  0.02  -0.17  -0.08  0.13  0.08  0.10  0.74  0.09  -0.34  0.14  0.08  -0.03  0.02  0.06 
4.10b Firm's competence new  0.02  0.15  -0.08  -0.06  -0.06  -0.12  0.59  -0.11  0.27  0.30  0.16  0.13  0.11  0.07 
4.11 Learning balance  0.10  -0.13  -0.08  0.28  0.30  -0.01  0.03  0.12  -0.25  -0.02  -0.15  -0.61  -0.24  0.07 
4.12a Partner can replace  0.18  0.22  0.11  0.19  -0.15  0.01  0.41  -0.11  0.19  -0.16  -0.38  0.37  0.06  0.19 
4.12b Firm can replace  0.10  -0.16  0.08  0.24  0.09  0.05  0.45  0.13  -0.22  -0.01  0.04  0.56  0.04  0.10 
5.10a Firm's experience  0.03  -0.12  -0.02  0.19  0.07  -0.12  0.03  -0.12  0.77  0.02  0.12  -0.06  -0.05  0.00 
5.10b Partner experience  0.14  0.30  0.08  -0.02  0.73  -0.03  -0.11  -0.11  -0.01  -0.02  0.07  -0.28  -0.04  0.08 
5.11a Firm's management Involvement  0.13  0.07  0.03  0.09  -0.04  -0.08  0.07  0.03  -0.04  0.08  -0.10  0.03  0.10  0.84 
5.11b Partner's management involvement  0.13  -0.08  0.08  0.07  -0.12  0.09  0.07  -0.06  -0.02  0.03  0.00  0.01  0.77  0.28 
5.12a Tech transfer to extern  0.05  0.09  0.12  0.68  0.08  -0.04  0.26  -0.09  0.25  -0.05  0.04  -0.06  0.02  0.19 
5.12b Tech transfer from extern  0.22  -0.02  -0.02  0.81  0.06  0.09  -0.01  -0.10  0.09  0.09  0.16  0.04  0.13  0.00 
5.12c Retain relations  0.10  0.04  0.08  0.85  0.04  -0.16  -0.01  0.02  0.06  0.06  -0.09  -0.01  -0.05  -0.01 
5.1a  Firm's status  -0.03  0.13  0.26  0.01  0.20  -0.28  0.09  -0.02  -0.04  -0.03  -0.02  0.21  0.64  -0.32 
5.1b Partner's status  0.04  0.01  0.12  0.36  0.40  -0.30  -0.02  0.08  -0.23  0.06  0.43  0.23  -0.15  -0.13 
5.2 Communication style similar  0.12  0.71  -0.16  0.03  0.04  0.20  0.02  -0.04  0.08  0.02  -0.12  0.07  -0.12  -0.03 
5.3 Decision style similar  0.11  0.78  -0.09  0.07  0.09  0.13  0.04  0.12  -0.10  0.08  0.28  -0.01  0.08  0.11 
5.4 Leaderships style similar  0.11  0.82  0.08  0.04  0.07  0.05  -0.04  -0.02  -0.10  -0.11  0.02  0.03  0.12  0.03 
5.5 Problem solving style similar  0.12  0.75  0.03  -0.04  0.15  -0.16  -0.01  -0.12  -0.14  0.13  -0.17  -0.05  -0.09  -0.03 
5.6a Firm openness communication  0.76  0.18  0.08  -0.01  -0.02  0.05  0.05  -0.04  -0.02  -0.07  -0.19  0.20  0.12  0.09 
5.6b Partner's openness communication  0.85  0.13  -0.01  -0.03  -0.04  0.05  -0.02  0.05  0.00  -0.10  0.02  0.01  -0.07  0.08 
5.7  Partner meets obligation  0.71  0.06  0.16  0.18  -0.07  -0.11  0.06  -0.08  -0.10  0.01  0.07  -0.11  0.08  -0.06 
5.8a We give responsibility  0.42  0.24  0.27  0.21  -0.03  0.15  0.37  0.00  0.16  -0.26  0.21  -0.13  0.11  -0.04 
5.8b Partner gives responsibility  0.43  0.27  0.20  -0.01  -0.01  0.20  0.42  0.04  0.33  -0.07  0.16  0.00  0.05  -0.18 
5.9a Partner shares expertise  0.79  0.06  -0.12  0.14  0.16  0.06  -0.05  0.14  0.02  0.16  0.06  -0.04  0.06  0.04 
5.9b Firm shares expertise  0.74  -0.05  -0.17  0.17  0.09  -0.12  0.09  0.24  0.05  0.18  0.02  -0.06  -0.02  0.02 
5.10a Firm's experience  0.03  -0.12  -0.02  0.19  0.07  -0.12  0.03  -0.12  0.77  0.02  0.12  -0.06  -0.05  0.00 
5.10b Partner experience  0.14  0.30  0.08  -0.02  0.73  -0.03  -0.11  -0.11  -0.01  -0.02  0.07  -0.28  -0.04  0.08 
5.11a Firm's management Involvement  0.13  0.07  0.03  0.09  -0.04  -0.08  0.07  0.03  -0.04  0.08  -0.10  0.03  0.10  0.84 
5.11b Partner's  management involvement  0.13  -0.08  0.08  0.07  -0.12  0.09  0.07  -0.06  -0.02  0.03  0.00  0.01  0.77  0.28 
5.12a Tech transfer to extern  0.05  0.09  0.12  0.68  0.08  -0.04  0.26  -0.09  0.25  -0.05  0.04  -0.06  0.02  0.19 
5.12b Tech transfer from extern  0.22  -0.02  -0.02  0.81  0.06  0.09  -0.01  -0.10  0.09  0.09  0.16  0.04  0.13  0.00 
5.12c Retain relations  0.10  0.04  0.08  0.85  0.04  -0.16  -0.01  0.02  0.06  0.06  -0.09  -0.01  -0.05  -0.01 
 Principal Component Analysis, Varimax rotation with Kaiser Normalization converged in 32 iterations. 




Table F.2:  Factor analysis of the dependent variables  
 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES  Rotated Component Matrix  
   1  2  3  4 
6.1 Contribute to competitive position  -0.19  0.62  0.23  0.37 
6.2 Possibility to integrate  -0.04  0.45  0.55  0.06 
6.3 Less risk/uncertainty  -0.18  0.59  0.07  0.11 
6.4 Better innovative position  0.09  0.41  -0.02  0.64 
6.5 Extra complementary resources  -0.03  0.13  -0.01  0.74 
6.6 Research synergies  -0.11  0.07  0.14  0.60 
6.7 Marketing benefits  0.83  -0.09  0.02  -0.13 
6.8 Sharing risk/revenue  0.88  -0.04  -0.03  -0.06 
6.9 IP Ownership  0.84  0.06  -0.01  0.06 
6.10 Cash spending  0.65  -0.21  0.07  0.06 
6.13 Break even  0.11  0.64  0.04  -0.05 
6.15 Revenue growth  -0.15  0.67  0.10  0.21 
6.16a Meeting financial goals  0.08  0.16  0.87  -0.06 
6.16b meeting strategic goals  -0.05  0.06  0.81  0.24 
6.16c meeting learning goals  0.14  -0.09  0.49  0.57 
 Note: Principal Component Analysis, Varimax rotation with Kaiser Normalization, 




 Appendix F 
 
257 
Table F.3:  Factor analysis of the market control variables  
 
Market control variables  Rotated Component Matrix 
   1  2  3 
2.1 Ambiguity  0.38  -0.39  0.44 
2.2 Complexity  0.64  -0.11  0.33 
2.3 Risk  0.85  0.09  0.01 
2.4 Uncertainty  0.86  0.02  -0.11 
2.5 Technological intensity  0.15  0.80  -0.04 
2.6 Life cycle market  0.07  -0.06  0.64 
2.7 External turbulence  -0.06  0.08  0.81 
2.8 Knowledge concentration  -0.10  0.81  0.02 
Note: Principal Component Analysis, Varimax Rotation with Kaiser Normalization converged in 5 iterations. 
 
 
Table F.4:  Factor analysis of the strategic control variables  
 
Strategy control variables  Rotated Component Matrix 
  1  2  3  4  5 
3.1a Strategic motives firm  0.13  0.20  0.58  -0.31  -0.10 
3.1b Strategic motives partner  0.43  -0.16  -0.06  -0.04  0.49 
3.2a Technological motives firm  -0.15  0.40  0.18  0.05  0.70 
3.2b Technological motives partner  0.22  -0.02  0.06  -0.20  0.73 
3.3a Financial motives firm  -0.06  0.06  0.85  -0.15  0.03 
3.3b Financial motives partner  -0.09  -0.09  0.62  0.18  0.34 
3.4   Strategic match  0.63  0.24  -0.22  -0.21  -0.07 
3.5a Organizational flexibility firm  -0.08  0.83  0.09  -0.06  -0.04 
3.5b Organizational flexibility partner  0.81  -0.01  -0.04  0.24  0.16 
3.6a Managerial flexibility firm  0.14  0.78  -0.01  -0.04  0.11 
3.6b Managerial flexibility partner  0.87  -0.03  0.11  0.09  0.10 
3.7a Change strategic priorities firm  0.06  -0.17  -0.14  0.78  -0.03 
3.7b Change strategic priorities partner  0.10  0.08  -0.02  0.81  -0.14 
4.1 Initial conditions  0.25  0.28  -0.35  -0.30  -0.02 
Notes: Principal Component Analysis, Varimax Rotation with Kaiser Normalization converged in 9 iterations. 
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Table F.5:  Regressions with commercial performance  
   COMMERCIAL PERFORMANCE 
   MODEL 1  MODEL 2  MODEL 3  MODEL 4  MODEL 5 
NR.OF PARTNERS  1.71*  1.33*  1.32º  1.35º  1.31 
   (2.61)  (2.03)  (1.98)  (1.93)  (1.63) 
NR.OF PARTNERS  -0.20**  -0.16*  -0.15*  -0.16*  -0.15 
(Quadratic)  (-3.28)  (-2.48)  (-2.29)  (-2.22)  (-1.91)    
   -0.24**  -0.22*  -0.22*  -0.20º  -0.22º 
   (-2.80)  (-2.55)  (-2.61)  (-1.86)  (-1.67)    
PARTNER'S STRATEGIC MOTIVES  -0.19*  -0.21*  -0.19*  -0.20º  -0.19 
   (-2.29)  (-2.19)  (-2.23)  (-1.89)  (-1.26)    



















   (-4.29)  (-4.45)  (-3.88)  (-3.20)  (-2.95)    
CONTRACT NEED     0.10  0.40  0.29  0.28 
     (1.15)  (0.74)  (0.46)  (0.45) 
CONTRACT NEED      -0.03  -0.01  -0.02 
(Quadratic)      (-0.56)  (-0.27)  (-0.29)    
FIRM'S EMBEDDEDNESS    -0.24º  -0.08  -0.05  0.01 
     (-1.76)  (-0.11)  (-0.06)  (0.01) 
FIRM'S EMBEDDEDNESS      -0.01  -0.01  -0.02 
(Quadratic)      (-0.18)  (-0.19)  (-0.22)    
FIRM'S CENTRALITY    -0.05  -0.05  -0.09  -0.03 
     (-0.40)  (-0.12)  (-0.19)  (-0.05)    
FIRM'S CENTRALITY      0.00  0.00  0.00 
(Quadratic)      (-0.01)  (0.09)  (-0.05)    
PARTNER'S EMBEDDEDNESS    -0.06  0.06  0.11  0.09 
     (-0.60)  (0.11)  (0.21)  (0.18) 
PARTNER'S EMBEDDEDNESS      -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
(Quadratic)      (-0.16)  (-0.27)  (-0.19)    
PARTNER'S COMPETENCES    0.05  -0.67º  -0.63  -0.65 
     (0.75)  (-1.86)  (-1.60)  (-1.46)    
PARTNER'S COMPETENCES      0.061*  0.06  0.06 
(Quadratic)      (2.05)  (1.88)  (1.68) 
COORDINATION NEED    -0.10  0.03  0.03  0.05 
     (-1.11)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.12) 


























(Quadratic)        (-0.29)  (-0.29)  (-0.21)    
TRUST           0.01  0.12 
         (0.04)  (0.09) 
TRUST          -0.01 
(Quadratic)          (-0.09)    
CULTURAL FIT        0.05  -0.21 
         (0.47)  (-0.47)    
CULTURAL FIT          0.03 
(Quadratic)          (0.62) 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER        -0.06  0.05 
         (-0.46)  (0.09) 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER          -0.01 
(Quadratic)          (-0.21)    
FIRM'S MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMEMENT      0.00  -0.04 
         (0.01)  (-0.06)    
FIRM'S MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMEMENT        0.00 
(Quadratic)          (0.08) 
PARTNER'S MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT      -0.03  -0.40 
         (-0.33)  (-0.90)    
PARTNER'S MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT        0.03 
(Quadratic)          (0.88) 
TECHNICAL INFORMALITY        -0.03  -0.26 
         (-0.24)  (-0.48)    
TECHNICAL INFORMALITY        0.04  0.23 
(Quadratic)        (0.38)  (0.51) 
COMMERCIAL INFORMALITY        0.02 
           (0.46) 



























(Quadratic)              (-0.43)    
   _cons  9.153***  11.32***  10.73**  10.80**  11.36*   
     (7.08)  (6.18)  (3.06)  (2.74)  (2.14) 
   N  134  132  132  132  132 
   R-sq  29.0%  36.2%  39.7%  40.3%  41.5% 
   adj. R-sq  25.1%  29.1%  29.5%  25.6%  21.7% 
   F  15.02  1.63  1.00  0.30  0.39 
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Table F.6:  Regressions with technological performance 
TECHNOLOGICAL PERFORMANCE 
   MODEL 1  MODEL 2  MODEL 3  MODEL 4  MODEL 5 
FIRM'S MULTI INPUT  1.15***  1.00**  1.13**  1.12**  0.85 
   (3.59)  (2.74)  (2.72)  (2.71)  (1.89) 
FIRM'S INNOVATIVENESS  -0.01  -0.02  -0.04  -0.07  -0.09º 
   (-0.21)  (-0.49)  (-0.90)  (-1.59)  (-1.83)    
PARTNER'S IMPORTANCE  0.25*  0.26*  0.29*  0.34**  0.25 
   (2.33)  (2.47)  (2.67)  (3.04)  (2.00) 
TECHNOLOGICAL MOTIVES  0.42***  0.36**  0.337*  0.25º  0.27º 
   (3.53)  (2.78)  (2.45)  (1.80)  (1.70) 
CONTRACT NEED     -0.29*  0.24  0.26  0.29 
     (-2.31)  (0.44)  (0.45)  (0.51) 
CONTRACT NEED      -0.05  -0.05  -0.05 
(Quadratic)      (-0.99)  (-1.04)  (-1.06)    
FIRM'S EMBEDDEDNESS    0.04  0.02  -0.27  -0.69 
     (0.30)  (0.03)  (-0.40)  (-1.00)    
FIRM'S EMBEDDEDNESS      0.00  0.02  0.05 
(Quadratic)      (-0.03)  (0.32)  (0.85) 
FIRM'S CENTRALITY    -0.02  0.16  0.22  0.51 
     (-0.21)  (0.42)  (0.49)  (1.01) 
FIRM'S CENTRALITY      -0.02  -0.02  -0.04 
(Quadratic)      (-0.62)  (-0.48)  (-0.92)    
PARTNER'S EMBEDDEDNESS    0.04  0.34  0.47  0.47 
     (0.32)  (0.91)  (1.17)  (1.33) 
PARTNER'S EMBEDDEDNESS      -0.02  -0.04  -0.04 
(Quadratic)      (-0.72)  (-0.93)  (-0.99)    
PARTNER'S COMPETENCES    0.11  0.19  0.08  -0.05 
     (0.92)  (0.36)  (0.19)  (-0.13)    
PARTNER'S COMPETENCES      -0.01  0.00  0.00 
(Quadratic)      (-0.15)  (0.01)  (0.12) 
COORDINATION NEED    -0.03  -1.29*  -1.32*  -1.61**  
     (-0.28)  (-2.59)  (-2.66)  (-2.94)    
COORDINATION NEED      0.11*  0.11*  0.14**  
(Quadratic)        (2.42)  (2.55)  (2.91) 
TRUST           -0.05  -2.49º 
         (-0.28)  (-1.72)    
TRUST          0.19º 
(Quadratic)          (1.72) 
CULTURAL FIT        -0.07  0.33 
         (-0.55)  (0.58) 
CULTURAL FIT          -0.04 
(Quadratic)          (-0.75)    
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER        0.25  1.59º 
         (1.50)  (1.69) 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER          -0.11 
(Quadratic)          (-1.38)    
FIRM'S MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMEMENT      0.25º  0.49 
         (1.78)  (0.91) 
FIRM'S MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMEMENT        -0.02 
(Quadratic)          (-0.43)    
PARTNER'S MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT      -0.22º  -0.57 
         (-1.87)  (-1.19)    
PARTNER'S MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT        0.03 
(Quadratic)          (0.67) 
TECHNICAL INFORMALITY        0.06  -0.09 
         (0.47)  (-0.19)    
TECHNICAL INFORMALITY          0.02 
(Quadratic)          (0.34) 
COMMERCIAL INFORMALITY        0.03  0.42 
         (0.41)  (1.02) 
COMMERCIAL INFORMALITY          -0.04 
(Quadratic)              (-0.97)    
_cons  0.03  1.85  2.65  1.80  7.31 
   (0.02)  (1.17)  (1.04)  (0.53)  (1.42) 
N  134  132  132  132  132 
R-sq  21.0%  25.7%  30.2%  37.6%  42.2% 
adj. R-sq  18.6%  19.5%  20.4%  24.3%  25.0% 
F  9.49  1.14  1.14  1.31  1.11 
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Table F.7:  Regressions with financial performance  
   FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
      MODEL 1  MODEL 2  MODEL 3  MODEL 4  MODEL 5 
PROJECT DURATION  0.25º  0.36*  0.30*  0.20  0.22 
   (1.94)  (2.44)  (2.07)  (1.10)  (1.17) 
PROJECT DURATION  -0.01*  -0.02**  -0.01*  -0.01  -0.01 
(Quadratic)  (-2.60)  (-3.16)  (-2.53)  (-1.26)  (-1.36)    
LIFE CYCLE PHASE  0.79*  0.86**  0.94**  0.61º  0.67º 
   (2.69)  (2.88)  (3.11)  (1.83)  (1.80) 
LIFE CYCLE PHASE  -0.07*  -0.08**  -0.09**  -0.05º  -0.06º 
(Quadratic)  (-2.68)  (-2.90)  (-3.17)  (-1.68)  (-1.75)    
PARTNER'S NATIONALITY  0.98º  0.82º  1.03*  1.04º  1.08º 
   (1.83)  (1.67)  (2.27)  (1.89)  (1.93) 
FIRM'S SALES P. EMPLOYEE  0.72***  0.66***  0.71**  0.59**  0.68**  
   (3.87)  (3.91)  (3.32)  (2.92)  (3.23) 
FIRM'S INNOVATIVENESS  0.11***  0.11**  0.11**  0.11***  0.11*** 
   (4.01)  (3.46)  (3.46)  (3.82)  (3.57) 



















   (1.77)  (1.34)  (1.73)  (2.37)  (1.99) 
CONTRACT NEED     -0.11  -1.29***  -1.51***  -1.39*** 
     (-1.20)  (-3.53)  (-4.72)  (-3.90)    
CONTRACT NEED      0.096**  0.12***  0.11**  
(Quadratic)      (2.86)  (3.93)  (3.27) 
FIRM'S EMBEDDEDNESS    0.07  -0.84  -0.69  -0.69 
     (0.65)  (-1.46)  (-1.57)  (-1.44)    
FIRM'S EMBEDDEDNESS      0.07  0.05  0.05 
(Quadratic)      (1.39)  (1.24)  (1.10) 
FIRM'S CENTRALITY    0.13  1.11***  1.30***  1.22*** 
     (1.07)  (3.71)  (4.75)  (4.29) 
FIRM'S CENTRALITY      -0.08**  -0.10***  -0.10*** 
(Quadratic)      (-3.16)  (-4.06)  (-3.83)    
PARTNER'S EMBEDDEDNESS    0.20º  -0.13  -0.30  -0.23 
     (1.78)  (-0.32)  (-0.93)  (-0.71)    
PARTNER'S EMBEDDEDNESS      0.02  0.03  0.03 
(Quadratic)      (0.62)  (1.04)  (0.91) 
PARTNER'S COMPETENCES    0.07  -0.10  -0.09  -0.07 
     (0.87)  (-0.18)  (-0.17)  (-0.14)    
PARTNER'S COMPETENCES      0.01  0.01  0.01 
(Quadratic)      (0.32)  (0.27)  (0.28) 
COORDINATION NEED    -0.10  0.00  -0.18  -0.14 
     (-1.47)  (-0.00)  (-0.50)  (-0.39)    


























(Quadratic)        (-0.09)  (0.31)  (0.09) 
TRUST           0.01  0.12 
         (0.09)  (0.11) 
TRUST          0.00 
(Quadratic)          (-0.06)    
CULTURAL FIT        0.18º  0.28 
         (1.72)  (0.80) 
CULTURAL FIT          -0.01 
(Quadratic)          (-0.36)    
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER        0.34*  0.17 
         (2.30)  (0.41) 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER          0.01 
(Quadratic)          (0.25) 
FIRM'S MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMEMENT      -0.03  0.30 
         (-0.48)  (0.78) 
FIRM'S MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMEMENT        -0.03 
(Quadratic)          (-0.79)    
PARTNER'S MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT      0.10  0.17 
         (1.11)  (0.52) 
PARTNER'S MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT        -0.01 
(Quadratic)          (-0.20)    
TECHNICAL INFORMALITY        0.03  -0.12 
         (0.43)  (-0.32)    
TECHNICAL INFORMALITY          0.02 
(Quadratic)          (0.43) 
COMMERCIAL INFORMALITY        0.15*  -0.15 
         (2.16)  (-0.46)    



























(Quadratic)              (0.97) 
   _cons  -0.19  -1.86  2.40  -0.55  -1.05 
     (-0.15)  (-1.07)  (0.88)  (-0.21)  (-0.27)    
   N  132  130  130  130  130 
   R-sq  35.1%  41.3%  49.5%  58.1%  59.5% 
   adj. R-sq  29.1%  32.4%  38.6%  45.4%  43.2% 
   F  7.5  2.17  2.87  2.18  0.52 
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Frans Stel 
Improving the performance of co-innovation alliances 
Cooperating effectively with new business partners 
 
There  is  little  doubt  that  open  Innovation  can  boost  the  performance  of  new  business 
development, where it enables higher R & D output and faster market introduction at lower 
costs.  It  is  considered  to  have  become  the  dominant  innovation  model  and  therefore  a 
necessity  in  the  competitive  world  of  modern  business  practice.  Unfortunately,  open 
innovation is difficult to implement due to increased complexities. The main objective of this 
study is to develop and test a theoretical and evidence-based framework in order to improve 
the performance of co-innovation alliances. The research questions are (1) Which factors and 
processes are known to diagnose and manage co-innovation alliances? (2) How do they differ in the 
case of different objectives? (3) Which changes result in higher performance? and (4) How do the 
factors and processes relate to one another? In this study, facilitating and blocking factors and 
processes  are  transferred  into  performance  indicating  scales.  We  base  our  scales  on 
contributions of contingency, network, organizational learning, and resource-based theory as 
well as research on joint ventures, strategic alliances and inter-firm cooperation. A framework 
is  developed  consisting  of  dependent  variables  (commercial,  technological  and  financial 
performance),  independent  variables  (organizational  and  relationship  drivers)  and  control 
variables  (characteristics  regarding  the  alliance,  market  and  strategy).  Following  principal 
component analysis, scales are constructed which show the relationship to performance of 
various  drivers:  contract,  coordination,  competences,  embeddedness,  governance  structure,  trust, 
culture, technology transfer, management involvement and personal relations. Based on data from 
questionnaire guided interviews involving 137 co-innovation partnerships in 51 companies, and 
using  multivariate  regressions  analysis,  hypotheses  are  tested  and  interaction  effects  are 
explored. The study reveals evidence that various organizational and relational drivers are 
linearly or curvilinearly (U-shaped or hill-shaped) related to performance and differ according 
to the type of performance, industry and project maturity. Furthermore, optimal levels of the 
drivers are indicated. Improving the performance of co-innovation is considered to be a multi-
level  challenge,  in  which  the  individual,  team,  organizational  and  inter-organizational  level 
interact with one another. By optimizing the relevant drivers at the appropriate time, the 
performance  of  co-innovation  alliances  can  be  improved.  The  framework  serves  as  a 
benchmark tool for co-innovation alliances.  
 
 
 